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THE LOST FRUITS OF 
WATERLOO 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

H1W YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO • DALLAS 
ATLANTA • SAN FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN & CO., Limited 

LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltdu 

TORONTO 



The 
Lost Fruits of Waterloo 



BY 
JOHN SPENCER BASSETT, Ph.D., LL.D. 

Author of "Life of Andrew Jackson," "A Short History 

of the United States," "The Middle Group 

of American Historians," "The 

Federalist System," etc. 



Km flork 

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

1918 

All rightt reterved 






Copyright, 1918 
By THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 



Set up and printed. Published April, 1918 



niM 



_ 3 \s\a 



©CI.A495961 



PREFACE 

This book was begun under the influence 
of the enthusiasm aroused by President Wilson's 
address to Congress on January 22, 1917. It 
was then that he first gave definite utterance of 
his plan for a league, or federation, of nations to 
establish a permanent peace. The idea had long 
been before the world, but it was generally dis- 
missed as too impracticable for the support of 
serious minded men. By taking it up the Presi- 
dent brought it into the realm of the possible. 
In the presence of the great world catastrophe 
that hung over us it seemed well to dare much 
in order that we might avoid a repetition of 
existing evils. And if the idea was worth trying, 
it was certainly worth a careful examination in 
the light of history. It was with the hope of 
making such a careful examination that I set 
to work on the line of thought that has led to 
this book. 



vi PREFACE 

As my work has progressed the great drama 
has been unfolding itself with terrible realism. 
New characters have come upon the stage, char- 
acters not contemplated in the original cast of 
the play. At the same time some of the old 
parts have undergone such changes that they 
appear in new relations. I am not unmindful 
of the fact that events now unforeseen may make 
other and radical changes in the dramatis 
persona? before this book is placed in the hand 
of the reader. But always the great problem 
must be the same, the prevention of a return to 
the present state of world madness. That end 
we must ever keep in mind as we consider the 
arguments here advanced, and any inconsistency 
discovered between the argument and the actual 
state of events will, I hope, be treated with as 
much leniency as the transitions of the situation 
seem to warrant. 

As I write, many things indicate that the great 
conflict is approaching dissolution. The ex- 
haustion of the nations, the awakening voices 
of the masses, the evident failure of militarism 
to lead Germany to world empire, the rising 
spectre of the international solidarity of the 



PREFACE vii 

laborers, and many other portents seem to show 
that the world will soon have to say "yes" or 
"no" to the plain question: "Shall we, or shall 
we not, have a union of nations to promote per- 
manent peace?" 

The warning that they must answer the ques- 
tion is shouted to many classes. Bankers are 
threatened with the repudiation of the securities 
of the greatest nations, manufacturers may soon 
see their vast gains swallowed up in the destruc- 
tion of the forms of credit which hitherto have 
seemed most substantial, churches and every 
form of intellectual life that should promote 
civilization may have their dearest ideals swept 
away in a rush toward radicalism, and even the 
German autocracy is fighting for its life against 
an infuriated and despairing proletariat. Are 
not these dangers enough to make us ask if the 
old menace shall continue? 

It is not my purpose to answer all the ques- 
tions I ask. It is sufficient to unfold the situa- 
tion and show how it has arisen out of the past. 
If the reader finds that mistakes were once made, 
he will have to consider the means of correcting 
them. No pleader can compel the opinions of 



Vlll 



PREFACE 



intelligent men and women. It is enough if he 
lays the case before clear and conscientious minds 
in an impersonal way. More than this he should 
not try to do: as much as this I have sought to 
do. If the world really lost the fruits of its 
victory over a world conqueror at Waterloo, it is 
for the citizen of today to say in what way the 
lost fruits can be recovered. 

Many friends have aided me in my efforts to 
present my views to the public, and among them 
Dr. Frederick P. Keppel, Dean of Columbia 
University, deserves special acknowledgment. I 
am also under obligation to Dean Ada C. Corn- 
stock, of Smith College, for very careful proof- 
reading. But for the opinions here expressed 
and the errors which may be discovered I alone 
am responsible. 

John Spencer Bassett. 
Northampton, Massachusetts, 
February 5, 1918. 



INTRODUCTION 

The nations of Europe fought a great war to a 
finish a hundred and two years ago, defeating a 
master leader of men and ending the ambitions 
of a brilliantly organized nation. They were so 
well satisfied with their achievement that they 
imagined that peace, won after many years of 
suffering, was a sufficient reward for their sac- 
rifices. To escape impending subjugation 
seemed enough good fortune for the moment. 
They forgot that it was a principle and not 
merely a man they had been contending against, 
and when they had made sure that Napoleon was 
beyond the possibility of a return to power, they 
thought the future was secure. But the prin- 
ciple lived and has come to life again. It was 
the inherent tendency to unification in govern- 
ment, a principle that appeals to the national 
pride of most peoples when they find themselves 
in a position to make it operate to the supposed 
advantage of their own country. It has been 



x INTRODUCTION 

seized upon by the Germans in our own genera- 
tion, to whom it has been as glittering a prize as it 
was to the Frenchmen of the early nineteenth 
century. To conquer the world and win a place 
in the sun is no mean ideal; and if the efforts of 
the Entente allies succeed in defeating it in its 
present form, it is reasonably certain that it will 
appear again to distress the future inhabitants of 
the earth, unless sufficient steps are taken to 
bind it down by bonds which cannot be broken. 

This conviction has led to the suggestion that 
when Germany is beaten, as she must be beaten, 
steps should be taken, not only to insure that she 
shall not again disturb the earth, but that no other 
power coming after her shall lay the foundations 
and form the ambition which will again put the 
world to the necessity of fighting the present war 
over again. When the North broke the bonds of 
slavery in the South in 1865 it was filled with 
a firm determination that slavery should stay 
broken. In the same way, when the nations shall 
have put down the menace of world domination 
now rampant in Europe, they should make it their 
.first concern to devise a means by which the 
menace shall stay broken. 



INTRODUCTION xi 

To kill a principle demands a principle equally 
strong and inclusive. No one nation can keep 
down war and subjugation; for it must be so 
strong to carry out that purpose that it becomes 
itself a conqueror. It would be as intolerable to 
Germany, for example, to be ruled by the United 
States as it would be to the United States if they 
were ruled by Germany. The only restraint that 
will satisfy all the nations will be exercised by 
some organ of power in which all have fair repre- 
sentation and in which no nation is able to do 
things which stimulate jealousy and give grounds 
for the belief that some are being exploited by 
others. This suggestion does not demand a well 
integrated federal government for all the func- 
tions of the state but merely the adoption of a 
system of cooperation with authority over the 
outbreak of international war and strong enough 
to make its will obeyed. It is federation for only 
one purpose and such a purpose as will never 
be brought into vital action as long as the feder- 
ated will is maintained at such a point of strength 
and exercised with such a degree of fairness that 
individual states will not question that will. 

This principle of federated action for a specific 



xii INTRODUCTION 

purpose was adopted by the United States in 
1789, and though hailed by the practical states- 
men of Europe as an experiment, it has proved 
the happiest form of government that has yet 
been established over a vast territory in which are 
divergent economic and social interests. In it 
is much more integration than would exist in a 
federated system to prevent war, where the 
action of the central authority would be limited to 
one main object. If it could be formed and put 
into operation by the present generation, who 
know so well what it costs to beat back the spectre 
of world conquest it might pass through the pre- 
liminary critical stages of its existence success- 
fully. At any rate, the world is full of the feel- 
ing that such things may be possible, and it would 
be unwise to dismiss the suggestion without giv- 
ing it fair and full consideration. 

The discussion brings up what seems to be a 
law of human activities, that as the ages run and 
as men develop their minds they combine in 
larger and larger units for carrying on the par- 
ticular thing they are interested in. And they 
make these combinations by force or through 
mutual agreement. We have before us the con- 



INTRODUCTION xiii 

sideration of the most important form of this 
unifying process, the unification of nations, 
which has generally come through force, but 
sometimes has come through agreement. 

In recent industrial history is a parallel process 
so well illustrating the point at issue that I 
can not refrain from mentioning it. In his book, 
My Four Years in Germany, Mr. James W. 
Gerard contrasts great industrial combinations in 
the United States and Germany. In one coun- 
try are trusts, in the other great companies 
known as cartels. The development of the trust 
we know well. It came out of a process of com- 
petitive war. Some large manufacturer who 
possessed ability for war, formed an initial group 
of manufacturers with the prospect of controlling 
a large part of the market. He was careful to 
see that his own group had the best possible or- 
ganization, central control, and a loyal body of 
subordinates. Then he opened his attack on his 
smaller rivals, and in most cases they were driven 
into surrender or bankruptcy. It was a hard 
process, but it led to industrial unity with its 
many advantages. 

The cartel began with co-operation. All the 



xiv INTRODUCTION 

persons or companies manufacturing a given 
article were asked to unite in its creation. They 
pooled their resources, adopted common buying 
and selling agencies, and shared the returns 
amicably. They proved very profitable for the 
shareholders, and they strengthened the national 
industry in its competition against foreigners. 
In the United ^States the trust has been unpopu- 
lar, despite its many economic advantages. The 
reason is the battle-like methods by which it de- 
stroyed its rivals. The result was the enactment 
of laws to restrain its development, laws so con- 
trary to the trend of the times that they have 
been very tardily enforced. The cartel, estab- 
lished with the co-operation of the whole group 
of manufacturers, aroused no antagonism and 
obtained the approval of the laws. It is not nec- 
essary to say which is the better of these two 
methods of arriving at the same object. 

Turning to the subject with which we are here 
chiefly concerned, it is interesting to note that 
Germany has undertaken in the last years to 
carry forward her world expansion by methods 
that are entirely different. While she has feder- 
ated in industrial life she appears in her foreign 



INTRODUCTION xv 

relations as a true representative of the spirit 
that built up the trusts. She means to unify 
her competitor states, not as she has united her 
industries, but as the American trusts secured the 
whole field of operations. First she forms a 
small group with herself at the head. In the 
group are Germany, Austria, Turkey, and, later 
on, Bulgaria. At this stage of her progress she 
has gone as far as the Standard Oil Company had 
gone when Mr. Rockefeller had perfected the 
idea of the "trust" in 1882. Her next step was 
to attack her rivals. France she would crush at 
a blow, first lulling Great Britain to inactivity 
by feigned friendship and the promise of gains 
in the Near East. Then she would do what she 
would with Russia. With these two nations dis- 
posed of, Britain, the unready, could be easily 
brought to terms, and the United States would 
then be at her mercy. The mass of German peo- 
ple had not, perhaps, reasoned the process out in 
this way; but it was so easily seen that it could 
not have escaped the minds of the leaders of the 
German military party. No trust builder ever 
made fairer plans for the upbuilding of his enter- 
prise than these gentlemen made for putting 



xvi INTRODUCTION 

through their combination, before which they 
saw in their minds the states of the world top- 
pling. So well were the plans made and so 
efficient were the strokes that the utmost efforts 
of the rest of the world have become necessary to 
defeat the German hopes. 

The United States have approached the prob- 
lem of world relations in another spirit. Reject- 
ing the spirit of the trust magnate, which 
Germany accepted, we have turned to co-opera- 
tion as the means of avoiding international 
competition and distrust. President Wilson's 
repeated suggestions of a federated peace are 
couched in the exact spirit of the cartel. He 
asks that war may be replaced by co-operation, 
pointing out the tremendous advantage to all 
if the machinery of competition can be discarded. 

Viewed in its largest aspects, therefore, the 
present struggle has resolved itself into a debate 
over the amount of unity that shall in the future 
exist between states. It does not seem possible 
that Austria will ever be a thoroughly sovereign 
state again, nor that Turkey will escape from 
the snare in which her feet are caught. What 
degree of unity this will engender between 



INTRODUCTION xvii 

France and Great Britain, if the old system of 
international relations continues, it is not hard 
to guess. And as for the small states of Europe, 
their future is very perplexing. 

This much rests on the assumption that Ger- 
many and her allied neighbours are going to 
make peace without defeat and without victory. 
If they should be able to carry off a triumph, 
which now seems impossible, it would not be hard 
to tell in what manner unification would come. 
However the result, the separateness of Euro- 
pean states will probably be diminished, and 
their interdependence, either in two large group- 
ings or in some more or less strong general 
grouping, will be increased. 

No wise man will undertake to say which form 
of interdependence will be the result. But it 
seems certain that we stand today with two roads 
before us, each leading to the same end, a stronger 
degree of unity. One goes by way of German 
domination, the other by way of equal and mutual 
agreement. I do not need to say which will be 
pleasanter to those who travel. We cannot 
stand at the crossing forever: some day we shall 
pass down one of the roads. It is said that the 



xviii INTRODUCTION 

world is not yet ready to choose the second road, 
and that it must go on in the old way, fighting 
off attempts at domination, until it learns the 
advantages of co-operation. It may be so; but 
meanwhile it is a glorious privilege to strike a 
blow, however weak, in behalf of reason. 



CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Introduction ix 

CHAPTER 

I The Question of Permanent Peace ... 1 

II Early Advocates of Universal Peace . . 23 

III Problems of the Napoleonic Wars ... 43 

IV Europe Under the Concert of the Powers 65 

V The Later Phases of the Concert of Eu- 
rope 83 

VI The Balkan States 103 

VII German Ideals and Organization . . .132 

VIII The Failure of the Old European System 154 

IX If the Submarines Fail 184 

X Obstacles to an Enduring Peace . . . 205 

XI Arguments for a Federation of States . . 229 

XII A Federation of Nations 254 



THE LOST FRUITS OF 
WATERLOO 

CHAPTER I 

THE QUESTION OF PERMANENT PEACE 

When war broke over the world three years 
ago many ministers and other people declared 
that Armageddon had come. They had in mind 
a tradition founded on a part of the sixteenth 
chapter of Revelations, in which the prophet was 
supposed to describe a vision of the end of the 
world. In that awful day seven angels appeared 
with seven vials of wrath, and the contents of each 
when poured out wiped away something that was 
dear to the men of the earth. The sixth angel 
poured out on the waters of the river Euphrates, 
and they were dried up ; and then unclean spirits 
issued from the mouths of the dragons and of 
other beasts and from the mouth of the false 
prophet, and they went into the kings of the 
earth, then the political rulers of mankind, and 



2 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

induced them to bring the people together "to 
the battle of that great day of God Almighty." 
And the armies met at Armageddon and fought 
there the last battle of time. This striking fig- 
ure made a deep impression on the early Chris- 
tians, and out of it arose the belief that some 
day would come a great and final war, in which 
the nations of the earth would unite for their 
mutual destruction, after which the spirit of 
righteousness would establish a millennial reign 
of peace. And so when most of the nations of 
the world came together in war in 1914, many 
persons pronounced the struggle the long ex- 
pected Armageddon. 

It was easy to say in those days of excitement 
that this war was going to be the last. Madness 
it certainly was, and surely a mad world would 
come back to reasonableness after a season of 
brutal destruction. Common sense, humanity, 
and the all powerful force of economic interest 
would bring the struggle to an end, and then by 
agreement steps would be taken to make a recur- 
rence of the situation impossible. 

It was in the days when we still had confidence 
in civilization. Humanity, we said, had devel- 



PERMANENT PEACE 3 

oped to such an extent that it could not return to 
the chaos that an age of war would imply. Inter- 
national law was still considered a binding body 
of morality, if not of actual law. International 
public opinion was believed to have power to pun- 
ish national wrong-doers. We who teach said as 
much to our classes many times in those days of 
innocence. In all sincerity we felt that a nation 
could not do this or that thing because public 
opinion would not tolerate it. How far distant 
seem now the days of early summer in 1914! 

We had adopted many specific rules to re- 
strain needless barbarity in war. For example, 
we would not use dum-dum bullets, nor drop 
bombs on non-combatants, nor shell the homes of 
innocent dwellers on the seashore. It was con- 
sidered an achievement of the civilized spirit that 
an army occupying enemy territory would re- 
spect the rights of the non-combatant inhabitants, 
set guards over private property, protect women 
and children from injury, and permit civilians to 
go about their business as long as they did not in- 
termeddle with military matters. In three and 
a half horrible years we have drifted a long 
way from these protestations. Those of us who 



4 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

once studied the elements of international law 
may well study them again when the war is over, 
if, indeed, international law is still thought worth 
studying. 

In the vision the angel poured out his vial on 

the great river, to the early men of Mesapotamia 
the symbol of the great waters. In our own day 
we have seen strange engines of wrath placed in 
the great waters, foul spirits that destroy men 
and ships in disregard of the rules of fair fighting. 
And out of the mouths of dragons and other 
loathsome beasts, and of false prophets as well, 
evil spirits have issued in these sad days. They 
have taken their places in the hearts and minds 
of self-willed men and made beasts of them; so 
that the rest of humanity have had to fight against 
them and suffer themselves to be killed by them, 
in order that the wicked shall not triumph over 
the whole earth. 

The war has been gruesome beyond the imagi- 
nation of man. No other recorded experience 
has told us of so much killing, and of so many 
different ways of killing. Men have been slain 
with swords, cannon, great howitzers, rifles, 
machine guns, tanks, liquid fire, electrified wires, 



PERMANENT PEACE 5 

and finally with the germs of disease deliberately 
planted. Nothing that science could invent for 
destroying human life has been omitted, except, 
possibly, dum-dum bullets; and in view of the 
use of much more cruel means we may well ask, 
"Why not dum-dums also?" 

We must admit that if the author of the Book 
of Revelations had prophetic insight and foresaw 
the world struggle that now is, he did not over- 
paint its terrors. And so, asks the man of faith, 
if the first part of the vision comes true, why 
may not the second part likewise come true? 
If the seer could foresee the war and its horrors, 
may he not also have spoken truly when he fore- 
told that after Armageddon wars would be no 
more; for God would wipe away the desire for 
them from the hearts of men ? 

To this question I answer: If a man is left 
in the world when this conflict is ended who 
glories in deliberate war, he is too bad to live in 
civilized society. Certain it is that the vast 
majority of men and women are already con- 
vinced that the desire for war, henceforth and 
forever, is wiped out of their hearts. In the 
stress of actual battle or in the preparations to 



6 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

sustain those who fight they may forget the 
fundamental folly of the whole thing for the time ; 
but it is always at the bottom of their hearts. 
What is the human power of reasoning worth, 
if it is not able to devise some way to escape 
from this obsession of self -slaughter? 

Do not be deceived by the strut of Mars. His 
Day has come with a vengeance. He has shot 
up rapidly, like a jimson-weed, and blossomed 
like a cactus. We may have laughed at him in 
the days of peace, but we now look to him for 
protection. We cannot decry the men who are 
dying for us, dying in the best sportsmanslike 
manner. But we do not like their business as a 
business, and we wish at the bottom of our hearts 
that it were abolished as a peril to humanity. 
And we believe that of all who hate war, none 
hate it more than those who are actually righting 
in this struggle. Let us give Mars his Day and 
all the glory that belongs to it, but let us not 
forget peace while we serve war. 

Nor should we be deceived by the pallid paci- 
fist. He has his counterpart in every struggle; 
and in general he serves some good purpose in 
a multitude of opinions. But the day of stress 



PERMANENT PEACE 7 

and world crisis is not his Day; and the practical 
world loses little time in putting him in his place. 
The pacifist does not represent the peace move- 
ment in its freest and most significant form. 
The advocates of peace today who are best serv- 
ing its promotion are those who are out in the 
armies bent on putting down that nation who is 
the most dangerous enemy of peace. 

These men are not mere pieces of machinery 
in a great driving process. They are thinking 
men with political power in their hands, either 
actually or potentially. War is a great school- 
teacher. It has lasted in our own time nearly as 
long as a course in college. The soldiers who 
survive from the beginning of this conflict may 
now be considered as more than half through 
their senior year. They know what war is and 
what it means, and they know something about 
the necessary form of cooperation that must 
exist in any society before the will of the people 
can be carried into effect. They knew little 
about war four years ago : they now know all the 
professors know. Behind the lines and here in 
our homes one never sees man nor woman who 
does not admit that it would be a blessing to 



8 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

make war impossible ; but few of us have any idea 
how to go about getting it made impossible. 
Many of us think we shall never get people to 
act together in such a cause. But it seems un- 
reasonable to expect that men who have raided 
through "No Man's Land," captured trenches 
and defeated great armies through organization 
and initiative should quail before the inertia 
of opinion, perhaps the chief obstacle confronting 
those who labor for a cooperative peace. 

The example of the Russians is a useful point 
in this connection. At the beginning of the war 
their armies were as machine-like as any armies 
could be. The privates were generally peasants 
who did not know why they fought, and who cer- 
tainly had nothing to say about the origin of the 
war. They were typical "cannon-fodder," and 
as unthinking as any modern soldier can be. 
They have learned much from less than three 
years of war. They slowly acquired purpose, 
a sense of organization, and leaders whom they 
follow. Having made this progress they over- 
threw the imperial government, drove away the 
great nobles, put an ensign in the place of a 
former grand duke and two exiles in the seats, 



PERMANENT PEACE 9 

of the highest officials, and stripped the high- 
est born army officers of their titles and in- 
signia. 

At the present writing they are holding out 
against all attempts to overthrow them, they are 
playing the diplomatic game with Germany 
without discredit, 1 and they are reported to be 
shaking the foundations of autocracy in Austria. 
At any rate, it must be confessed that a small 
group of the Russian "cannon-fodder" have 
made commendable progress in the process of 
education during the last ten months. The 
process seems to have been under the direction 
of the socialists, a small but well organized group 
of intelligent persons who do not lack initiative. 
It is they who are educating the Russian peasants 
into political self-expression. 

The possible results of this incident are tre- 
mendous. Nowhere else in the world have the 
agricultural classes fallen into one party with 
vigorous and trained leaders. If Russia is now 
embarking on an era of representative govern- 

i Since the above was written events have occurred in Russia 
which seem to discredit the diplomacy of the revolutionists; but 
the general situation is so unsettled that no conclusions can be 
drawn at this time, February 27, 1918. 



10 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

ment, as seems probable, she is passing through 
a stage in which political parties are being 
crystallized. So far, it does not appear that any- 
considerable party is organized in the vast empire 
on what we should call a conservative basis. It 
will be an interesting experiment in political 
history if Russia has a great peasant party in 
control of the administration. 

The party that now controls Russia is com- 
mitted to the idea of a peace through the co- 
operation of the nations. It is true that inter- 
nationalism goes further than mere federation of 
nations ; for it also implies the socialization of in- 
dustry, the equal distribution of property. In 
short, it is the internationalism and unification of 
the industrial classes in all nations for a com- 
bined opposition to capital. With these aims 
we shall, probably, not be pleased. But they 
imply the destruction of war; and it now seems 
possible that Russia will stand before the world, 
at least until the radical elements fall before 
conservatives, as the most prominent champion 
of cooperative peace. 

As to the socialistic purpose of the interna- 
tionalists, it stands apart logically from that fea- 



PERMANENT PEACE 11 

ture of their doctrine that relates to the mere 
cooperation of nations. They would say, prob- 
ably, that cooperation is but incidental to their 
main desire, the unification of the workers of 
the world. But it is right to expect that they 
would support cooperation among the nations 
to obtain the destruction of war, since it would 
make it easier for the world to accept their other 
ideals. On the other hand the man who opposes 
internationalism as such, could accept the aid of 
a radical Russia in obtaining federated peace, 
without feeling that in doing so he was necessarily 
contributing to the promotion of the socialistic 
features of internationalism. 

This remarkable shifting of power in Russia 
has had its counterpart on a less impressive scale 
in other countries. Whether it comes to the 
point of explosion or not, there is in the minds 
of all — the thoughtful people, the working-men, 
and all intermediate classes — a growing belief 
that a new idea should rule the relations of 
nations among themselves. From an age of in- 
ternational competition they are turning to the 
hope of an era of international agreement; and 
it does not appear that their influence will be un- 



12 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

heeded when men come to face steadily the 
problems the war is sure to leave behind it. 

Most notable influence of all in behalf of a 
federated peace is the position taken by Presi- 
dent Wilson. In the beginning of this conflict 
he had the scholar's horror of warfare, and he has 
taken more than one opportunity to suggest the 
formation of a league of nations to prevent the 
outbreak of future wars. His address to Con- 
gress on January 22, 1917, was a notable pre- 
sentation of the idea to the world. Enthusiastic 
hearers pronounced the occasion a turning-point 
in history. Whether a league of nations is es- 
tablished or not, according to the president's 
desires, his support of the idea has given it a 
great push forward. He has taken it out of the 
realm of the ideal and made it a practical thing, 
to be discussed gravely in the cabinets of rulers. 

A year after the question has been brought 
forward, it should be possible to form an opinion 
of the attitude of European nations in regard 
to the suggestion. From all of them, including 
Germany and Austria, have come courteous 
allusions to the idea of the president; and the 
pope has given it his support. But it is not 



PERMANENT PEACE 13 

clear that all are sincerely in favor of a logically 
constituted league that will have power to do 
what it is expected to do. That President Wil- 
son will continue to urge steps in this direction 
is to be taken as certain. The measure of his 
success will be the amount of hearty and sub- 
stantial support he has from that large class of 
people who still ask: "Can't something be done 
to stop war forever?" 

When this page is being written the news- 
papers are full of a discussion of the two speeches 
that came from the central powers on January 
25, 1918, one from Chancellor von Hertling of 
Germany, and the other from Count Czernin, of 
Austria. In the former is the following utter- 
ance: 

"I am sympathetically disposed, as my political activity 
shows, toward every idea which eliminates for the future 
a possibility or a probability of war, and will promote 
a peaceful and harmonious collaboration of nations. If the 
idea of a bond of nations, as suggested by President 
Wilson, proves on closer examination really to be conceived 
in a spirit of complete justice and complete impartiality 
toward all, then the imperial government is gladly ready, 
when all other pending questions have been settled, to 
begin the examination of the basis of such a bond of na- 
tions." 



14 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

This very guarded utterance means much or 
little, as the German rulers may hereafter deter- 
mine. By offering impossible conditions of what 
they may pronounce "complete justice and com- 
plete impartiality to all" they may be able to 
nullify whatever promise may be incorporated in 
it. On the other hand, the sentiment, if accepted 
in a fair spirit and without exaggerated demands, 
may be a real step toward realizing President 
Wilson's desires. If, for example, Germany 
should insist, as a condition for the formation 
of a "bond of nations," that Great Britain give 
up her navy, or dismantle Gibraltar, while she 
herself retained her immense Krupp works and 
her power to assemble her army at a moment's 
notice, it is hardly likely the demand would be 
granted. We can best know what Germany 
will do in this matter when we see to what ex- 
tent she is willing to acknowledge that her war 
is a failure and that her military policy is a 
vast and expensive affair that profits nothing. 
Moreover, there is a slight sneer in the chan- 
cellor's words, as though he does not consider the 
president's idea entirely within the range of the 
diplomacy of experienced statesmen; and this is 



PERMANENT PEACE 15 

not very promising for the outcome — unless, 
indeed, the logic of future events opens his eyes 
to the meaning of the new spirit that the war has 
aroused. 

Among our own allies the suggestion of our 
president has found a kinder reception. Mr. 
Lloyd George has announced his general support 
of the proposition, and Lord Bryce and others 
have given it cordial indorsement. It seems 
that if the United States urges the formation 
of a league of peace, she will have the coopera- 
tion of Great Britain. As to the position of 
France and Italy, the matter is not so clear. 
They probably are too deeply impressed by the 
danger they will ever face from powerful neigh- 
bors to feel warranted in dismissing their armies, 
unless the best assurance is given that Germany 
and Austria accept federated peace in all good 
faith. 

As the contending nations approach that state 
of exhaustion which presages an end of the war, 
the question of such a peace becomes increasingly 
important. Everything points to the conclusion 
that the time has arrived to debate this subject. 
If the hopes of August, 1914, that Armageddon 



16 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

would be succeeded by an era of permanent 
peace are to be realized, they will not come with- 
out the serious thought of men who are willing 
to dare something for their ideals. And if they 
come out of the present cataclysm it is time to 
be up and doing. The sentiment that exists in 
this country, and in other countries, must be 
organized and made effective at the critical 
moment. There is nothing more dispiriting to 
the student of history than to observe as he reads 
how many favorable moments for turning some 
happy corner in the progress of humanity were 
allowed to pass without effort to utilize them. 
It has been a hundred years since the world had 
another opportunity like this that faces us, and 
if it is not now tried out to the utmost possibility, 
there is little hope that the next century will be as 
bloodless as the past has been, even with the 
present conflict included. 

Every general war in Europe since the days 
of the Roman Empire has brought humanity 
there to a state of exhaustion similar to that 
which now exists. So it was with the Thirty 
Years' War, with the wars inaugurated by Louis 
XIV to establish the predominance of France, 



PERMANENT PEACE 17 

and with the Napoleonic wars a century ago. 
Each of these struggles, it will be observed, ex- 
tended to a larger portion of Europe than its 
predecessor; and it was because the common in- 
terests of nations were progressively stronger; 
for it was ever becoming so that what concerned 
one state concerned others. In the present war 
the interrelations of nations is such that Japan 
and the United States have been brought into the 
conflict, along with China and several of the 
smaller American states. If the conflict recurs 
in the future it may be expected to involve a 
still wider area. 

There is evidence that in each of these strug- 
gles the humane men then living were filled with 
the same longing for permanent peace that many 
men feel today. 1 The feeling was especially 
strong during the last stages of the Napoleonic 
wars and immediately after they ended. Singu- 
larly enough it was strongest in Russia, due, how- 
ever to the accident that an enthusiastic and 
idealistic tsar was ruling in that country. He 
had received his ideals from a French tutor who 
was deeply imbued with the equality theories 

i See below, pp. 46-62, 



18 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

of the revolution that swept over his own country. 
The tsar accepted them with sincerity and spent 
several years of conscientious effort in his at- 
tempts to have them adopted. More singularly 
still, they found their only sincere indorsement, 
among the rulers who had the right to indorse or 
reject, with the king of Prussia, who at that time 
was a very religious man. Most peculiar of all 
they found very strong opposition in England, 
where practical statesmen were in power. As I 
read the history of that day and reflect on what 
has been the train of events from the battle of 
Waterloo to the invasion of Belgium in 1914, it 
is hard to keep from wishing that a better effort 
had been made in 1815 to carry out the sugges- 
tion which the tsar urged on his royal brothers 
in Europe. 

The defeat of Napoleon was purchased at im- 
mense sacrifices. To the people of the day the 
most desirable thing in the world seemed to be a 
prevention of his reappearance to trouble man- 
kind. They took the greatest care to keep his 
body a prisoner until he was dead; but they did 
not seriously try to lay his ghost. Probably 
they did not think, being practical men, that his 



PERMANENT PEACE 19 

spirit would walk again in the earth. They 
were mistaken; for not only has the ghost come 
back, but it has come with increased power and 
subtlety. In fact, it was an old ghost, and having 
once inhabited the bodies of Louis XIV, Augus- 
tus Caesar, and Alexander of Macedon, as well as 
that of Napoleon I, it knew much more than 
the grave gentlemen who undertook to arrange 
the future of Europe in practical ways in 1815. 

As we approach again the re-making of our 
relations after a world war, it is worth while to 
glance over the things that were done in 1815, to 
understand what choice of events was presented 
to the men of that day, and what results came 
from the course they deliberately decided to 
follow. Thus we may know whether or not the 
course proved a happy one, and whether or not 
it is the course that we, also, should follow. And 
if it is not such a course, we ought as thinking 
people to try to adopt a better. 

We should always remember that the condi- 
tions of today are more suitable to a wise decision 
than the conditions of 1815. We have, for one 
thing, the advantage of the experience of the 
past hundred years. There is no doubt in our 



20 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

minds as to how the old plan has worked and 
how it may be expected to work if again followed. 
It led to the Concert of Europe and the Balance 
of Power, both of which served in certain emer- 
gencies, but failed in the hour of supreme need. 
Indeed, it is probable that they promoted the 
crash that at last arrived. 

Another advantage is that we have today in 
the world a vastly greater amount of democracy 
than in 1815. The people who pay the bills of 
Mars today can say what shall be done about 
keeping Mars in chains; and that is something 
they could not do in 1815. It is for them to know 
all his capers, and his clever ways of getting out 
of prison, and to look under his shining armor to 
see the grizzly hairs that cover his capacious ribs ; 
and having done this to decide what will be their 
attitude toward him. 

It is not the business of an author to offer 
his views to his reader ready made. Enough if 
he offers the material facts out of which the 
reader may form his own opinions. That is my 
object in this book. I do not disguise my con- 
viction that some of the fruits of the war that 
ended at Waterloo were lost through the inex- 



PERMANENT PEACE 91 

perience of the men who set the world on its 
course again. Whether or not the men were as 
wise as they should have been is now a profit- 
less inquiry. My only object is to set before 
the reader as clearly as I can the idea of a per- 
manent peace through federated action, to show 
how that idea came up in connection with the 
war against Napoleon, how it was rejected for a 
concerted and balanced international system, 
what came of the decision in the century that 
followed, and finally in what way the failure of 
the old system is responsible for the present war. 
If the reader will follow me through these con- 
siderations, he will be prepared to examine in a 
judicial spirit the arguments for and against 
President Wilson's suggested union of nations 
to end war. 

As these introductory remarks are written, we 
seem to be girding up our loins again with the 
firm conviction that we cannot talk of peace until 
Germany knows she is beaten. The decision is 
eminently wise. But if it is worth while to fight 
two or ten years more to crush Germany's con- 
fidence in her military policy, how much ought it 
not to be worth to make the nations realize that 



m THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

if they really wish to destroy war they can do 
it by taking two steps: first, end this struggle 
in a spirit of amity ; and second, make an effective 
agreement to preserve that state of amity by pre- 
venting the occurrence of the things and feelings 
that disturb it. That is the task as well as the 
opportunity of wise men, who can govern them- 
selves; and it is for their information that this 
volume is written which undertakes to point out 
"The Lost Fruits of Waterloo" and the con- 
ditions under which we may seek to recover them. 
It is not a book of propaganda, unless facts are 
propagandists. It is not a pacifist book, al- 
though its pages may make for peace, if God 
wills. It is only a plain statement of the les- 
sons of history as they appear to one of the many 
thousands of puzzled persons now habitants of 
this globe who are trying to grope their ways out 
of this fog of folly. 



CHAPTER II 

EARLY ADVOCATES OF UNIVERSAL PEACE 

Those who have tried to point the world to 
universal peace may be divided into two schools : 
one advocating a form of cooperation in which 
the final reliance is to be reason, the other looking 
forward to some effective form of common action 
behind which shall be sufficient force to carry 
out the measures necessary to enforce the com- 
mon will. It is convenient to describe the former 
group as advocating a league of peace, since we 
are generally agreed that a league is a form of 
concert from which the constituent members may 
withdraw at will, and in which does not reside 
power to force them to do what they do not find 
reasonable. The second group wish to have a 
federation, if by that term we understand a united 
group in which exists power sufficient to pre- 
serve the common cause against any possible 
disobedient member. To form a league is easier 
than to form a federation. States are tenacious 

23 



24 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

of sovereignty. The Swiss cantons, the Dutch 
provinces, and the original thirteen states of 
North America are the most striking illustrations 
of states that were willing to submit themselves 
to the more strenuous process of union. They 
acted under stress of great common peril, and 
their first steps in federation were short and 
timid; but none of them have regretted that the 
steps were taken. It was the good fortune of 
these groups of states that they were able to 
unite at the proper time and that their actions 
were not overclouded by the counsel of "prac- 
tical statesmen" to whom ideals were things to 
be distrusted. 

In other states in periods of great distress from 
war men lived who dreamed of cooperation to 
promote peace, but their voices were too weak for 
the times. The most notable early advocate of 
this scheme was the Duke of Sully, if we may 
accept the notion that he wrote the work known 
as the Grand Design of Henry IV. In that 
plan was contemplated a Christian Republic, 
composed of fifteen states in Europe, only three 
of which were to have a republican form of gov- 
ernment. They were to give up warring among 



ADVOCATES OF UNIVERSAL PEACE 25 

themselves and to refer to a common council, 
modeled on the Ionic League, all matters of 
inter-state relation that were of importance to 
the "very Christian Republic." The only war 
this republic was to wage was the common war 
to expel the Turks from Europe. It was after 
Henry's death that Sully published the plan with 
the assertion that his former master had formed 
it just after the treaty of Vervins, 1598. 

Whether it was the work of king or duke, no 
attempt was made to put it into force. In 1598 
Europe was in the throes of a long and hopeless 
struggle for religion. Cities were destroyed, 
men and women were butchered, and the safety 
of states was threatened. The Grand Design 
represents the reaction of either Henry's or 
Sully's mind against such a terror. It was a 
thing to be desired, if it could have been attained. 
One of the marks of peace that it displayed was 
the attitude it took towards the branches of the 
Christian faith. Complete tolerance was to 
exist for the three forms, Catholicism, Lutheran- 
ism, and Calvinism. This was a kind of idealism 
that was then unattainable; but in the course of 
time it has been achieved. I should not like to 



26 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

say the day will not come when the other side of 
the scheme, interstate peace, will also cease to be 
too ideal for realization. 

The next important suggestion of union for 
peace was made by William Penn in 1693 in an 
Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of 
Europe. At that time the Continent was racked 
with war — a result of the ambition of Louis XIV 
to raise France to a dominating position among 
the other nations — , the Palatinate had been dev- 
astated, and the will of the "Grand Monarch" 
was the dreaded fact in international politics. 
Penn realized that great sacrifices were ahead; 
for it was as true then as now that when a strong 
state rises to a position in which it can threaten 
universal rule, there is nothing for the other 
states but to combine and fight as long as they 
can. 

Penn's proposal was that the sovereigns of 
Europe should form a Great Diet in which all 
their disputes should be adjusted. If any 
state refused to submit to the judgment of the 
diet and appealed to arms, all the other states 
were to fall upon it with their armies and make 
it rue the course it had taken. Quaker though 



ADVOCATES OF UNIVERSAL PEACE 27 

he was, he would have war to prevent war. His 
proposal made no impression on his "practical" 
contemporaries; but he was prepared for that. 
Men of his faith were used to "bearing testi- 
mony" in the expectation that "the world" would 
scoff. Although it was not included in the origi- 
nal folio edition of his works this essay remains 
to this day the best known thing he wrote. It 
is one of the most logical arguments for peace 
that we have. 

From 1701 to 1714 was waged the War of 
the Spanish Succession, the last of the series of 
struggles in which Louis XIV wore out his king- 
dom in trying to make it supreme over its neigh- 
bors. It left France exhausted and miserable, 
and it had not realized the king's ambition. 
In 1713, the year in which Louis was forced to 
accept the Treaty of Utrecht in token of his 
defeat, was published by the Abbe Castel de St. 
Pierre a book called Pro jet de Traite pour rendre 
la Paix Perpetuelle. Like the utterances of 
Sully and Penn, it was wrung out of the mind of 
the author by the ruin that lay around him. It 
differed from them in nothing but in its more 
abundant details. The abbe had taken many 



28" THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

things into account, and the union of nations that 
he proposed was to do six important things. 

1. There was to be a perpetual alliance of 
European rulers with a diet composed of pleni- 
potentiary agents in which disputed points were 
to be settled amicably. 2. What sovereigns 
were to be admitted to the alliance was to be de- 
termined by the act of alliance, which was also 
to fix the proportion in which each should con- 
tribute to the common fund. 3. The union 
was to guarantee the sovereignty of the con- 
stituent states with existing boundaries, and 
future disputes of this nature were to be referred 
to the arbitration of the council. 4. States 
offending against the laws of the diet were to be 
put under the ban of Europe. 5. A state under 
the ban was to be coerced by the other states 
until it accepted the laws it had violated. 6. The 
council was to make such laws, on instruction 
from the sovereigns, as were thought necessary 
to the objects for which the perpetual alliance 
was created. 

Like the two preceding plans the abbe's scheme 
was too strong to be rated as a league. It does 
not allow us to think that a state could withdraw 



ADVOCATES OF UNIVERSAL PEACE 29 

at pleasure from the alliance; and it gave to the 
council the authority to lay taxes, make laws that 
were binding, and punish defiant members. It 
is noteworthy for the large amount of power it 
gave to the sovereigns, since the members of the 
council were their agents and acted only on in- 
structions. Under the prevalent notions of the 
divine right of kings no other method of selecting 
the members of the council would have been 
considered in France, Spain, or Germany. On 
the other hand, the abbe's scheme was less liberal 
in this respect than Penn's, which provided that 
the wisest and justest men in each nation should 
be sent to the council. It was also a part of 
Penn's plan that the council should be a really 
deliberative body, a parliament of Europe as 
truly as there was in England a parliament of the 
realm. 

We have no evidence that the arguments of the 
good abbe made a profound impression upon 
any of the sovereigns upon whose favor the 
scheme depended. The Treaty of Utrecht was 
followed by a season of peace. So deeply 
wounded was Europe by conflict that it had no 
stomach for war during a generation. It was a 



30 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

time of great industrial prosperity in England, 
France, and Prussia. Walpole, the wise guard- 
ian of peaceful society, dominated the first of 
these nations, Fleury, also a man of peace, was 
for a large part of the time the guiding hand 
in the second, and Frederic William I directed 
the development of the third with a sure sense of 
economy and the efficient use of resources. At 
the same time Austria was under the direction of 
Charles VI, a peaceful monarch who had too 
many anxieties at home to think of wars against 
the Christian sovereigns around him. The small 
struggles that occurred were without signifi- 
cance; and it was not until 1740, when a new 
generation was on the scene, that Europe again 
had a period of general war, precipitated by an 
imaginative young king who could not resist 
the temptation to use the excellent tool with 
which his father had provided him. Out of the 
twenty years' struggle that now followed, no 
new plan arose for a system of cooperation to 
secure peace, but one of the great philosophers 
of the time made a new statement of the Abbe 
St. Pierre's plan, which served as a new proposi- 
tion. 



ADVOCATES OF UNIVERSAL PEACE 31 

It was during the last years of the Seven 
Years' War that Rousseau received the papers 
of the good abbe, with the expectation that he 
would prepare them for publication in a more 
popular form than the twenty-one volumes in 
which the author's thoughts were buried. He 
eventually gave up the task, but he produced two 
short summaries, one of which was entitled 
Eootrait dn Projet de Paix perpetuelle de M. 
UAbbe de Saint-Pierre, The "extract" proper 
was followed by a "judgment" in which Rousseau 
voiced his own views. He advocated the creation 
of a confederacy mutually dependent, no state to 
be permitted to resist all the other states united 
nor to form an alliance with any other state in 
rivalry with the confederacy. The scope of the 
central authority was defined, and there was to 
be a legislature to make laws in amplification 
of that authority, such laws to be administered 
by a federal court. No state was to withdraw 
from the union. Thus, Rousseau made his pro- 
posed confederacy rest on force. In his mind it 
was to be vitally efficient government, capable 
of doing all it was created to do. 

All the plans I have mentioned contemplated 



32 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

the creation of a central authority strong enough 
to make itself obeyed. They implied, therefore, 
that each constituent state should relinquish a 
part of its sovereignty in order to form the fed- 
eration. Now this was, as at the present time, a 
strong objection to the scheme. No one has met 
it better than William Penn, who said : 

"I am come now to the last Objection, That Sovereign 
Princes and States will hereby become not Sovereign: a 
Thing they will never endure. But this also, under Cor- 
rection, is a Mistake, for they remain as Sovereign at Home 
as ever they were. Neither their Power over their People, 
nor the usual Revenue they pay them, is diminished: It 
nay be the War Establishment may be reduced, which will 
indeed of Course follow, or be better employed to the Ad- 
vantage of the Publick. So that the Soveraignties are as 
they were, for none of them have now any Soveraignty 
over one another: And if this be called a lessening of their 
Power, it must be only because the great Fish can no 
longer eat up the little ones, and that each Soveraignty is 
equally defended from Injuries, and disabled from com- 
mitting them." 

A quarter of a century later, in the beginning 
of the French Revolution, Jeremy Bentham, the 
English philosopher, advocated the union of 
states in behalf of common peace, but he rested 
his argument on morality, not on force. There 



ADVOCATES OF UNIVERSAL PEACE 33 

was to be a league of states, with a legislature 
and courts of justice, but the decisions were to 
be executed by the states themselves. He held 
that after the court gave a decision in a specified 
case and published the evidence and arguments, 
public opinion would be strong enough to en- 
force the judgment. By discarding force Ben- 
tham had the advantage of preserving the sover- 
eignty of the states, a thing that is particularly 
esteemed by an Englishman. He is to be con- 
sidered the first of a series of eminent peace 
advocates who look no further than a league of 
states bound together by their plighted word and 
relying on the weight of public opinion to coerce 
the individual states. 

He had given his life to the task of fixing the 
sway of law in the minds of humanity, and it was 
a part of his general idea that a high court of jus- 
tice, investigating a controversy, and exposing 
all the sides of it before a world of fair minded 
observers, would lessen the asperity of opposing 
passions so that the verdict of the court would be 
received as saving credit and honor to the party 
who had to yield. It is out of this attitude that 
our whole doctrine of arbitration as an expedient 



34 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

for escaping war has its rise, a doctrine of such 
importance in our general subject that no peace 
advocate would dare reject it wholly. 

Bentham's opinion was expressed in a stray 
pamphlet that made little impression in his time 
and has nearly escaped the notice of posterity. 
A more conspicuous achievement, and nearly 
contemporary, was an essay by Immanuel Kant, 
philosopher at Konigsberg, in Prussia. In 1795 
he published Zum ewigen Frieden, an outline for 
a league of perpetual peace. There was a time, 
he argued, when men lived by force under the 
laws of nature, each regulating his own conduct 
toward his neighbors, the strongest man having 
his way through his ability to overawe his asso- 
ciates. Then came the state and the rule of law, 
and with their arrival one saw the exit of personal 
combat. Kant applied the same argument to 
the intercourse of the nations, saying they were 
in a state of nature toward one another. He 
proposed to organize a super-state over them, 
with authority to bring them under a law pro-!* 
hibiting wars among themselves. He would as- 
sign a definite field of action to the new power, 
with the function of making laws in enforcing 



ADVOCATES OF UNIVERSAL PEACE 35 

that authority, and it would have the neces- 
sary administrative and judicial officers. The 
law made by the united government was to be as 
good law for its own purposes as the law made 
by the individual states for their purposes. 

Kant's suggestion was closely kin to Rous- 
seau's ideas of the state, but he wrote at a time 
when the world, stampeded by the excesses of 
the Jacobins, was turning away from all the po- 
litical theories that underlay the French Revolu- 
tion. It had no use for the idea that govern- 
ment was the outcome of a social contract; and 
if this idea was not accepted for the state itself, 
how much less would it be accepted as a means of 
organizing the international state! The world 
suffered too much at the hands of Napoleon to 
like ideas that were responsible for the very be- 
ginning of the letting out of the waters. And 
this was especially true in Prussia, where the foot 
of the French conqueror was extremely heavy. 

At the moment when Kant's ideas were at 
the height of unpopularity came the young 
philosopher, Hegel, who announced a philo- 
sophical view of war that pleased the govern- 
ing class of Prussia, bent on establishing a system 



36 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

of military training that would be sufficient for a 
redeemed country. He taught that war through 
action burns away moral excrescences, purifies 
the health of society, and stimulates the growth 
of manly virtue. This idea became the basis of 
much German reasoning, and it is not improb- 
able that its defenders in trying to discern the 
virtues they argued for, were led to develop 
them. But in their enthusiasm they came to ex- 
aggerate these virtues into habits that were often 
mere manifestations of an exalted egoism. As 
to the claim that war burns up the effete products 
of society, it may be met by the undeniable as- 
sertion that it also burns much that is best. One 
does not burn a city to destroy the vermin that 
are in it. 

The next attempt to bring about a system of 
cooperation to secure peace among the nations 
was the formation of the Holy Alliance, a futile 
attempt to apply principles like those just de- 
scribed, made by Alexander I, of Russia, at the 
close of the Napoleonic wars. It is considered at 
length in the chapter following this, where it 
finds its proper setting. The extremely religious 
spirit in which it was conceived was a drawback 



ADVOCATES OF UNIVERSAL PEACE 37 

to success, but it is not likely that it would have 
fared better than it did fare, even if stripped of 
all its pious fantasy, since the world was not 
educated to its acceptance as a purely political 
idea. 

At this stage one must notice the development 
of peace societies. Organized at first as local 
bodies they were drawn together into national 
organizations in the early decades of the nine- 
teenth century. It was in 1816 that such a 
society was created in Great Britain, and in 1828 
that the American Peace Society was formed out 
of local societies in the United States. In the 
same year was established at Geneva the first 
peace society on the Continent, the second being 
organized at Paris in 1841. The influence of 
such societies was weak for a long time; but 
within the past twenty years it has been much 
stronger. 

One of the most striking examples of the 
prevalence of the peace idea in recent times is the 
growing use of arbitration as a means of settling 
international disputes. Another is the meeting 
of the Hague conferences to promote peace. 
The first was called by the tsar, Nicholas II, in 



38 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

1899 and laid a broad outline of the work that 
such conferences ought to do. A second as- 
sembled in the year 1907, and a third was about 
to convene when the Great War began in 1914. 
The conferences devoted their strongest efforts 
to the reduction of armaments and the checking 
of militarism; but in each case they found the 
German Empire planted boldly across their path, 
and in this respect their efforts were futile. It 
is not to be doubted that the attitude of Germany 
contributed much to develop the widespread sus- 
picion of that country which has been one of her 
handicaps in the present war. 

The "peace movement," as the totality of these 
activities is called, has thus gained strength, and 
it would seem that it must eventually prevail in 
public opinion. It received an important mo- 
mentum in 1910, when Mr. Andrew Carnegie 
gave $10,000,000 to establish the Carnegie En- 
dowment for International Peace, an organiza- 
tion which has contributed powerfully to the pro- 
motion of peace ideas. It acts on scientific 
principles, seeking to gather and publish such 
facts bearing on international relations, the laws 



ADVOCATES OF UNIVERSAL PEACE 39 

of economics and history, and the science of in- 
ternational law, as will show in what respect war 
is to be removed from its hold on society. 

The careless enthusiasm with which a great 
many people hailed the outbreak of war in 1914 
swept the peace advocates into the background 
and was the occasion of some sarcasm at their 
expense. But as the struggle grew in grimness 
and horrors the advocates of peace on principle 
returned to their old position in public esteem, 
and have steadily gained on it. It seems un- 
deniable that the war has done more to convince 
the world of the madness of war than many dec- 
ades of agitation could do. 

One of the manifestations of the rebound 
here mentioned was the organization in June, 
1915, of "The League to Enforce Peace." This 
society was created in a meeting of representa- 
tive men assembled in Carpenters' Hall, Phila- 
delphia, the place in which the Declaration of 
Independence was adopted. Its principles are 
embraced in the following proposals: 1. A 
judicial tribunal to which will be referred judi- 
ciable disputes between the signatory powers, 



40 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

subject to existing treaties, the tribunals to have 
power to pass on the merits of the disputes sub- 
mitted as well as on its jurisdiction over them. 
2. The reference of other disputes between the 
signatory states to a council of conciliation, which 
will hear the cases submitted and recommend 
settlements in accordance with its ideas of jus- 
tice. 3. If any signatory state threatens war 
before its case is submitted to the judicial tri- 
bunal or the council of conciliation, the other 
states will jointly employ diplomatic pressure to 
prevent war; and if hostilities actually begin 
under such circumstances they will jointly use 
their military forces against the power in con- 
tempt of the league. 4. The signatory states 
will from time to time hold conferences to formu- 
late rules of international law which are to be 
executed by the tribunal of arbitration unless 
within a stated time some state vetoes the pro- 
posal. 

The system of cooperation embodied in these 
proposals is not a federation, within the meaning 
that I have given to that term. It is what it 
pretends to be, merely a league. It seems to 
concede the right of a state to secede from the 



ADVOCATES OF UNIVERSAL PEACE 41 

league at will. As to what would happen under 
it if a signatory state refusing to abide the decis- 
ion of the tribunal or council of conciliation should 
attempt to withdraw and make war at once, we 
can have little doubt. In such a case the attempt 
to secede would probably be considered defiance 
and steps be taken to reduce the state to sub- 
mission. Nevertheless it might happen that a 
state within the league, finding its action re- 
stricted so that it could not adopt some policy 
which it considered essential to its welfare, might 
proceed to withdraw in view of a line of conduct 
it intended to take at a later time. In that case 
it is difficult to see how the league could resist 
unless it was willing to take the position that it 
had a kind of sovereignty over all interstate rela- 
tions, a position that involves more concentration 
than the form of the league seems to imply. 

At this point in our inquiry into the subject of 
cooperation to secure universal peace an inviting 
field of speculation opens before us, but we must 
turn aside for the time, in order to consider 
various phases of the process by which the world 
has arrived at the crisis now before it. This 
chapter will serve its purpose if it gives the reader 



42 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

a view of the earliest suggestions of systems of 
common action and if it makes clear the differ- 
ences between the two general plans that have 
been formulated, the league and the federation. 



CHAPTER III 

PROBLEMS OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS 

The career of Napoleon, which has long com- 
manded the greatest interest, not to say en- 
thusiasm, of students of history, aroused grave 
fears in the minds of most of the thoughtful 
men of his day who did not live in France. His 
design to conquer all his neighbors was most 
evident, and his apparent ability to carry it into 
execution caused him to be regarded as the em- 
bodiment of greed and insatiable ambition. 
Not since the days of Louis XIV had Europe 
felt such thrills of danger and horror. All its 
energy was called into play to withstand his at- 
tacks. Wars followed wars in a series of cam- 
paigns that ended after many years of extreme 
anxiety in his ruin, only when France had been 
worn out by his repeated victories. When he 
began his wars he was at the head of the best 
prepared nation in the world. He struck with 
sudden and vigorous blows against nations that 

43 



44 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

were not united, defeating one after the other 
with startling effect. Their lack of preparation 
was most marked and was probably the most 
effective cause of his initial success. After years 
of conflict they learned how to oppose him. 
From his own example they learned the value of 
organization and method in fighting, and from 
their own disasters they at last acquired the sense 
of union that was necessary to give him the final 
blow that made him no longer a menace to their 
national integrity. It was not until 1815 that he 
was finally defeated and reduced to the state of 
ineffective personal power from which he had 
risen. 

From the beginning of the struggle he was to 
his opponents the incarnation of all that was 
hateful in government. Few of the epithets 
now hurled at the kaiser were not as lavishly cast 
at Napoleon. He was tyrant, robber, brute, and 
murderer in turn, and it was pronounced a serv- 
ice to humanity to suppress him. In the begin- 
ning of the wars his pretensions were treated with 
disdain, but as his victories followed one another 
in bewildering rapidity, his power was treated 
with more respect, although there was no greater 



PROBLEMS OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS 45 

disposition to contemplate his triumph with com- 
placency. As the struggle became fiercer, the 
other states than France began to think of some 
permanent form of cooperation for restraining 
him; and they even began to speculate on the 
possibility of some permanent arrangement by 
which the world might be saved from a recur- 
rence of such a vast waste of life and treasure as 
was involved in the struggle. It was thus that 
suggestions were made during the Napoleonic 
era for abolishing war through international ef- 
fort. For us, who are today burdened with the 
ruin of a similar but more stupendous struggle, 
these efforts have a special interest, and the space 
of a single chapter is none too much to give to 
their consideration. 

It is singular that these plans should have 
found their most conspicuous supporters in 
the heads of the two governments most widely 
apart with reference to the popular character 
of their institutions. It was in autocratic 
Russia that one found the most advanced idea 
of dealing with the future, and in Great Britain, 
the most liberal of the great powers, that the 
most conservative design was held. Each plan 



4S THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

was supported by the head of these two gov- 
ernments respectively, each ran through its 
own development while the armies were locked 
in deadly struggle, and each was debated with 
seriousness in the moment of victory when the 
statesmen of the winning powers met to arrange 
for the future relations of the states whose 
victories made them the arbiters of Europe. 

The initiative was taken by Alexander I, of 
Russia. He was a man of the best intentions, 
and throughout the period with which we are 
now dealing he showed himself persistently fa- 
vorable to views which, to say the least, were a 
hundred years ahead of his time. By tempera- 
ment he was imaginative and sympathetic. In 
his personal life were irregularities, but not as 
many as in Napoleon's, Louis XIV's, or Talley- 
rand's. He lacked the royal vice of despotism, 
and his escape from it was probably due to the 
influence of Frederic Cesar de La Harpe, an 
instructor of his youth, who arrived in Russia 
with his head full of the dynamic ideas of the 
French philosophers of the pre-revolutionary 
period. 

While "liberty, equality, and fraternity" mad- 



PROBLEMS OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS 47 

dened France, long oppressed by the dull repres- 
sion of the ancient regime, La Harpe was con- 
verting his royal pupil to the doctrine of the 
"Rights of Man." So well was the lesson taught 
that a long series of encounters with the solid 
wall of Russian autocracy was necessary before 
the pupil ceased to try to do something to 
ameliorate the condition of his people. His- 
torians have called Alexander a dreamer, but 
what is a man to do who is born a tsar and has 
the misfortune to believe in the doctrines for 
which we honor Lincoln and Jefferson? I am 
willing to call him impractical, but I cannot with- 
hold sympathy from a man who tried, as he, to 
strike blows in behalf of the forms of government 
which makes my own country a home of liberty. 
Alexander I came to the throne of Russia in 
1801, anxious to carry out his liberal plans. 1 In 
1804, through his minister in London, he sug- 
gested to Pitt, the prime minister, a plan for 
settling the affairs of Europe after the defeat of 
Napoleon. France, he said, must be made to 

i For an excellent treatment of the events discussed in this 
chapter see W. A. Phillips, The Confederation of Europe, London, 
1914. 



48 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

realize that the allies did not war against her 
people but against Napoleon, from whose false 
power they proposed to set her free. Once liber- 
ated she was to be allowed to choose any gov- 
ernment she desired. From La Harpe he had 
imbibed a deep repugnance to the government of 
the Bourbons, and in all his future discussions 
of the subject he showed no enthusiasm for re- 
storing that line to their throne. 

One of the charges often made by the allies 
was that Napoleon overthrew international law. 
It was a part of Alexander's plan to reestablish 
its potency and to have the nations see to it that 
no future violations of it could occur. He also 
suggested that the firm agreement then existing 
between Russia and Great Britain should con- 
tinue after the establishment of peace and that 
other great powers should be brought into it so 
that there should be a means of securing common 
action in affairs of mutual significance. At this 
time he had not, it seems, fully determined just 
what form of cooperation ought to be adopted, 
but in the suggestion of 1804 can be found the 
germ of all his later designs for permanent peace. 

At that moment Pitt was looking for the re- 



PROBLEMS OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS 49 

newal of the European war and he expected the 
formation of the great coalition of 1805, in which 
Russia, Great Britain, Austria, and Sweden un- 
dertook to defeat France. He did not dare, 
therefore, reject the tsar's proposals outright. 
He gave approval to the suggestion in regard to 
the restoration of international law, but he quali- 
fied his sanction of the scheme for a future league 
of nations. Napoleon crushed, he said, it would 
be for the states to guarantee such an ad j ustment 
of European affairs as they should agree upon in 
solemn treaty. Looking into these two state- 
ments it is seen that the tsar had in mind the 
formation of some kind of league of nations, 
with well defined powers and duties, while Pitt 
looked forward to that kind of international co- 
operation which was later described by the term 
''Concert of Europe." In the subsequent deal- 
ing of Alexander with the British leaders over 
this matter there was always this difference be- 
tween them. 

In 1807 Napoleon won the battle of Friedland 
over Russia and occupied a large part of the 
tsar's domain. Then came the Treaty of Tilsit 
in which Alexander and Napoleon standing face 



50 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

to face came to an unexpected agreement to 
divide the accessible part of the world between 
them, Alexander ruling one half and Napoleon 
ruling the other. It is certain, however, that 
the tsar had in his mind that both he and his new 
ally would rule their respective halves in the 
spirit of La Harpe's teaching. Napoleon baited 
his trap with no less attractive a morsel than 
self-government under a wise monarch in order 
to catch Alexander I. 

The Moscow campaign brought the tsar to his 
senses. He himself said that it was the burning 
of the ancient city, 1812, that illuminated his 
mind and enabled him to see the true character of 
the Corsican. For five years he had been lulled 
into inactivity by the belief that some form of per- 
manent peace was coming to the world through 
Napoleon. He now realized that he had been 
duped, and after making due acknowledgment 
of his error turned to the task of destroying the 
deceiver. From that time he did not waver in his 
determination. 

Russia and Great Britain were thus in close 
alliance, and immediately began consideration of 
a permanent alliance looking toward a regulation 



PROBLEMS OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS 51 

of affairs in Europe after the war was ended. 
The British cabinet took up the question and in 
1813 passed a resolution in which occurs the fol- 
lowing declaration: "The Treaty of Alliance 
[between the states which were united against 
Napoleon] is not to terminate with the war, but 
is to contain defensive engagements, with mutual 
obligations to support the Power attacked by 
France with a certain extent of stipulated suc- 
cors. The casus foederis is to be an attack by 
France on the European dominions of any one 
of the contracting parties." * This provision was 
kept secret for the time, but it remained the 
basis of the British policy throughout the negotia- 
tions that followed. Castlereagh, in ability and 
character the greatest statesman of his day, was 
then at the head of the British cabinet, and it 
seems certain that he inspired its policy. 

He was already suspicious of the position of 
the tsar in reference to France. That sover- 
eign had in no way relaxed his friendship for the 
French people. Hating the Bourbons he would 
have prevented their restoration to the throne, 
and he had a project for allowing the French to 

i Phillips, loc. cit. } 67. 



52 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

determine whom they would have for king after 
Napoleon. If he could carry this plan through 
he would make himself very popular in France 
and would have a strong position with the ruler 
whose selection he should thus make possible. 
To Castlereagh this was nothing but a shrewd 
piece of policy for laying the foundation of a 
Franco-Russian alliance which would have over- 
weening influence in Europe, and he set himself 
against its execution. He was forced to proceed 
cautiously, however, since Napoleon was not 
beaten and the aid of the tsar was essential. 
There is nothing to suggest that Alexander did 
not entertain his French views in all singleness 
of purpose. The worst his enemies said of him 
was that he was a dreamer ; but he was not given 
to a policy of calculation. 

To thwart Alexander and carry through his 
own views Castlereagh set himself to "group" the 
tsar, that is, to draw him into an agreement with 
other sovereigns in which such a policy was ac- 
cepted as would serve to deflect the whole group 
of allies from the direct course which the tsar 
would have followed if left alone. Early in 
1814 a treaty was signed at Chaumont by Great 



PROBLEMS OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS 53 

Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia in which all 
the problems then before the allies were taken 
up. The sixteenth article of the treaty dealt 
with the point which had caused Castlereagh so 
much anxiety. It ran: 

"The present Treaty of Alliance having for its object 
the maintenance of the Balance of Europe, to secure the re- 
pose and independence of the Powers, and to prevent the 
invasions which for so many years have devastated the 
world, the High Contracting Parties have agreed among 
themselves to extend its duration for twenty years from 
the date of signature, and they reserve the right of agree- 
ing, if circumstances demand it, three years before its 
expiration, on its further prolongation." 1 

By this means Alexander was "grouped" with 
his three allies in the support of a kind of co- 
operation which was not what he had hitherto 
insisted upon. It is probable that he did not 
realize how completely he was outplayed, when 
he was forced by the logic of events to set his 
hand to a treaty that provided for the Concert 
of Europe, and not for the league to which he had 
long looked forward. At any rate, he did not 
give up his ideals and he seems to have thought 
that in the hour of victory he could do what he 

i Phillips, loc. cit. } 78. 



54 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

had not been able to do in the hour of necessity. 
The Treaty of Chaumont was followed by the 
battle of Leipzig, and that was followed by sev- 
eral smaller battles in which the allies fought 
their way through French territory until they 
stood before the gates of Paris in the autumn of 
1814. Napoleon fled the Nemesis that had over- 
taken him, the city was opened to his enemies, 
and Alexander I, at the head of his splendid 
guard, led the conquering army down the broad 
avenue of Champs Elysee, the inhabitants of the 
city cheering the radiant pageant. Men reflected 
that two years earlier a great French army had 
penetrated to the Russian city of Moscow and 
found it smoking ruins; and they could but 
observe the contrast. It was worthy of the great- 
ness of the tsar of the Russias to show a gen- 
erous face to a beaten foe; and the Frenchmen 
were gallant enough to receive the friendship of 
the tsar in the spirit in which it was given. A 
lenient treaty by which France was saved from 
humiliation and Napoleon was given Elba, was 
also due chiefly to the good will of Alexander. 
An Englishman on the spot, who did not see 
things with the broad vision of the prime min- 



PROBLEMS OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS 55 

ister, wrote that the tsar "by a series of firm 
and glorious conduct has richly deserved the 
appellation of the liberator of mankind." But 
as Alexander continued to "play the part 
of Providence in France" the same writer became 
alarmed and five days later wrote to London 
urging that Castlereagh come to the French 
capital. The hint was taken, and soon the manly 
stride of the handsome tsar was intercepted by 
the deftly woven webs of the skilled diplomat. 
Erelong France was handed over to the Bour- 
bons, who came back to show that they had 
learned nothing and forgotten nothing. 

The center of interest now shifted to the Con- 
gress of Vienna, whose sessions lasted from 
September 10, 1814, to June 9, 1815. Europe 
had looked forward to it for many years as the 
means of effecting a wise and just reform in 
all the evils that afflicted the continent. "Men 
had promised themselves," said Gentz, "an all- 
embracing reform of the political system of 
Europe, guarantees for universal peace, in one 
word, the return of the golden age." Thus 
Alexander was not entirely ahead of his time. 
There were enlightened men then, as now, who 



56 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

hoped for a spirit that would rise above mere 
diplomatic self-interest; and we may look upon 
the tsar as their exponent. But they were to be 
disappointed. Spoils were to be divided and in 
the disputes that the expected division engen- 
dered, the spirit of reform was dissipated. 
Alexander spent his energy in trying to reestab- 
lish the kingdom of Poland with liberal institu- 
tions, but his desire that it should be under his 
protection aroused the keenest opposition from 
the neighboring nations. If a victorious Russia 
stood as protector of a reestablished France and 
a renewed Poland, who could foretell her power 
in future dealings among nations? Considering 
the extent to which jealousy carried the conten- 
tions of the states at Vienna, it is enough that 
the congress did not break up in an appeal to 
arms. 

Gentz, whom we recall as the secretary of the 
congress, was one of the men who had entertained 
hopes that it would give a new and better form to 
the political structure of Europe. He avowed 
his disappointment at the results in saying: 

"The Congress has resulted in nothing but restorations, 
which had already been effected by arms, agreements be- 



PROBLEMS OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS 57 

tween the Great Powers of little value for the future 
balance and preservation of the peace of Europe, quite ar- 
bitrary alterations in the possessions of the smaller states; 
but no act of a higher nature, no great measure for public 
order or for the general good, which might compensate 
humanity for its long sufferings or pacify it for the future. 
. . . But to be just, the treaty, such as it is, has the un- 
deniable merit of having prepared the world for a more 
complete political structure. If ever the Powers should 
meet again to establish a political system by which wars 
of conquest would be rendered impossible, and the rights 
of all guaranteed, the Congress of Vienna, as a preparatory 
assembly, will not have been without use. A number of 
vexatious details have been settled, and the ground has been 
prepared for building up a better social structure." x 

Looking back over the past century it is hard 
to find justification for Gentz's optimism. The 
respite that Europe had for a generation from 
war was due in a sense to the lesson learned 
in the Napoleonic struggle; but it was not a 
permanent lesson. We shall proceed to examine 
the expedients that came to be used for the end 
specified; but it is certain that they did not 
achieve permanently the end desired. Had the 
Congress of Vienna done all that was expected 
of it, the world might today be at peace. If not 

i See Phillips, loc. cit., 118. 



58 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

at peace, we might at least say that the men of 
the Congress did all they could to secure peace. 

If we ask for the fundamental cause of the 
failure of the Congress of Vienna to satisfy the 
hopes of liberal men in constructing what Gentz 
called "a more complete political structure," the 
answer must lie in the illiberal views of the ruling 
classes in the European states. Self-govern- 
ment was less developed than in the most con- 
servative state of today. Had the people of these 
states been in power, and had they been to a fair 
degree trained in the principles of good govern- 
ment, the result could hardly have been as it was. 
But the ignorant bureaucrats and arbitrary 
rulers were in power, men who in their own lives 
never knew the burdens of war, and to whom 
national egotism appeared a high virtue; and 
they thought only of gaining territory for 
their states. They placed such things above the 
Jiigh opportunity to reform the political structure 
of Europe. They turned to the future with the 
old principles still dominant, hoping that by a 
system of concert among the great states they 
could stave off war for an indefinitely long period. 
They could place self-interest against self -in- 



PROBLEMS OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS 59 

terest, forgetting that a time was likely to come 
when self-interest might lead the strongest to 
dare the rest of the world, hoping to move quickly 
in a moment of temporary advantage and thus 
gain ends that only the most severe sacrifices 
could take away. But that is a story reserved 
for another chapter. 

Before we take up the Concert of Europe we 
must deal with the Holy Alliance, which, though 
but an interlude in the play, is so frequently men- 
tioned in the books that it cannot be omitted 
from this discussion. It was signed at Paris, 
November 20, 1815, and may be considered only 
one of the forms in which the tsar's ideal was 
embodied. Its religious character made it the 
butt of ridicule for the "practical" statesmen 
of the day, and the historian has been prone to 
look at it from their standpoint. But it was then 
popular to express political principles in reli- 
gious phrases, and the alliance is to be inter- 
preted by the purpose that lay underneath, rather 
than by the mere form in which it was set forth. 

As we have seen, Alexander I had formulated 
his plan for a league of states long before the end 
of the war. He had relaxed his intentions in no 



60 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

sense when he met Baroness Kriidener in June, 
1815. This remarkable woman, though nobly 
born, was a religious enthusiast who to the faculty 
of intense conviction added the gift of preaching. 
Wherever she went she found followers who hung 
on her words and yielded themselves to her im- 
passioned appeals for religious devotion. In the 
height of her enthusiasm she came to think that 
she had revelations from God. Many a popular 
revivalist of recent times could be compared with 
her ; and if we are tolerant of their undoubtedly 
well-meant efforts to stir humanity to righteous- 
ness, we may allow her also a fair share of our 
esteem as a would-be agent of good through the 
employment of human means to attain human 
ends. 

Like the other religious teachers of the day 
she was deeply impressed by the calamities of the 
war. She knew of the tsar's desire to establish 
a regime of peace and came to believe she was 
divinely called to induce him to take a conspicu- 
ous step in that direction. At first Alexander, 
who was not always religious, refused to see her ; 
but in June, 1815, an interview was arranged 
while he was at Heilbron, on the campaign. He 



PROBLEMS OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS 61 

was deeply impressed and asked her to remain 
near him. When he went to Paris after the 
second defeat of Napoleon she was given quarters 
near his palace, and it was there, in the following 
autumn, that he drew up the plan of the Holy 
Alliance. 

The "Alliance" was expressed in the spirit of 
a mediaeval religious brotherhood. The signa- 
tory sovereigns pledged themselves to take the 
will of God for highest law, to give aid to an im- 
periled brother sovereign, and to hold the Alliance 
as "a true and indissoluble fraternity." The 
constituent states were to make "one great Chris- 
tian nation" and their sovereigns were to act 
"as delegates of Providence" in ruling their re- 
spective states. If such an ideal could have 
been accomplished at all, a stronger grip of the 
church on the springs of government would have 
been necessary than existed in that day. The 
tsar proclaimed the Holy Alliance on November 
26, 1815. It was signed by all the states of 
Europe except Turkey, Great Britain, and the 
Papal State. Great Britain's refusal to sign 
was due to Castlereagh, to whom the tsar seemed 
mentally unbalanced. He gave as his justifica- 



6& THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

tion that the prince-regent, ruling in the place of 
his insane father, had no authority to sign, but 
said that he would support the principles of the 
Alliance. As it was to be a union of Christian 
states the sultan was not invited to sign. The 
Pope was not asked because of his overwhelming 
influence in matters connected with religion. 
Frederick William, of Prussia, was a religious 
man and is believed to have signed in good faith. 
Metternich advised the emperor of Austria to 
sign but said that the document was mere ver- 
biage. 

In all I have said hitherto about the tsar's idea 
of preserving peace no definite plan has been 
mentioned. His most specific utterance was to 
ask for a league of nations, but he said nothing 
of its powers, its specific organization, or the 
limits of its action. The suggestion was vague, 
probably because the mind of its author was itself 
vague. If taken seriously it could be made to 
serve as the foundation of a unified state of 
Europe which might hold all other states under 
its hand, a unified state largely under the domi- 
nation of Russia. That its author had no such 
object in view is not to be doubted for an in- 



PROBLEMS OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS 63 

stant; but who could tell how long he would 
remain in his existing state of mind, and how 
soon he might be succeeded by a tsar of far other 
spirit? As a plan for permanent peace the Holy 
Alliance was impossible, not only because it was 
cast in religious forms and thrown to a world in 
which the authority of religion had lost much of 
its ancient hold on the minds of men of influence, 
but because its indefinite form made it a possible 
instrument of greater evils than war. 

Beneath its defects, however, was the great 
idea of a unified Europe, in which justice has the 
place of suspicion and intrigue, in which runs one 
law, one order, and one obedience to the majesty 
of the state. Alexander not only believed in such 
an ideal, but he was willing to cast his nation into 
the melting-pot in order to fuse such a state. He 
could have given no better proof of his support of 
his ideal. Of course, it was ahead of the time, 
how much so it is hard to say. The widespread 
popular longing for permanent peace would have 
gone far in accepting unification of the states, 
and in this sphere of opinion the religious cast 
of the scheme was not a great disadvantage. The 
thing which stood firmly in its way was the dull 



64 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

practicality of the upper, ruling class. If it 
could have passed these lions in the way, it might 
have had a chance of working its way forward 
into some acceptable form of a league in per- 
petuity. But it is a big if that I have used. 
Upper ruling classes know more about govern- 
ment than the lower classes, and that is a source 
of conservatism. The lower classes, knowing 
little, usually act upon their impulses; the mem- 
bers of the upper, ruling class, having informa- 
tion in varying degrees, usually strike an aver- 
age of mediocre enlightenment, and it is a difficult 
thing for a new idea to gain possession of them. 
In 1815 the upper, ruling class was well settled 
in power in Europe, and it was most convinced 
of its superior wisdom. It never accepted the 
tsar's plan; and failing to get its acceptance the 
plan was futile. 



CHAPTER IV 

EUROPE UNDER THE CONCERT OF THE POWERS 

Having disposed of Alexander's plan for a 
federation of nations it now remains to consider 
the other plan which, under the name of "Con- 
cert of Europe," was adopted by Castlereagh and 
Metternich, though not for the same purpose as 
that which had inspired the tsar. Its funda- 
mental idea had been in the positions taken by 
Pitt and Castlereagh when replying to the tsar's 
proposals, but it found its official basis in a Treaty 
of Alliance signed by Great Britain, Russia, 
Austria, and Prussia at Paris, November 20, 
1815, the same day they accepted the Holy 
Alliance. Its chief provisions were as follows: 
1. The Powers bound themselves to see that 
the second treaty of Paris, regulating affairs be- 
tween France and the allies, was executed. 2. 
They agreed to meet from time to time to take 
cognizance of the state of affairs in Europe. 3. 
They promised to suppress any recurrence of the 

65 



66 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

revolutionary activity of France. 4. They set- 
tled upon the quota of men and supplies that each 
nation should furnish in case common action be- 
came necessary. 5. They undertook to "con- 
solidate the intimate tie which unites the four 
sovereigns for the happiness of the world." The 
most important of these provisions for the pur- 
pose of this inquiry was the second, taken in con- 
nection with the fifth. 

The first meeting that may be said to have been 
called under the agreement was the Conference 
of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1818. It was called to 
determine whether or not France should be re- 
lieved of her garrisons of occupation, a matter 
which was soon adjusted. Alexander I saw 
his opportunity and urged that the sovereigns 
should take steps to make the Holy Alliance a 
more vital kind of league. But Castlereagh in- 
terposed, as in former meetings, and turned the 
efforts of the tsar aside without arousing his dis- 
pleasure. This may be considered the last gasp 
of the Holy Alliance, as it was the complete tri- 
umph of the Concert over it. At the same time 
France was admitted to the alliance of the four 
powers, which henceforth was known as the Quin- 



EUROPE UNDER CONCERT OF POWERS 67 

tuple Alliance. But if ever a question were 
to come up in which France was at variance with 
the four other Powers over matters connected 
with her obligations assumed in recent treaties, 
these four Powers would continue to act in their 
old capacity. Mr. W. A. Phillips remarks that 
the Quadruple Alliance still survived as "a rod 
in pickle for a France but doubtfully disciplined." 
For us, who are chiefly concerned to see the result 
of the attempt to take the affairs of Europe un- 
der the protection of the great Powers, it is suffi- 
cient to remember that France gave no further 
trouble of the kind anticipated, and that the 
Quintuple Alliance, as the formal expression of 
the Concert of Europe, had other problems to 
consider. 

The first arose out of revolutions in Spain 
and Naples, where armed men seized the power 
and forced the kings to accept liberal constitu- 
tions. Alexander I and Metternich looked on 
with different feelings. The former had been 
encouraging the liberals in Italy and was not 
greatly shocked by the revolution there, but he 
was deeply concerned over the upheaval in Spain 
and would have led a Russian army thither to 



68 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

suppress it. The suggestion alarmed Metter- 
nich, who did not relish the idea of Alexander's 
marching through Austrian lands with a great 
body of men. He did what he could to dis- 
courage the expedition against Spain. At the 
same time he believed that Naples should be 
disciplined, since its revolution endangered the 
safety of Austrian possessions in Italy. It is 
amusing to see how self-interest ran across the 
currents of the general good as proclaimed in the 
Concert of Europe. 

The tsar thought the situation warranted call- 
ing another conference of the Quintuple Alliance. 
Metternich objected, being chiefly concerned by 
the seeming certainty that the tsar would wish 
to carry into the situation his well-known views 
in support of liberalism. To him it seemed suffi- 
cient that the powers should agree severally to 
give their arms to the suppression of revolution, 
without meeting in conference. After much 
discussion a conference was called, at Troppau, 
but it was regularly attended by only three of 
the five powers. The suppression of constitu- 
tional government was not popular in Great 
Britain, and her government took no official part 



EUROPE UNDER CONCERT OF POWERS 69 

in the conference. France held aloof also; she 
was so much under the protection of Great 
Britain that she did not dare risk British dis- 
pleasure by allying herself with the forces of re- 
pression. 

Did the absence of two nations from Troppau 
presage the dissolution of the Alliance? Castle- 
reagh gave a negative reply. His nation, he said, 
was not bound beyond her treaty obligations, the 
terms of which were clear and specific. They 
were embodied in the Treaties of Chaumont and 
Paris. He considered the project of dealing with 
revolution in its present form as beyond the mean- 
ing of these agreements. "If," he said, "it is de- 
sired to extend the Alliance so as to include all 
objects present and future, foreseen and unfore- 
seen, it would change its character to such an ex- 
tent and carry us so far, that we should see in it 
an additional motive for adhering to our course at 
the risk of seeing the Alliance move away from us 
without our having quitted it." These frank 
words show that the Alliance was strained but 
not broken. It would seem that a system like 
that of which we speak should have at bottom 
some broad common principles. In purpose it 



70 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

should be harmonious. As between the prevail- 
ing British idea of liberty and Metternich's ideas 
of legitimacy there was no ground for mutual 
support; and out of this divergence of views was 
to grow the disruption of the Alliance, as we shall 
soon see. 

Up to this time the two ideas that had run side 
by side were the tsar's plan for a league to se- 
cure cooperation of a general nature and the 
British plan limiting common action to a few 
specific matters, chiefly connected with the re- 
pression of France in case she wished to return 
to a policy which would threaten the peace of 
Europe. As it became increasingly apparent 
that France was no longer a menace this type of 
union became less important, and the British 
ardor for it cooled, especially since it was becom- 
ing more and more certain that the Alliance was 
being used to support repression. 

At the same time a change was passing through 
the mind of the tsar. In all he had done he had 
been supported by liberal ministers, against whose 
influence at his court Metternich did not hesitate 
to intrigue. Alexander's conversion to the cause 
of repression came suddenly and completely in 



EUROPE UNDER CONCERT OF POWERS 71 

1820, when there was a mutiny in a favorite reg- 
iment of his guard. Sober advisers pointed out 
to him that the action of the regiment had no 
political significance, but he would not be con- 
vinced. He insisted he would not countenance 
revolt abroad, lest it encourage insurrection at 
home. All the fervor he had shown in behalf of 
liberal ideas he now manifested in behalf of re- 
pression. At Troppau he met Metternich in a 
spirit of profound repentance for what he had 
done in the past, saying with an outburst of 
emotion: "So we are at one, Prince, and it is to 
you that we owe it. You have correctly judged 
the state of affairs. I deplore the waste of time, 
which we must try to repair. I am here with- 
out any fixed ideas ; without any plan ; but I bring 
you a firm and unalterable resolution. It is for 
your Emperor to use it as he wills. Tell me what 
you desire, and what you wish me to do, and I 
will do it." The speech astonished the Prince 
as much as it pleased him. All his schemes had 
lost in the defection of Castlereagh, and probably 
more, was made up in the accession of his new 
ally. Not only was the cause of legitimacy, as 
he advocated it, made safe; but the danger was 



72 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

removed of a Franco-Russian alliance, always 
a thing to be dreaded by the great Powers in 
the center of Europe. 

In the conference at Troppau, Austria, Russia, 
and Prussia now acted together. Up to that 
time Metternich had ignored the Holy Alliance. 
He now brought it out as his stalking horse. 
The three sovereigns, controlling the conference, 
issued a declaration suspending from the Alliance 
any state that tolerated revolution in its borders 
and declaring that the other Powers in the 
Alliance would bring back the offending state by 
force of arms. Under the indefinite terms of the 
instrument this was a legal interpretation of 
power, but it was not in the spirit of the benevo- 
lent sovereign who made the Holy Alliance pos- 
sible. 

Those of us who now favor a league or fed- 
eration of states as a means of preserving peace 
perpetually may well study the crisis to which a 
similar system had come in the development of 
international relations in 1820. The tsar's ideal 
was a thing of glory thrown before a sordid 
world. Not even he, as we see, was proof against 
the debasement of his surroundings. If his 



EUROPE UNDER CONCERT OF POWERS 73 

plan had been adopted by all the nations, it is 
likely that the time would have come when 
the confederation thus formed would have be- 
come an agency for reaction against which liberal 
views would have been unable to contend. 

On the other hand, we must not ignore the 
weight that a confederation would have had as 
an idea in promoting respect for liberal govern- 
ment. If it had been established under the pro- 
tection of the tsar, it may well have been that 
Metternich would not have taken up the crusade 
of legitimacy, that the tsar and Castlereagh 
acting together in behalf of liberal institutions 
would have insured a steadier attitude on the 
part of the former, and that under such circum- 
stances the kings of Spain and Naples would 
have been less inclined to the severe measures 
which provoked revolution. Of course, these 
are mere conjectures, but it is only fair to men- 
tion them as things to be said for the other side 
of the question. 

When we come to apply the lessons of 1815- 
1820 to the present day, we must not forget that 
conditions, are now very greatly changed. It 
was the supremacy of arbitrary government in 



74 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

Europe that made the hopes of 1815 come to 
naught. Of all the agents who then controlled 
affairs in the great states of Europe, Castlereagh, 
next to the tsar, was the most liberal. If a plan 
of union were adopted after the present war, it 
might not be a success, but the failure would not 
be for the same reasons as those that brought 
the Alliance of 1815 to a nullity. 

Castlereagh made a protest against the pur- 
poses of the three Powers at Troppau in which 
were some telling arguments against such a 
league as was threatening. They were well made 
and would be applicable to the situation today, 
if it were proposed to establish a league like that 
which found favor at Troppau. The plan pro- 
posed, said he, was too general in its scope. It 
gave the projected confederation the right to 
interfere in the internal affairs of independent 
states on the ground that the general good was 
concerned, and if carried out the Alliance would, 
in effect, be charged with the function of policing 
such states. Against all this he protested, and 
he pointed out that so many grounds of dissatis- 
faction lay in the scheme that to try to enforce 
it would surely lead to counter alliances, the end 



EUROPE UNDER CONCERT OF POWERS 75 

of which would be war It ought to be said, also, 
that Castlereagh was opposed to giving up war 
as a means of settling disputes. "The extreme 
right of interference," he said, "between nation 
and nation can never be made a matter of writ- 
ten stipulation or be assumed as the attribute of 
an alliance." If a man takes that position he 
can hardly be expected to see good points in any 
scheme to preserve peace perpetually. 

The evils he pointed out are largely eliminated 
in the modern plans that are offered. For ex- 
ample, the jurisdiction of the proposed leagues 
or federations is strictly limited to the enforce- 
ment of peace. A supreme court held by emi- 
nent judges would pass upon cases as they 
come up and say whether or not the central au- 
thority should employ force. Under the plan it 
would be hard to bring a purely internal ques- 
tion before the court, and if brought there it 
would not be considered by the judges, since the 
pact of the federation would specify that such 
cases were not to be tried. The pact would be 
the constitution of the federation, and the court 
would be expected to pass on the constitutionality 
of measures from the standpoint of that instru- 



76 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

merit. Under a system like that recently ad- 
vocated a revolution in Naples would have to be 
submitted to a court whose members were ap- 
pointed from states in which free institutions 
are in existence. It could not be the tool of 
a Metternich. Under such a system the whim of 
a tsar, if such a ruler ever again wears a crown, 
could not make or mar a question like that 
which underlay the calling of the Conference of 
Troppau. So many are the differences that it 
is, perhaps, not profitable to dwell longer on 
this point. The study of the peace problem and 
the attempt to solve it a hundred years ago is 
extremely interesting to one who considers the 
situation now existing, but it is chiefly because 
the mind, having grasped the development of the 
former problem and become accustomed to see 
the process as a whole, is in a better state to un- 
derstand the present and to know wherein it 
differs from the past and in what respect old 
factors are supplemented by new factors. Such 
lessons from the past are open to all who will but 
read. 

These reflections should not make us forget the 
main thread of our story, which became relatively 



EUROPE UNDER CONCERT OF POWERS 77 

weak after Troppau. From that time it was 
clear that Europe had no hopes of peace through 
cooperation under either of the two plans that 
had been suggested. Almost immediately began 
a train of events which gave added impulse to the 
dissolution of the Alliance. In 1821 began the 
Greek War of Independence. Austria was in 
consternation lest the revolution should spread 
to her own people. Russia, however, was deeply 
sympathetic with the Greeks, partly through 
religious affiliations and partly because the Rus- 
sian people, looking toward the possession of 
Constantinople, were anxious to weaken the 
Turk in any of his European possessions. 
Alexander I showed signs of going to war for 
the Greeks, and Metternich hastily sought to 
counteract any such course. 

At the same time the situation in Spain's 
American colonies was becoming more urgent, 
because the weakness of the government had 
stimulated the South American revolutionists to 
renewed activity until Mexico as well as the rest 
of the Continental colonies except Peru was in 
successful revolt. Metternich would have helped 
Turkey against the Greeks and allowed the 



78 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

tsar to carry out his long cherished wish of inter- 
vening in Spain, as a means of keeping him quiet. 
The situation seemed to call for another confer- 
ence and after some discussion a meeting was 
arranged at Verona, 1822. France was anxious 
to take over the task of punishing the Spanish 
revolutionists, and as Russia, Austria, and Prus- 
sia agreed to her plan, four of the five Great 
Powers now stood side by side in favor of repres- 
sion. They would have gone further, and settled 
the fate of the American revolutionists, but 
against that course Great Britain made such a 
protest that the question was left open. 

It was not definitely closed until the next year, 
and then through the action of the United States, 
taken in association with Great Britain. For 
when France had performed her task, she looked 
forward to taking some of the Spanish colonies as 
indemnity for her expenses. The principle of 
federation among the Powers was working so well 
that it was considered only a natural thing to 
call another conference at which France could be 
assigned the right of conquering the colonies. 
Canning, at the head of the British government, 
was genuinely alarmed. The four united Powers 



EUROPE UNDER CONCERT OF POWERS 79 

were willing to defy Great Britain if she stood 
alone. He turned to the United States as the 
only ally in sight. Would we support him in op- 
position to the designs of the Powers ? President 
Monroe, influenced by John Quincy Adams' 
stout patriotism, replied in the affirmative and 
went a step further; for he insisted that the de- 
fiance of the Powers should be announced in 
Washington, not as a mere expedient to meet an 
isolated case, but as a general policy of our gov- 
ernment. The Monroe Doctrine was one of the 
things that broke up the Quintuple Alliance, 
already weakened by the alienation of Great 
Britain. 

The last blow was the revolution in France 
in 1830, which drove the Bourbon king into exile 
and made a liberal government possible. At the 
same time so strong were the manifestations of 
republicanism in other countries that the old con- 
servatism was lowered in tone and chastened in 
pride. From France the revolutionary move- 
ment passed into Belgium, which the Congress of 
Vienna had decreed should be a part of the king- 
dom of the Netherlands. So completely was the 
revolution successful that even the Great Powers 



80 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

had to bow to it, and in a congress at London 
they recognized Belgium as a separate state and 
saw it set up a liberal constitution with a king at 
the head of the government. Several of the 
small German governments also adopted more 
liberal forms. Poland broke into rebellion and 
before its power of resistance was crushed by- 
Russia the infection spread into Lithuania and 
Podolia. At last the arms of the tsar over- 
powered all resistance and peace reigned ; but the 
reactionaries were sobered, and the dream of a 
league to enforce repression passed away. 

Glancing backward we may see through what 
a development the ideas of reform had passed. 
Europe, distressed by the wars of 1800-1815, 
had hungered for peace. Having issued from a 
decade of discussion of liberty and humanity, the 
friends of freedom were more than ordinarily 
earnest for replacing war by an age of reason. 
In our own day the cause of universal peace 
stands on a broader and better laid foundation 
than a hundred years ago, but it is, perhaps, no 
more impressive. At any rate the philosophically 
inclined men of the earlier period supported Kant 
and Rousseau, among them, Alexander I. A 



EUROPE UNDER CONCERT OF POWERS 81 

considerable portion of the world believed that 
the outcome of the war madness then reigning 
must be an era of sanity. 

We have seen that two plans of improvement 
were formed in the minds of men who were in 
position to have practical influence: the tsar's 
scheme for a league, or federation, that was so 
strongly integrated that the central authority 
should be able to enforce its commands upon con- 
stituent states; and the plan of Castlereagh for 
prolonging the existing system of cooperation in 
a form which we may call the Concert of the 
Great Powers. We have seen that the tsar's 
plan, ignored at first, was seized on by Metter- 
nich as a possibility for enforcing a system of re- 
action, that it met the opposition of Great Brit- 
ain and aroused the revolutionary protest of 
1830, and thus it came to an end. It was never 
the dream of any of the philosophers that a fed- 
eration should be formed which might become an 
engine of despotism, yet practical use showed 
that such a course was within the bounds of pos- 
sibility. The mere glimpse of such a thing was 
enough to make Europe prefer the old era of 
wars. 



82 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

One does not have to look far into the situation 
to see that the real failure of the plan was due 
to the wide use of arbitrary government in Eu- 
rope. Had Austria, Russia, and Prussia been 
ruled by the people, either as republics or as lib- 
eral monarchies, the great alliance of Europe 
could hardly have been turned to the side of re- 
pression; and under the guidance of enlightened 
statesmen it might have been the beginning of a 
long era of peace and international good will. 
The failure of the nineteenth century, therefore, 
does not prove that federation is essentially im- 
possible. It only proves that a century ago the 
world was not ready to employ it successfully. 



CHAPTER V 

THE LATER PHASES OF THE CONCERT OF EUROPE 

The revolutionary movement of 1830 did not 
destroy the influence of Metternich in Europe. 
He was too able a man to be overthrown as leader 
of the legitimists merely because the people were 
in a ferment. To his party he was still the man 
to be trusted, and as legitimacy managed to beat 
down revolution in most of the areas in which 
commotion appeared, the scope of his power was 
wide, although it was evident that he could not 
use it with former impunity. 

At the same time he gave up the pretense of 
making the Alliance of the Powers a federation. 
He was content to try to secure that concert of 
action that would enable the states that leaned 
to legitimacy to act together against incipient 
revolution; and for a time he was successful. 
In anticipation of the failure of the plan to per- 
mit France to interfere in the Spanish colonies, 
Canning exclaimed: "Things are getting back 

83 



84 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

to a wholesome state again. Every nation for 
itself and God for us all!" But the cry of joy 
was premature. The time had not returned in 
which each crisis was to be met in its own way, 
without reference to a recognized concert of ac- 
tion, and the reason was the deep consciousness 
of the states that certain grave questions that 
ever hung over the horizon had in them the pos- 
sibilities of general war. Let one of these ques- 
tions loom large, and common action was taken 
to avert the threatened danger. In such way the 
Concert of Europe was kept alive, and remained 
something to be reckoned with as a part of the 
background of European policy. In spite of 
its temporary disuse, it was a thing to be brought 
forth again if the nations decided that it was 
needed to meet an emergency. 

In fact, it reappeared many times in the course 
of the nineteenth century, notably in 1840, when 
the so-called Eastern question became promi- 
nent. At that time Mehemet Ali, who had made 
himself lord of Egypt and seized Syria, was 
threatening Constantinople, having the support 
of France. Russia became alarmed, made a 
close alliance with the sultan, and seemed about 



LATER PHASES OF CONCERT 85 

to get that secure foothold on the Bosphorus for 
which she had striven many years. Great Brit- 
ain, Austria, and Prussia resented this prospect 
and took steps jointly to counteract it. Their 
object was to preserve Turkey from the dangers 
that threatened to divide her. Before such a 
combination Russia was not able to stand, and 
she gave up her pretensions in order to join the 
other three powers. France, however, held to 
her purpose, supporting the adventurer of 
Egypt. Thus it happened that the four Great 
Powers, reviving the Concert of Europe, but 
leaving out the government of Louis Philippe, 
had a conference in London to settle Eastern 
affairs. They decided to offer Mehemet Ali cer- 
tain concessions and to make war on him if he 
refused to accept them. He spurned their coun- 
sel and was expelled from Syria but was saved 
from utter destruction by the interference of 
France, who secured a settlement by which he 
was left in firm possession of Egypt, as heredi- 
tary ruler under the nominal authority of Tur- 
key. All the powers now united in an agree- 
ment by which Turkey was to exclude foreign 
warships from the Dardanelles. Thus, by an 



86 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

appeal to the principle of the Concert of Europe, 
a grave crisis was averted, and war between 
Great Britain and Russia was avoided. 

In 1848, seven years after the conclusion of 
these negotiations, Europe was thrown into con- 
vulsions by the appearance of a new era of 
revolution. France became a republic, and Ger- 
many, Austria, and Hungary went through such 
violent upheavals that the existence of arbitrary 
government hung for a time in the balance. Out 
of the struggle emerged Napoleon III, of 
France, who thought some military achievement 
was necessary to stabilize his power. At that 
time Russia was asserting a protectorate over all 
Christians in Turkey, and it was generally be- 
lieved that she was about to establish vital politi- 
cal control. Napoleon took up the sword against 
her and Great Britain came to help, the result 
being the Crimean War, 1854-1856. 

In the beginning of this struggle the Concert 
of Europe seemed to be dead, but two years of 
heavy fighting and nearly futile losses brought it 
to life again. The war, which began in an out- 
burst of international rivalry, ended in the Con- 
ference of Paris, 1856, in which all the Great 



LATER PHASES OF CONCERT 87 

Powers but Prussia undertook to settle the 
Eastern question by neutralizing the Euxine and 
the Danube and by making new allotments of 
territory which were supposed to adjust bound- 
aries in such a manner that rivalries would dis- 
appear. The Conference went on to take up the 
work of a true European congress by agreeing 
upon the Declaration of Paris, in which were 
assembled a body of rules regulating neutral 
trade in time of war. England gave up her long 
defended pretension to seize enemy goods on 
neutral ships and neutral goods on enemy ships, 
and in return gained the recognition that priva- 
teering was unlawful. Thus the Crimean War, 
fought by Great Britain and France against 
Russia, and in support of Turkey — with Austria 
and Prussia as neutrals — was at last ended by 
an agreement between all the parties concerned. 
The nations undertook to settle the long Eastern 
dispute by pledging the sultan to reforms which 
it was not in his nature to carry out. 

The next three wars were fought without 
respect to the Concert of Europe. They arose 
from local causes and were soon determined with- 
out the aid of the Great Powers. They were the 



88 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

war of Austria and France over the liberation of 
Italy, 1859 ; the war between Prussia and Austria, 
1866, in which Prussia overthrew the Austrian 
predominancy in Germany; and the Franco- 
Prussian war in 1870-1871, in which Prussia 
crushed France and made herself the head of the 
German Empire. In the first of these struggles 
no state could gain enough power to become a 
menace to the other states, since Italy was to be 
the recipient of all territory gained. Had the 
contest gone so far as to promise the vast en- 
largement of the power of France by reason of 
an alliance with enlarged Italy, interference 
might have resulted. In fact, the German states 
began to suspect such a result, and the realization 
of it was one of Napoleon's reasons for with- 
drawing very unceremoniously from the war. 
Here we see, therefore, that the principle of con- 
cert was not entirely dead. The second and third 
wars were fought by a brilliantly organized state, 
Prussia, with whose successful armies no nation 
cared to make a trial of strength. 

In 1877 Russia made war on Turkey and pro- 
ceeded with such energy that she soon forced 
the sultan to sign the treaty of San Stefano, al- 



LATER PHASES OF CONCERT 8<9 

together in favor of Russia. The particulars 
of the struggle belong to another chapter, 1 but 
here it is only necessary to point out that the 
Concert of Europe was now suddenly revived by 
the Great Powers, and Russia was forced to sub- 
mit her well won victory to the Congress of Ber- 
lin, which scaled down the awards of San Stefano 
until Russia might well ask what was left of her 
victory. A similar thing happened in the Bal- 
kan War of 1912-1913. Here the parties con- 
cerned had fought their quarrel out to the end 
and had nearly expelled Turkey from Europe, 
dividing the spoils among themselves. Then 
in stepped the Great Powers, prescribing in a 
treaty at London the limits of gain to the suc- 
cessful contestants. They acted in the interest 
of peace ; for Austria, watching the actions of Ser- 
bia and Greece, let it be known that she would 
not allow Serbia to have Albania, and the Powers 
interfered in order to prevent such action from 
kindling a great European war. 

Thus in three notable wars, the Crimean War, 
the Russo-Turkish War, and the Balkan War, 
the action of the Great Powers was not to pre- 

i See below, p. 112. 



90 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

vent war, but to neutralize its gains. So far did 
this principle go that writers were known to sug- 
gest that war would no longer be profitable to 
nations, since in a Concert of Europe the Great 
Powers would ever nullify the gains of the con- 
testants. 

At this time concert had come to mean another 
thing than it meant in the decade after the fall 
of Napoleon. Then it was a fixed system of con- 
sultation and decision in anticipation of some 
issue that threatened war: now it was concerted 
action to keep a local war from going so far 
as to involve a general conflict. It was a 
last resort in the presence of dire danger. A 
more present means of preserving peace was the 
Balance of Power, which consisted in forming 
the states in groups one of which balanced an- 
other group and prevented the development of 
overwhelming strength. The principle was well 
known in the past history of Europe, but it was 
never so clearly defined in the remote past as in 
the last half century. For our purposes its 
modern phase begins after the Franco-Prussian 
War, 1870-1871. 

Before that time Prussia was strong in Europe 



LATER PHASES OF CONCERT 91 

but not over-whelmingly great. On one side 
was Austria, long her enemy, and on the other 
was France. Within five years they were de- 
feated with such quick and crushing blows that 
the world was startled and the Germans them- 
selves were as much astonished as delighted. 
Out of this brilliant period of success arose the 
German Empire, with Prussia for its corner- 
stone and Bismarck for its builder and guardian. 
Immediately a singular thing happened. One 
would hardly expect that a beaten state would 
straightway form an alliance with the power that 
had humiliated her; yet such a relation was es- 
tablished between Germany and Austria, and it 
has lasted to this day. Where Germany has 
loved Austria has loved, where Germany has 
hated Austria has hated, and the ambition of 
one has been supported by the other. Bis- 
marck's policy had this state of friendship in view 
and he gave Austria generous terms of peace in 
1866, when she was at his feet. Common blood 
bound the two states together and later led to 
the hope of unification in a great Pan-German 
empire. 

With France, however, the empire which Bis- 



92 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

marck founded was to have no such state of 
amity. Between them was no brotherhood, not 
even in the tenuous bonds of the theory of the 
rights of man. Back of 1871 were many acts 
of aggression, many bitter wars, and some very 
humiliating experiences for states inhabited by 
Germans. And now the tables were turned. 
France was weak and the often beaten Germans 
were strong and victorious. Their vengeance 
was expressed in the long siege of Paris, the 
proclamation of the German Empire in the 
chateau of the old French kings, the humiliating 
indemnity levied on the French people, and the 
annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, so long in 
the quiet keeping of France that they were thor- 
oughly French in sympathy and political pur- 
pose. Bismarck usually ruled his heart with his 
head, but he lost himself for the moment when 
he sent a defeated neighbor under the yoke of 
needless disgrace, and Germany has paid the 
price many times over in maintaining a great 
army and parrying the diplomatic thrusts of 
France. The hostile feelings thus engendered 
gave rise to the particular kind of balance of 
power that has existed in Europe since 1871; 



LATER PHASES OF CONCERT 93 

for on whatever side Germany was found France 
was on the other, and however the elements 
shifted in the grouping of nations these two states 
were always opponents. 

It was Bismarck's idea to form an alliance so 
powerful that no other state nor group of states 
would dare attack it, and by holding his allies 
in hand to preserve peace. That was the way 
the Balance of Power was to serve to prevent 
war. For his purpose he formed what was 
known as the Three Emperors' League, consist- 
ing of the rulers of Germany, Russia, and Aus- 
tria. The combination was weak in one im- 
portant point; for Russia and Austria had rival 
hopes of territorial gains in the Near East, and 
they were not likely to remain permanently in 
accord. With an eye to such a disruption of the 
alliance Bismarck looked about for another state 
which could be added to the group. He turned 
to Italy, bound to him because he had befriended 
her in her struggle for nationality. 

To bring Italy into the alliance was not easy; 
for she was bitterly hostile to Austria, who still 
held the unredeemed part of the Italian people 
and who was still hated in the peninsula for her 



94 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

ancient oppression of Italian provinces. The 
Iron Chancellor generally carried his point, 
partly because of his personal ability and partly 
because it was felt that he could and would live 
up to his promises. He showed the king of Italy 
the advantages the kingdom would have under 
German protection, which would support it 
against France, strengthen it in the quarrel with 
the pope, and even hold back Austria if that 
power was inclined to pay off old scores. These 
arrangements were completed in 1882 and gave 
rise to the Triple Alliance, until 1914 a strong 
factor in European affairs. The greatness of 
Bismarck is well shown in the fact that he could 
carry this plan through and still retain Russia 
in cooperation with Austria and Germany. 
Until he retired from office in 1890 he had the 
support of the tsar. 

After he withdrew the union of the three em- 
perors was dissolved. But for his strong hand 
it could hardly have been formed. Russia and 
Austria were at bottom rivals If Germany 
supported Russia in her plans for the Near East 
she would offend Austria, and if she lent herself 
to Austria she would lose Russia. Moreover, if 



LATER PHASES OF CONCERT 95 

she favored Russia openly she was likely to 
arouse the opposition of Great Britain, who was 
at that time very suspicious of the tsar's designs 
on Constantinople. It was a delicate situation, 
and it was only good luck and Bismarck's char- 
acter that kept it intact for more than fifteen 
years. 

After 1890 the Triple Alliance continued its 
existence, Italy suppressing her dislike for 
Austria as well as she could in view of her need 
of strong friends among the nations. But Rus- 
sia fell away and in 1895 announced that she had 
formed a Dual Alliance with France, a thing 
which Bismarck had been very solicitous to 
prevent. By holding Russia in hand he had been 
able to isolate France in Europe, but her isola- 
tion was now a thing of the past. The Dual 
Alliance confronted the Triple Alliance and the 
result was peace. At the same time the rivalry 
of Russia and Austria over Turkey became more 
energetic, which tended to increase the probability 
of war. 

Succeeding Bismarck came German states- 
men who were not so steady as he, and their 
weaker hold on the situation added to the gravity 



96 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

of the prospects of peace. It can hardly be 
doubted that the fall of Bismarck lessened the 
prospect that Europe would remain at peace. 
The Balance of Power, which took so clear a 
form with the organization of the Dual Alliance, 
was not as good a guarantee of peace as it seemed ; 
for while it made the checking of powers by 
powers more apparent, its very existence was 
evidence of a state of stronger rivalry of na- 
tions than existed before the Dual Alliance was 
formed. At the same time the men who now 
guided the fortunes of Germany were not so con- 
vinced as Bismarck that the country should have 
peace. 

While these things happened Great Britain re- 
mained generally neutral. She was busy with 
trade expansion and the development of her 
colonies, especially in Africa ; and her chief inter- 
est, so far as the schemes of the Continental 
nations were concerned, was to see that none of 
them interfered with her progress in that field 
of endeavor. Late in Bismarck's time, however, 
she became convinced that Germany was becom- 
ing a rival both in trade and colonization. It is 
true that France was also a rival, and between 



LATER PHASES OF CONCERT 97 

her and Great Britain occurred some sharp pas- 
sages; but France was not an aggressive nation 
and had no strong military resources to back her 
ambitions in the field of peaceful activities. Ger- 
many, on the other hand, was increasingly mili- 
taristic and the logic of events seemed to indicate 
that she would at some time in the future be 
willing to support her commercial and colonial 
ambition with a formidable appeal to arms. 
British anxiety was quickened when the young 
kaiser began to build a great navy, with the 
avowed object of making it equal to the British 
navy. For centuries it had been the key-note 
of British policy to have a navy that could con- 
trol the seas; and while there was nothing in the 
will of Father Adam that gave Britons the do- 
minion of the seas, the kaiser must have known 
that he could not challenge their superiority on 
water without arousing their gravest appre- 
hension. During the Boer war (1899-1902) 
Germany gave added offense to Britain. She 
showed sympathy openly for the Boers, and it 
was generally believed in Great Britain that she 
took advantage of the opportunity to try to form 
a grand alliance to curb the power of the "Mis- 



98 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

tress of the Seas." Rumor said that the plan 
was defeated only by the refusal of France to 
lend her assistance unless she received Alsace- 
Lorraine. If the report is true, it only shows 
what a costly thing to Germany was the hatred 
that Bismarck created when he put France to 
the humiliating dismemberment of 1871. 

During this period Theophile Delcasse was 
head of the French foreign office (1898-1905). 
He was a man of great original ability and was 
desirous of restoring the prestige of France. 
When he came into office the French public was 
excited over the Fashoda incident, a clash of 
French and British interests in the Sudan which 
seemed to threaten war. The British govern- 
ment took a strong attitude, as it was likely at 
that time to do, when it felt that it was dealing 
with a weaker nation. Delcasse realized that 
the true welfare of his country demanded friend- 
ship with the one power which could help it 
against Germany, and at the risk of denunciation 
at home he gave up all that Great Britain de- 
manded in the Sudan. He thus showed that 
he possessed that high trait of statesmanship 



LATER PHASES OF CONCERT 99 

which consists in the ability to convert an op- 
ponent into a firm friend. 

The opportunity to which he was looking for- 
ward came when Germany set her plans into 
operation during the Boer war. He not only 
held out for the return of the lost provinces but, 
that failing, made overtures for a better under- 
standing with the British. It was a time when 
a friendly hand was gladly received by the Lon- 
don government. The result was a series of 
agreements which became known as the Entente 
Cordiale, 1904. They marked the reappearance 
of Great Britain as a leading power in Conti- 
nental affairs, after a long period of aloofness. 
She had become an active part of the Balance 
of Power, and her strength was thrown to the 
side which was bent on restraining the vast in- 
fluence of Germany. Her action caused great 
alarm at Berlin, where her motive was inter- 
preted as commercial jealousy, the statesmen of 
that city apparently forgetting that they had pro- 
voked it by their unfriendly attitude in the Boer 
war. 

In the same year began the Russo-Japanese 



100 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

war (1904-1905) . At first glance it would seem 
that this conflict threatened to weaken the En- 
tente Cordiale, for Japan was allied to Great 
Britain and Russia was bound up with France 
by the Dual Alliance. But the result was just 
the opposite. The Entente was not only left in- 
tact, but it was actually strengthened. When 
Japan defeated Russia, Great Britain ceased to 
fear Russian aggression in the Far East, which 
made it possible for her to draw nearer to the 
Muscovite power. At the same time, Russia, 
always seeking an outlet to the sea, turned her 
eyes with greater eagerness than ever to the 
Near East, which brought her into a more intense 
state of opposition to Austria and Germany. 
Delcasse seized the opportunity offered him and 
succeeded in bringing together these two great 
nations, which for many years had been con- 
tinually ready to fly at one another. He put 
into motion the negotiations out of which was 
formed the Triple Entente (1907) in which 
Great Britain, France, and Russia announced 
that they had settled their differences and would 
stand together in future crises. 

The incidents that followed the culmination 



LATER PHASES OF CONCERT 101 

of Delcasse's diplomacy are very striking, but 
they must be deferred until I reach a later stage 
of my subject. Here it is only proper to observe 
that it brought the theory of the Balance of 
Power to its logical development. Delcasse was 
in a world in which one great and most efficiently 
armed nation stood in a position to turn sud- 
denly on the rest of Europe and sweep it into 
her lap. By her military and naval power, by 
her vast trained army, by her readiness for in- 
stantaneous action, by her well planned strategic 
railroads, and by her alliances with the middle- 
European states she was in a threatening position. 
At a given signal she could seize great domains, 
fortify herself, and defy all the world to drive 
her out of what she had taken. There was hardly 
an intelligent German who did not believe that 
this course would be followed in the near future 
and who did not feel confident that it would make 
Germany the dominating nation of the world. 
Against this system the Triple Entente was 
formed, as a means of balance. It was larger 
than the Triple Alliance but not so effectively 
led. 

And here I must observe that these two groups 



102 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

had come into existence in the most natural way. 
Bismarck had founded the Triple Alliance as a 
means of preserving peace, not as a means of 
aggression; but it had become something more 
than he intended it to be. It had enabled Ger- 
many to play such a part in European politics 
that the creation of another great group as a 
balance was apparently demanded. Imme- 
diately that her position was lowered Germany 
felt aggrieved that the combination had been 
made against her. So powerful were her con- 
victions about her wrongs that she threw away 
all thought of a concert of the Great Powers for 
the settlement of the difficulty. She had trusted 
to the Balance to protect her; but she now con- 
sidered it something more than a state of equi- 
librium and she appealed to arms. Before this 
narrative recounts the actual events by which 
she felt that she was justified in taking this step, 
it is necessary to consider the Balkan question, a 
series of causes and events which for nearly a 
century has been an open menace to European 
peace and stability. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE BALKAN STATES 

Viscount Grey has been criticized for not 
understanding the Balkan problem. If his 
critics understood how complex is the story of the 
last century in this part of Europe they would 
withold their strictures. I, at least, do not 
blame any man for failing to carry in his mind 
an appreciation of all that the mixed mass of 
races and religions in the Balkan country have 
striven and hoped for during the recent past. In 
this chapter the best that can be promised is an 
account of the main facts of Balkan history. A 
more detailed narrative would be confusing to 
the reader. A failure to mention the subject 
would leave much unexplained that is essential to 
an understanding of the origin of the present 
war. And we shall hardly know how to decide 
what kind of a peace the future security of 
Europe demands, if we leave out of consideration 
the proper disposition to be made of the small 
states of the Southeast. 

103 



104 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

In 1453 Turkey took Constantinople and be- 
gan a series of conquests that carried her to the 
very gates of the city of Vienna. That impor- 
tant stronghold seemed about to fall into her 
hands in 1683, when an army of Polish and Ger- 
man soldiers came to its rescue in the name of 
Christianity, drove off the infidels, and wrenched 
Hungary out of their hands for the benefit of 
the Austrian power. This struggle proved the 
highwater mark of Turkish conquest in Europe. 
From that time to this, wars of reconquest have 
followed one another, the pagans always playing 
a losing game. But for a long time all that part 
of Southeastern Europe that could be reached 
from the Black Sea was held by the Turks, the 
part that was easily reached from Germany 
was held by the Christians, and the part that lay 
between, a broad belt of hilly country, was con- 
tinually in dispute. Across it armies fought 
back and forth, each side winning and losing in 
turn, but with the general result in favor of the 
Christians, who slowly pushed back the frontier 
of their enemies. 

The region held by the Turks was tenacious of 
its Christian faith and recognized the religious 



THE BALKAN STATES 105 

authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople, 
who, Christian though he was, stood under the 
control of the sultan. The inhabitants suffered 
many hardships and were reduced to the condi- 
tion of serfs under Mohammedan masters. The 
long bondage to their overlords had a peculiar 
effect on their characters. They came to think it 
right to use fraud, violence, and subterfuge 
against their oppressors, and so they employed 
religion and patriotism to defend the commission 
of acts which in ordinary situations are consid- 
ered without the pale of civilized conduct. To 
this day the Balkan states are not rid of their 
heritage from these years of moral darkness. 

The Balkan people, ruled long as Turkish 
subjects, have gradually formed themselves into 
five principal groups as follows: the Serbians, 
dwelling in the interior of the country northwest 
of Turkey proper and occupying much of the 
hinterland lying east of the Adriatic; the Bul- 
gars, settled east of the Serbs and extending as 
far as the shores of the Black Sea; the Wallach- 
ians and Moldavians, who were of kindred stock 
and became known as Rumanians because they 
believed themselves the descendants of the inhabi- 



106 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

tants of the ancient Roman colony of Dacia; 
the Albanians living along the lower eastern 
shores of the Adriatic; and the Montenegrins, of 
the same race as the Serbians, who defended 
themselves so well in their mountain strongholds 
that they could say they had never been con- 
quered by the Turks. Many race elements 
entered into these groups, but the Serbs and 
Montenegrins were largely Slavic, while the 
Bulgars were generally of a distinct race of 
Asiatic origin, and the Rumanians were gen- 
erally Vlachs, a name given to the Latin speak- 
ing population of the Eastern Roman Empire. 
The Albanians seem to be of mixed stock, but 
they have a strong sense of nationality. These 
five groups correspond respectively to the five 
civil divisions that have emerged from the Turk- 
ish provinces, each playing its part in the modern 
Balkan problem. 

Montenegro aside, the first group to become a 
state was Serbia, whose hardy mountain in- 
habitants rose in revolt in 1804. A number of 
brave leaders appeared and valley by valley the 
Turks were forced out of the country. The 
Serbs were practically independent for a time, 



THE BALKAN STATES 107 

but the sultan did not acquiesce in their freedom, 
and the constant preparedness that was necessary 
to repel any attack he might launch was a source 
of much expense and anxiety to the people. 

In 1821 the Greeks, also under the domination 
of Turkey, rose in revolt. Great sympathy was 
aroused in the rest of Europe and in spite of 
the disposition of the Great Powers to allow 
Turkey a free hand to preserve her territory in- 
tact, lest one of them gain over-balancing terri- 
tory, public opinion forced them to intervene. 
The first to show sympathy was Russia, who had 
an interest in making herself the protector of the 
Christians in Turkey. The other powers re- 
sented her assistance to the Greeks, and finally 
Great Britain and France united in a project of 
intervention, sending a joint fleet to the Medi- 
terranean which destroyed the Turkish fleet at 
Navarino in 1827. The stubborn sultan re- 
mained unyielding, and in 1828 Russia entered 
the war openly, having come to an agreement 
with the other Powers. She sent an army across 
the border which carried all before it, and the 
sultan was forced to make the treaty of Adria- 
nople, in which Turkey recognized the independ- 



108 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

ence of Greece and acknowledged Serbia as an 
autonomous state under Turkish suzerainty. 
At the same time Wallachia and Moldavia, where 
Humans lived, were recognized as independent 
under a Russian protectorate. Thus one sov- 
ereign and three dependent but locally autono- 
mous states stood forth out of the confused 
and misgoverned Christian area of Turkey in 
Europe. 

The rest of the region, occupied by Bulgars 
and Albanians, with Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
claimed by the Serbs as legitimate parts of their 
national habitat, remained in an unredeemed con- 
dition and were governed by agents appointed 
by the sultan. Montenegro retained her posi- 
tion of practical independence, which Turkey 
had been forced to acknowledge in 1799. These 
arrangements were confirmed in a more formal 
treaty in 1832. 

The successes of this period quickened the 
spirit of nationality in the Balkans. Just as the 
Greeks were swept by a wave of enthusiasm for 
their classical culture and sought to revive the 
language and ideals of the remote past, so the 
Balkan peoples set out to revive their ancient 



THE BALKAN STATES 109 

culture, long obscured by the shadow of Turkish 
masters. Serbs, Rumans, and Bulgars made 
grammars of their own languages, gathered up 
what was preserved of their ancient literatures 
and traditions, taught their children to revere 
the national heroes, and sought in many other 
ways to stimulate the spirit of nationality. The 
Slavic portion turned to Russia for support, 
whom they called their "big brother," while the 
Rumans cultivated an appreciation of Italy and 
France, whom they considered kindred descend- 
ants of the ancient Romans. To their national 
hopes in these things was added the desire for 
religious independence. They disliked being un- 
der the ecclesiastical authority of the Patriarch 
of Constantinople, who was appointed by the sul- 
tan, and looked forward to a time when they 
might have exarchs of their own, with jurisdiction 
not limited by the Patriarch. 

In 1854 Russia was ready for another advance 
in the region of the Balkans, hoping to gain at 
last what Peter the Great had declared was es- 
sential to her progress, a window looking out on 
the Mediterranean. Great Britain and France 
came to the help of the sultan and the Crimean 



110 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

War followed. After a hard struggle it ended 
in Russia's defeat, and at the Conference of 
Paris, 1856, the affairs of the Balkans were again 
up for settlement, but this time the victory leaned 
to the side of the Turk, although it was modified 
by the restraining hand of his two allies. The 
purport of the treaty was to reduce the power 
of Russia, and in doing so the aspirations of the 
Balkans states were checked. The protectorate 
the tsar had established over Wallachia and Mol- 
davia was destroyed, and Bulgars, who had 
expected independence, remained under the rule 
of the sultan, while Greece, who had desired a 
large portion of Macedonia, was forced to con- 
tinue in her old boundaries. This crisis was not 
the last in which the vexed Balkan question, 
seemingly near solution, was made to give way 
before the complicated problems of the general 
European situation. Looking backward we may 
well say that if Russia had secured her wish, ex- 
pelled the Turk from Constantinople and liber- 
ated the Balkan states, the fortunes of France 
would not have been lessened, and Great Britain, 
safe through her supremacy at sea, would not 
have lost any of the strength she had in India. 



THE BALKAN STATES 111 

At the same time the sore spot of European 
relations would have been healed, and we should 
probably have had no war in 1914. 

Wallachia and Moldavia were of the same 
stock and wished to unite as one kingdom. They 
made their desires known in the negotiations 
that resulted in the Treaty of Paris, but the 
Powers did not mean to create a large state on 
the borders of Russia which might prove a bul- 
wark of influence for the tsar, and accordingly 
they denied the request. The two states found 
a way to accomplish their desire, soon after the 
conference at Paris adjourned. Meeting to 
select rulers each chose Alexander John Cuza 
simultaneously, and after hesitating two years 
the Powers acknowledged him as king. Thus 
was formed the united kingdom of Rumania; 
and its formation illustrated a weak point in the 
Concert of Europe. However much the Powers 
might interfere to prevent the consummation of 
an act they considered dangerous, they would 
think twice before trying to punish a Balkan 
state, since in doing so they might set off an 
explosion in the very system they were working 
to keep peaceful. Rumania understood this 



112 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

phase of the matter and took her chances. Her 
firm course had its reward. 

The influence of Great Britain was now para- 
mount at Constantinople. The sultan was satis- 
fied with his ally, since he knew that of all the 
Powers he had least to fear from this state, which 
had no territories in that part of the Mediter- 
ranean and was committed to the preservation of 
his rule as a means of keeping Russia away from 
the Bosphorus. To justify herself for defending 
the Turk, Great Britain gave the world assur- 
ances that the sultan was about to become good. 
Under her insistance a series of reforms was an- 
nounced, but they did not go far in the realiza- 
tion. Some of the promises referred to the gov- 
ernment of the Balkans, but they were as fruit- 
less as the others. Meanwhile French and 
British merchants found large profits in Turkish 
trade. 

The tsar was humiliated by his loss of influence 
in the Southeast, and in 1877 he began another 
war against Turkey. He thought the time 
favorable for such action. Impeded for a while 
at Plevna, in Bulgaria, he at last swept the enemy 
before him and took Adrianople on January 16, 



THE BALKAN STATES US 

1878. His successes created great enthusiasm 
among the Serbs, Bulgars, and Rumans, who 
flocked to his victorious standard. The panic- 
stricken sultan sued for peace and at San Stefano 
signed a treaty which granted all that was de- 
manded of him. Serbia, Montenegro, and 
Rumania were recognized as completely inde- 
pendent, Bulgaria as an autonomous tributary 
province, and Bosnia and Herzegovina were as- 
sured of important administrative reforms. 
Russia was awarded some territory not strictly in 
the Balkans, but her greatest gain was the pres- 
tige she now had as liberator of Christian states. 
The treaty of San Stefano alarmed Great 
Britain and Austria, both of whom felt that they 
had major interests at stake. They got a con- 
gress of the Great Powers to meet at Berlin, 
1878, which revised the treaty in what they were 
pleased to call the interest of European peace. 
Complete independence was announced for 
Serbia, Rumania, and Montenegro, and the sul- 
tan accepted the fact of their perfect sovereignty. 
By the treaty of San Stefano Bulgaria was to 
include Macedon and eastern Rumelia, making 
one great buffer province between the Turkish 



114 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

and the Christian states. The three parts were 
now left distinct, Bulgaria proper being autono- 
mous but under Turkish suzerainty, and the 
other two less independent. 

To create a "Big Bulgaria" as a bulwark 
against Turkey had been Russia's chief hope in 
the war. Her initial success awakened enthus- 
iasm in all the Balkan people, and the results 
were expressed in the way in which they rallied 
to her aid. At last, said the onlookers, an op- 
portunity had come to found a strong Balkan 
confederacy which would play an important 
part in the development of the Near East. The 
hand of Russia seemed strong enough to hold 
these nascent states to one policy, allay their in- 
cipient jealousies, and bring them to a great com- 
mon ideal. If such a course could have been 
adopted the future of Europe would have been 
profoundly altered. It was defeated by that 
Concert of Europe which was supposed to exist 
in order that the world might be spared the bur- 
den of war. It was really prevented through the 
operation of the forces of national selfishness, 
safely esconced in the system which we have 
called the Concert of Europe. 



THE BALKAN STATES 115 

The ambition of Austria-Hungary played a 
large part at the Congress of Berlin. This na- 
tion had long looked upon the region that sepa- 
rated her from the Adriatic as a sphere through 
which she was justified in extending her power at 
the expense of Turkey, and she now felt that 
the time had come to realize her plans. If she 
waited, Russia would acquire such an influence 
as to forestall Austrian advancement. Her eyes 
were fixed on Bosnia and Herzegovina, for some 
time in revolt against Turkish misgovernment. 
Her influence was such that the congress gave 
her the right to occupy and administer the two 
provinces under the reservation of sovereignty to 
the sultan. The inhabitants, who were largely 
Slavic, were forced to accept the decision, al- 
though they did not relax their cherished hopes 
of independence. They were pawns thrown to 
Austria as a balance for the gains of Russia. 
The transaction only whetted the Austrian appe- 
tite for more and deepened the Serbian resent- 
ment for Austria. 

Great Britain had her advantage out of the 
bargain also. She retained her position of para- 
mount friend at Constantinople, justifying her- 



116 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

self with the assurance that the sultan would 
carry out reforms in his empire. She seemed 
to think that the "Sick Man of Europe" would 
cure himself under her guidance and then defend 
himself against states that tried to oust him from 
his seat of power. To enable her to watch the 
bedside of her patient from a convenient posi- 
tion, as well as to safeguard the Suez Canal, 
Great Britain was given the right to occupy and 
administer the island of Cyprus under nominal 
authority of Turkey. To be perfectly fair we 
must admit that there is little moral difference 
between her acquisition of Cyprus and Austria's 
gain in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and it is clear 
that in this case the Concert of Europe was a 
concert for the gain of selfish ends. It is also 
worth while to note that two of the Great Powers 
took no benefit from the agreement. France 
was slowly recovering from the war of 1870- 
1871 and was in no condition to fight, although 
in 1881 she established a protectorate over Tunis. 
The German Empire, newly founded and not yet 
fully adapted to the imperial system, was also in 
no condition to undertake a stiff encounter. 
There were many Germans who wished that their 



THE BALKAN STATES 117 

government should not allow the other states to 
get large gains of territory while Germany got 
nothing; but they yielded to Bismarck's wise 
policy which held that it was not yet time 
for Germany to assume an aggressive position 
in the world. The impatience of the Ger- 
man patriots lost nothing through having to 
wait. 

No treaty ends the march of time, and the 
Balkan situation continued to develop along the 
old lines. In 1881 Greece acquired Thessaly in 
accordance with a promise made to her at the 
Congress of Berlin. In 1885 East Rumelia de- 
clared herself united to Bulgaria, acting in de- 
fiance of the will of the Congress of Berlin. The 
Powers did not interfere for the same reason 
that they did not act when Wallachia and Mol- 
davia united in 1862. To attempt to undo the 
union would have precipitated a general war. 
The Concert was stronger to prevent a given 
action than to correct it after it was done. 
Serbia, however, took the action of the two 
provinces as a menace and declared war against 
the new state of Bulgaria. She seemed about 
to throw herself on her adversary when she sud- 



118 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

denly made peace, evidently feeling she was not 
strong enough to carry on the war alone. 

Thenceforth the Powers showed that they did 
not mean to allow the Balkan states to profit 
by seizing parts of the decaying Turkish Em- 
pire. But for their restraint it seems that the 
Turk would have been expelled from Europe 
before the end of the nineteenth century. 

Their intention was clearly manifested in re- 
gard to the island of Crete, whose population 
long suffered from Turkish oppression. In 1896 
the island was in revolt and the sultan was forced 
to promise reforms. The assurance proved 
empty and in 1897 Greece interfered in behalf 
of Crete. In the war that followed the Greeks 
fought heroically but alone and were no match 
for Turkey in operations on land. They made 
peace without success, but through the instru- 
mentality of the Great Powers the sultan agreed 
to allow Crete self-government under an elected 
assembly. The powers let it be known that 
they would not have the island annexed to Greece, 
which they did not mean to make a preponderat- 
ing influence in the Balkans. Now appeared a 
great Cretan leader, Eleutherios Venezelos, 



THE BALKAN STATES 119 

whom his admirers call the Cavour of Greece. 
'Under his influence the Cretan assembly voted the 
union of the island with Greece in 1905, but again 
the Powers interposed, insisting that the sover- 
eignty of the sultan should not be abrogated. 
However, they permitted the Greek king to ap- 
point a representative to rule the island as a 
Turkish fief, and Greek officers were allowed to 
train the Cretan soldiers and police. At last 
the Balkan war (1912-1913) brought the com- 
pletion of union, the Great Powers yielding their 
assent. 

The explanation of the conduct of the Powers 
in this incident is to be found in the delicate 
nature of the whole Balkan question. With 
Austria and Russia keenly aroused and each of 
the Balkan states anxiously looking for the 
moment when the rest of the sultan's territory in 
Europe was to be divided between them, it was 
evident that a little thing could precipitate a 
serious conflict. It was in view of this phase of 
the situation that the Balkans were called "the 
tinder-box of Europe." 

It will be observed that while these things 
happened the Balkan states were developing 



120 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

steadily in national resources and spirit. Greece, 
Serbia, Bulgaria, and Rumania became vitally 
organized powers, it became more and more evi- 
dent that they were no longer mere pawns in 
the diplomatic game, and the time was fast ap- 
proaching when they would wish to take parts 
on their own initiative. So assertive were they 
becoming that it was certain that the time would 
soon come when the Great Powers would tire of 
the process of holding conferences to keep these 
states out of trouble. It is not an easy task to 
serve as custodian for a "tinder-box." 

A fair warning of this kind of danger oc- 
curred in 1908. For twenty-three years Bul- 
garia had remained undisturbed, giving herself 
to a rapid process of educational and industrial 
development, in both of which lines she had 
come under the influence of German methods. 
Suddenly she threw off her nominal Turkish 
sovereignty and declared herself an entirely in- 
dependent state. At the same time, and 
evidently by agreement with the German Em- 
pire, Austria-Hungary announced that she would 
hold Bosnia-Herzegovina as an integral part of 
her empire, thus superseding the "occupation" 



THE BALKAN STATES 121 

that was authorized by the congress of Berlin, in 
1878. Serbia took the matter as a great injury, 
but she could do nothing alone. Her natural 
ally was Russia, then recovering from the severe 
losses of the war against Japan. Had the tsar 
been ready for war it is doubtful if he would 
have drawn the sword in this instance; for a 
world war would have resulted, and the nations 
were not yet ready to think of such an under- 
taking. But Serbia nursed her wrongs and to 
Russia the sense of her shame grew as she thought 
how her weakness had been flaunted in the face 
of the world. The day came when the fire could 
no longer be smothered. 

To understand Serbia's feelings we must re- 
call the national ideal by which her hopes had 
been formed for many years. Most of the 
people of Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, 
Novi-Bazar, and the northwestern corner of 
Macedonia were Serbs by blood. To unite them 
into a great Serbia had long been spoken of in 
Serbia as the "Great Idea." When, therefore, 
Austria took definite possession of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina the "Great Idea" seemed defeated 
forever. Rage and despair possessed the Serbs 



122 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

wherever they lived, patriotic societies voiced the 
feeling of the people, and vengeance was plotted. 
Probably it was the feeling that this wide-spread 
hatred should be uprooted in the most thorough 
manner that prompted Austria to make the heavy 
conditions that were demanded as atonement for 
the crime of Sarajevo. 

After Austria took the fateful step of 1908 
Turkey still held the territory just north of the 
Bosphorus, organized as the province of 
Adrianople. She also had in Europe the prov- 
inces of Macedonia, Albania, and the sanjak 
of Novi-Bazar. To drive her out of these pos- 
sessions was the object of the Balkan states. In 
1911 Italy began a war against the sultan to 
gain Tripoli. The Balkan States seeing their 
enemy embarrassed, concluded that the hour of 
fate had come. They formed the Balkan 
League, made up of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, 
and Montenegro, and made ready for war. 
Their action alarmed the Great Powers, who 
brought the Concert of Europe to bear against 
the League. They gave the allies fair notice 
that they would not permit them to take any of 
the sultan's territory in Europe, even though 



THE BALKAN STATES 123 

a war was won against him. The reply to this 
threat shows how weak the Concert had become. 
It was voiced by Montenegro, the smallest of 
the states, whose king immediately declared war 
and called on his allies to aid him in driving the 
pagan out of Europe. The call was accepted 
gladly and an ultimatum was sent to the sultan, 
who, relying on the promise of the Powers, defied 
his opponents. 

In the war that followed Turkey was con- 
fronted by a united army of nearly a million 
men. It was impossible to withstand them and 
in two months most of Macedonia was lost, Con- 
stantinople was threatened, and Turkey asked 
for an armistice. Negotiations began in Lon- 
don, the Powers seemingly forgetting their empty 
threat that they "would not permit at the end of 
the conflict any modification of the territorial 
status quo in European Turkey." The allies de- 
manded hard terms which seemed about to be 
accepted by Turkey when by a coup d'etat the 
"Young Turks," a patriotic party of reformers, 
got possession of the government at Constanti- 
nople and resumed the fighting. Although they 
fought well, they could not withstand the large 



124* THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

numbers that were against them. Janina fell to 
the Greeks, Adrianople was taken by a Serbo- 
Bulgarian force, and Scutari was taken by the 
Montenegrins. The Turks now yielded defi- 
nitely and negotiations for peace were resumed. 
Behind the diplomatic proceedings was the fol- 
lowing interesting situation: Austria-Hungary 
was dismayed at the prospect of having a strong 
and permanent league organized in the Balkans ; 
for it would probably make it impossible for her 
to realize her desire to extend her territory in 
that direction. She was especially unwilling to 
allow Serbia and Montenegro to hold the con- 
quered shore of the Adriatic, since it was here 
that she designed to gain additional outlets to 
the seas. Italy at the same time was alarmed at 
the extension of Serbian power, since she, also, 
did not relish the prospect of having a strong 
state on the eastern side of the sea. It was with 
unexpected short-sightedness, however, that she 
was willing to block Serbia in order to promote 
the schemes of Austria, a far more formidable 
rival in that quarter, if she were ever firmly es- 
tablished there. Both states, therefore, appeared 
at London to limit the expansion of Serbia, and 



THE BALKAN STATES 125 

Germany supported them, seemingly on the 
principle that she was merely standing by the 
members of the Triple Alliance. It has been 
supposed that she expected that Ferdinand, heir- 
apparent of Austria, when he came to rule, would 
promote a vital union of the two great Mid-Con- 
tinental empires. If we accept this theory, we 
must conclude that she had a still more vital rea- 
son for wishing Austria to have a large Adriatic 
coast-line, with important commercial harbors. 

These considerations ran exactly counter to 
Serbia's hopes in Albania. She had already oc- 
cupied the Albanian port of Durazzo and ex- 
pected to make it the center of a fair commercial 
life. When ordered to withdraw she did not dare 
refuse; but it was a great humiliation to her to 
cut off the possibility of her future growth. For 
a second time Austria had given her a vital blow, 
and there was another wrong to be remembered 
by those Serbians who were inclined to remember. 
By the decree of the Powers Albania was made 
an autonomous state under Turkish suzerainty, 
and later on a German prince was appointed to 
rule it. 

While these affairs were being discussed 



126 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

Montenegro besieged Scutari, in northern Al- 
bania and continued operation until the place 
was taken, notwithstanding the purpose of the 
Powers was well known. Her courageous con- 
duct won the admiration of lovers of brave men 
everywhere. Eight days after the capture of 
Scutari, Austria announced that she would enter 
the war if the place was not evacuated, and Italy 
and Germany declared they would support her. 
Throughout all slavic countries arose a cry of 
indignation. In Russia especially it was loud 
and bitter; and it seemed that a great war was 
about to begin when King Nicholas, of Monte- 
negro, gave the world the assurance of peace by 
withdrawing his army from Scutari. 

Then came that unhappy turn of affairs by 
which the Balkan League was dissolved and the 
hope disappeared that a strong power would 
arise which would take the Near East out of the 
position of pawn for the greed of the Great 
Powers. Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria had made 
an ante-bellum agreement for the disposal of the 
territory they would take from Turkey, and the 
first was to have a large part of Albania. Denied 
this region she asked her allies to make a new 



THE BALKAN STATES 127 

allotment. Bulgaria raised strong objection, 
since the new demand, if granted, would mean 
that her gains would be smaller than was first 
agreed. Angry speeches led to war, and after 
a sharp struggle Bulgaria was beaten and forced 
to make peace without honor. While they were 
locked in the conflict Turkey seized the oppor- 
tunity to recover Adrianople, and eventually held 
it. It illustrates the sordid nature of some of 
the Balkan states that Rumania entered this war 
for purely predatory purposes. She had re- 
mained neutral during the common effort to drive 
the Turk out ; but now that Bulgaria was march- 
ing to sure defeat she came into the battle against 
her, and at the end of the war she demanded and 
was given a large part of Bulgarian territory. 
The "July War," as this stage of the Balkan con- 
flict is called, left the allies filled with bitter 
hatred for one another, and Bulgaria, weakened 
as she was, felt little inclined to lean on any of 
her immediate neighbors. She was ripe for the 
reception of Teutonic offers of friendship, and 
the result was soon seen of all men. 

I have thus followed the complex story of the 
Balkan States to the year 1913. Through a 



128 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

century of war and intrigue Serbia, Bulgaria, 
Rumania, Greece, and the small state of Monte- 
negro had emerged from the Christian lands over 
which the Turks had ruled. Russia and Austria 
had taken small portions of those lands and had 
definite plans to secure influence over larger por- 
tions. In the Balkans Russian prestige was 
great, but if a state feared it she was apt to look 
to Austria, or to Germany — which was the same 
thing — as a means of balancing against Russia. 
At the same time it was known that Russia was 
planning to construct strategic lines of railroad 
leading to the Black Sea along the western bor- 
der of her empire, and this was considered an 
ominous sign for the future. Altogether, the 
"tinder box" was ready for ignition. 

As to Turkey, her fortunes shrank steadily. 
At the end of the Balkan War she retained only 
1,900,000 subjects in Europe, inhabitants of the 
district around Adrianople. She was becoming 
a distinctly Asiatic power, and the sultan must 
have felt that his hold on Constantinople was 
precarious. At the same time, as we shall see 
later on, Great Britain had secured a foothold 
on the shores of the Persian Gulf, and Russia 



THE BALKAN STATES 129 

was extending her influence in Persia, two threats 
from the eastward. Any far sighted Turk could 
see that his country was in danger of being 
crushed in a vise of foreign aggression. To 
which of the great states should Turkey turn for 
that protection which had long been her safety? 
Not to Russia, whose ambition was for Con- 
stantinople itself, nor to Great Britain, who 
seemed to desire the Euphrates Valley, and who 
was safely established in Egypt. In her ex- 
tremity she listened to the suggestions of Ger- 
man wooers, who promised industrial develop- 
ment, railroads, and financial aid. Here was 
laid the foundation of Turko-German sympathy 
which was to be very important in the Great 
War. 

After a calamity has occurred it is easy to 
point out the course by which it might have been 
avoided. It seems certain that if we stood again 
where the world stood in 1914 we should not do 
what we did in 1914. So we can see in what 
respects the events of the Balkan history went 
wrong. But the men who settled the crises of 
the past were not able to see what we see. They 
had the same blindness for the future that we 



130 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

have for that which lies before us now. They 
fumbled their problems as most men fumble 
problems, as we shall, perhaps, go on fumbling 
until the end of time. It is asking much to ex- 
pect that statesmen shall be as wise as we who 
review their deeds. 

But there are great facts in history which it is 
possible to know and use with profit. One of 
them is the incompetency of the principle of the 
Concert of Europe to deal with a situation like 
that we have reviewed in the Balkans. Concert 
predicates a group of satisfied great states, with- 
out over-reaching ambitions, who are willing to 
unite their efforts to restrain small states, or even 
one large state, from a course which shall force 
the rest of the world into conflict. When a 
group of great states have united to carry out a 
certain policy, and another tries to restrain the 
first group, concert is in great danger of break- 
ing down. That was the situation in the Bal- 
kans. These states were drawn into the whirl 
of general European politics, and they intensi- 
fied its velocity at one particular corner, so that 
what may be contemplated as a harmonious ro- 
tary movement broke into a twisting tornado. 



THE BALKAN STATES 131 

If, when the present war is over, the nations of 
the world undertake to go on under the old sys- 
tem, trusting to concert as the means of avoiding 
war, there is no reason to expect that the future 
will be less turbulent than the past. 



CHAPTER VII 

GERMAN IDEALS AND ORGANIZATION 

When wars begin between nations we usually 
see the leaders of thought on each side busy de- 
veloping distrust among their own citizens for 
the people against whom they are fighting. In 
accordance with this fact, the people of the 
United States have read a great deal since Au- 
gust, 1914, to make them think very unkindly of 
Germany. 

This chapter is not a plea for the Germans, 
and I agree that they did unnecessarily cruel and 
impossible things in Belgium. It is not to be 
denied that they played a most unwise part in 
the war game, when they tried to steal a march 
on France by invading through Belgium, a thing 
they were pledged not to do. It pays to keep 
faith; and when a nation does not keep faith 
other nations have no recourse but to treat it as 
if it were a pirate. If they do otherwise, the 
whole game will become a pirate's game, and 
good faith will disappear from international re- 

132 






GERMAN IDEALS AND ORGANIZATION 133 

la t ions. If Germany may violate Belgium at 
will, why may she not violate Switzerland, Hol- 
land, or any other state that stands in her way; 
and who would not expect her to do it, if no 
powers faced her that were willing and able to 
dispute her will? 

It is not improbable that German leaders un- 
derstood this as well as we who now pass it under 
review. They must have made their calculations 
on arousing the opposition of the world and pro- 
ceeded with the expectation that they would gain 
so much by their sweep through forbidden Bel- 
gium that they could defy the world. And if 
things had gone well for them, the calculation 
would have been well made. For if Germany 
had carried France off her feet and placed her 
in a position to offer no further menace during 
the next ten years, and if she had dealt a similar 
blow to Russia, what power could have checked 
her in the future decade? By glancing at the 
situation in Europe today we may see how an 
intrenched Germany defies the united and un- 
whipped world. How much more might she not 
have had her way, if the thrust through Belgium 
had succeeded! 



134* THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

Let us suppose that the game of bad faith had 
proved successful as planned, what would have 
been the result? Probably Great Britain would 
have wakened slowly to her peril, but her posi- 
tion was such that she could have done nothing. 
Her fleet would have been useless against an 
enemy that rules on land. Her army could not 
have met the combined Teutonic armies, and she 
would have had no allies. Meanwhile, Germany 
and Austria at their leisure could have digested 
the Balkans and drawing Turkey into their net 
could have established a "Mittel-Europa" that 
would have left the rest of the world at their 
mercy. These were alluring stakes to play for, 
and it is not hard to see how a nation whose lead- 
ers have thrown aside the homely motto that 
"Righteousness exalteth a nation" would be will- 
ing to take a chance in order to obtain them. 

When we think of such things as these we are 
in danger of concluding that they represent the 
real Germany. We look back to that Germany 
of the past which we saw in our youth, whose 
music we have heard all our lives, whose Goethe 
we have read, whose scholarship we have built 
upon, and whose toys have amused us and our 



GERMAN IDEALS AND ORGANIZATION 135 

children through many decades and ask our- 
selves whether or not we were mistaken in our 
ideas of Germany. Are there two Germanies, 
and if so, which is the true Germany? Probably 
the answer is that each is the real Germany mani- 
festing herself in different moods. Fundamen- 
tally we have an intense and emotional people, 
swayed in one instance by artistic emotions, in 
another by the love of exact research for facts, 
in another by the feeling of domesticity, and in 
still another by the powerful impulse of a great 
national egoism. They are a people who can 
love much, hate much, play much, sacrifice much, 
and serve well when called into service. In their 
war-maddened mood they have stained a fair 
reputation, and they are now trying to think that 
the stain will not matter if they can only fight 
through to victory. But nations are like men in 
this that however successful one may become 
personally he never gets to be so great that he 
can afford to carry a tarnished reputation. 

Let us turn to the Germany of old and see 
if we cannot observe the process by which she 
came to her present state of mind. While I 
realize that it is absolutely necessary for the 



136 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

world to crush her attempt to rule Europe, I 
cannot find it in my heart to hate her. She has 
risen to such a state of efficiency in social organ- 
ization and in the capacity to spread the light of 
civilization that she commands respect from 
thinking foes. It is the duty of the world to 
chasten the spirit of arrogance out of her, but to 
leave her sound and able to deal with the future 
in that way in which she is so well fitted to play 
a strong and beneficial part. If ever a great 
people needed the discipline of disaster to teach 
them that nations, like men, should do to others 
as they wish others to do to them, that nation is 
the Germany of today. To understand in what 
way this splendid state has run away from its 
past we shall have to glance at its history in the 
recent past. 

For a point of departure let us take the Seven 
Years' War. This struggle was the result of the 
ambition of young Frederick, a strong and un- 
ethical king of Prussia. When he came to the 
throne he found that a parsimonious father had 
left him a full treasury, an excellent army, and 
a united kingdom, while fate had sent the neigh- 
boring state Austria, a young woman for ruler 



GERMAN IDEALS AND ORGANIZATION 137 

and an army that was not formidable. It was 
a favorable opportunity to seize Silesia, which 
Prussia considered necessary to her welfare, and 
to which she had the flimsiest pretense of right. 
The rapacity of Frederick, her king, cannot be 
justified on moral grounds, and it threw Europe 
into commotions for which nearly a quarter of 
a century was needed for settlement. The last 
phase of this quarter-of-a-century was the Seven 
Years' War, 1756-1763. By the time it began 
Frederick of Prussia was looked upon by his 
neighbors as a menace to Europe; and Austria, 
France, and Russia united to crush him. He 
had a friend in Great Britain, who was gen- 
erally found among the foes of France. In the 
great war he waged through seven years he 
fought off foes first on one side and then on the 
other until the war ended at last with Prussia 
still unconquered. 

If hard and valiant fighting and solicitude for 
the welfare of his country could redeem the error 
of the invasion of Silesia the Seven Years' War 
would relieve Frederick, whom posterity calls 
"Frederick the Great," of all odium on account 
of the thoughtless way in which he began his 



138 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

wars. Unlike the present kaiser, he began a 
long reign rashly and ended it wisely. Admin- 
istrative reforms and a policy of peace with his 
neighbors made his last years a period of happi- 
ness for Prussia. 

But Silesia fixed a firm hold on the Prussian 
imagination. Long justified as an act necessary 
to the safety of the Fatherland, and therefore 
permissible, it has given sanction for the idea 
that wrong may be done that good shall result, 
if only the state is to be benefitted. It is a false 
doctrine, and it can do nothing but lead to wars. 
Nations are under the same obligations to do 
right as individuals. 

The next phase of German history which has 
interest for us in connection with this study is 
that which lies between the years 1806 and 1813. 
It was a period of deep humiliation at the hands 
of Napoleon. The small states were huddled to- 
gether in a Confederation which was, in fact, a 
tool of the Emperor of France, and Prussia lay 
like a trembling and crushed thing in his hand. 
No living man who hates Germany for the deeds 
of the present war could wish her a worse fate 
than Napoleon inflicted on her after the battle 



GERMAN IDEALS AND ORGANIZATION 139 

of Jena in 1806. He insulted the king, burdened 
the people with requisitions, and limited their 
armies. It was the acme of national shame for 
the nation that is now so strong. 

The cause of these woes was the lack of organ- 
ization, and perhaps Napoleon did the nation a 
service when he beat the Prussians into a realiza- 
tion of it. No nation is so poor that it has not 
reformers who see in what way its evils may be 
corrected. In the days that preceded the calami- 
ties of which I speak Prussia had her prophets 
crying to deaf men. Misfortune opened the ears 
of the rulers so that the prophets might be heard. 
Reforms were adopted out of which has grown 
the Germany of today. They all looked toward 
the unification of national energy, whatever its 
form; but they are expressed in three notable 
ways: universal military service, the correction 
of waste energy in civil life, and the inculcation 
of the spirit of obedience to authority. On these 
principles chiefly a new Germany was built. 

We have said a great deal recently about 
crushing the German military system. Prob- 
ably we do not know just what we mean in say- 
ing this. At least, it was not always our habit 



140 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

to decry the system. Many a time we have 
spoken with admiration of the reforms of 
Scharnhorst, of the glory of Leipzig and of the 
services of Blucher at Waterloo. If we stop to 
think we shall see that our real objection is the 
purpose for which the German military system 
has been used. And it seems that if it is to be 
broken into pieces it must be opposed with a 
stronger system built on a similar plan. 

The next period that expresses Germany's 
peculiar spirit is the era of Bismarck, 1862 to 
1890. It was the time of the cult of iron. Bis- 
marck was the "Iron Chancellor," the nation of- 
fered its enemies "blood and iron." Iron can- 
non, iron words, and iron laws became the ideals 
of the people. Statesmen, historians, poets, edi- 
tors, professors, and all other patriots began to 
worship according to the rite of the new cult. 
And iron entered into the blood of the Germans. 

To carry out Bismarck's policy it was neces- 
sary to break down a promising liberal movement 
that seemed on the point of giving Prussia re- 
sponsible government. It was his faith that a 
united Germany must hew her way into the posi- 
tion of great power in Europe, and in order to 



GERMAN IDEALS AND ORGANIZATION 141 

have a state that could do this there must be a 
strong central authority, able to direct all the 
resources of the state to the desired end. The 
large number of small nobles had long ago 
formed the celebrated Junker autocracy, a body 
with like ideals. He gave their restless energy 
a more definite political and military object, and 
made them take places as parts of his great state 
machine. 

He had his reward. In 1866 he fought a de- 
cisive war against Prussia's old enemy, Austria, 
and won it so quickly that even the Prussians 
were astonished. In 1870-1871 he threw the 
state against France in a war that left the land 
of Napoleon as completely at his feet as Prussia 
had been at the feet of the Corsican. And then 
in the moment of exultation over the victory he 
founded the German empire by uniting with 
Prussia the numerous smaller German states. 
There is much to support the suggestion that a 
similar stroke is held in reserve to create a Mittel- 
Europa of Germany and Austria-Hungary as a 
final glory of the present war, if Germany shows 
herself able to carry off the victory. 

Bismarck's ambition for Germany was to hold 



142 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

a position of arbiter in Continental affairs. He 
felt that this was the best way to make his coun- 
try safe from hostile combinations, and it met 
his ideal of the dignity to which Germany ought 
to attain. He achieved his desire in the Three 
Emperors' League and the Triple Alliance. 
Predominance in influence was the height of his 
ambition. The conquest of new lands, and the 
support of industry and trade by a policy of ter- 
ritorial expansion, were not within his plans. 
He was a man of an older generation to whom 
a predominance among the Great Powers was 
better than chasing the rainbow of world empire. 
In 1888 died Wilhelm I, the king whom Bis- 
marck made Emperor. He was an honest man 
who loved the simple and sound Germany in 
which he was reared. At this time the leading 
men of 1871 were passing from power and a 
group was coming on the scene who were young 
men in the intoxicating times of Sedan and Metz. 
A new emperor came to the throne, possessing 
great energy and the capacity of forming vast 
plans. He was eleven years old when the em- 
pire was proclaimed at Versailles, the age at 
which ordinary boys begin to wake from the 



GERMAN IDEALS AND ORGANIZATION 143 

dreams of childhood. From such dreams Wil- 
helm II passed to dreams of imperial glory. 
The idea of bigness of authority that he thus 
formed has remained with him to this day. Add 
the effects of an impulsive disposition and an un- 
usual amount of confidence in himself and you 
will account for the peculiar gloss spread over a 
character that is strong and otherwise wholesome. 

Early in his reign he gave ground for alarm 
by several acts that are hardly to be described 
in a less severe word than "bumptious." He 
dismissed Bismarck from the Chancellorship, 
seemingly for no other reason than that he wished 
a chancellor who would be more obedient to the 
imperial will, and he uttered many sentiments 
which caused sober men to wonder what kind of 
emperor he was going to be. But as the years 
passed it was noticed that all his aberrations fell 
short of disaster, and as he was very energetic 
and devoted to efficiency in civil and military 
matters the world came at last to regard him 
with real esteem. 

When the present war began the kaiser became 
its leader, as was his duty and privilege. Opin- 
ion in hostile countries pronounced him the 



144 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

agent responsible for its outbreak. Around his 
striking personality have collected many sto- 
ries of dark complexion. At this time it is not 
possible to test their accuracy, but it is safe to 
say that many of them are chiefly assumption. 
On the other hand, it is undoubted that he is now 
a firm friend of the military party, and that he 
supports the autocracy in its purpose to carry 
the war to the bitter end. He has been a dili- 
gent war lord and he has shown a willingness to 
share the sacrifices of the people. Stories of ap- 
parent reliability that have come out of Germany 
in recent months imply that he has steadily 
gained in popularity during the conflict, while 
most of the other members of his family have 
lost. 

If it is important to clear thinking to see the 
kaiser in an impartial light, it is equally neces- 
sary to understand the German Kultur. This 
term is used in Germany to indicate the mass of 
ideas and habits of thought of a people. It ap- 
plies to art and industry, to religion and war, to 
whatever the human mind directs. From the 
German's standpoint we have a Kultur of our 
own. We have no corresponding term, nor con- 



GERMAN IDEALS AND ORGANIZATION 145 

cept, and we cannot realize all he means in using 
the term if we do not put ourselves in his place. 
Now it is true that the German has won great 
success in intellectual ways. Scholarship, scien- 
tific invention, the application of art to industry, 
and well planned efficiency in social organization 
are his in a large degree. He is proud of his 
achievements; and when the war began he felt 
that it was the German mission to give this Kul- 
tur to other peoples. From his standpoint, a 
Germanized world would be a world made 
happy. It was an honest opinion, and it went 
far to support his desire for expansion. 

The Germans are a docile people with respect 
to their superiors, and this trait is a condition of 
their Kultur. It is traditional in Germany for 
the peasant to obey his lord, the lord to obey his 
over-lord, and the over-lord to obey his ruler. 
To the kaiser look all the people in a sense which 
no citizen of the United States can understand 
without using a fair amount of imagination. 
The lords and over-lords constitute the Junkers, 
who in the modern military system make up the 
officer class. A high sense of authority runs 
through the whole population, the upper classes 



146 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

knowing how to give orders and the lower classes 
knowing how to take them. 

Before the battle of Jena, 1806, the Prussian 
army was made up of peasants forced to serve 
under the nobles, who took the offices. Towns- 
men were excluded from the army. The peas- 
ant's forced service lasted twenty years. The 
system was as inefficient as it was unequal, and 
a commission was appointed to reform it. The 
result was the modern* system of universal serv- 
ice, put into complete operation in 1813. After 
a hundred years it is possible to see some of the 
effects of the system on the ideals of the peopls. 
It has taught them to work together in their 
places, formed habits of promptness and clean- 
liness, and lessened the provincialism of the lower 
classes. It has been a great training school in 
nationalism, preserving the love of country and 
instilling in the minds of the masses a warm de- 
votion to the military traditions of the nation. 

It has also produced results of a questionable 
value. By fostering the military spirit it has de- 
veloped a desire for war, on the same principle 
that a boy in possession of a sharp hatchet has a 
strong impulse to hack away at his neighbor's 



GERMAN IDEALS AND ORGANIZATION 147 

shrubbery. It is probable that the temptation 
to use a great and superior army was a vital fact 
in bringing on the present war. Furthermore, 
the wide-spread habit of docility leaves a people 
without self-assertion and enables their rulers to 
impose upon them. As to the influence of uni- 
versal service in promoting militarism, that has 
been frequently mentioned. 

On the other hand, it should be borne in mind 
that not all states that have had universal mili- 
tary training have been saddled with these evils. 
France, for example, has had universal training 
without becoming obsessed with the passion for 
war and without the loss of popular individual- 
ism. It seems well to say that universal training 
itself does not produce the evils sometimes at- 
tributed to it. In Germany, at least, it seems 
that it was the purpose for which the army ex- 
isted, and not the army itself, that developed 
militarism and brought other unhappy effects. 

Probably the German army before the war was 
the most efficient great human machine then in 
existence. There was less waste in it and less 
graft than in any other army. Since the army 
included all the men of the empire at some stage 



148 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

or other of their existence, it was a great train- 
ing school in organization. Its effects on Ger- 
man history are hardly to be exaggerated. 

I have said that military organization alone 
was not sufficient to make the modern Germany. 
It was also necessary to give the nation a definite 
national purpose, and this was the task of its 
intellectual leaders. The purpose itself was ex- 
pressed in the idea of German nationality. By 
a bold stretch of fancy every part of Europe 
that had once been ruled by Germans, that 
spoke the German language, or that could be 
considered as a part that ought to speak that 
language was fixed upon as territory to be 
brought within the authority of the Fatherland. 
It was in accordance with this principle that 
Schleswig-Holstein was taken from Denmark 
in 1864 and Alsace-Lorraine in 1871. Here the 
march of annexation paused. Bismarck was too 
wise to carry the theory to an extreme; but a 
growing number of writers and speakers in the 
empire took up the idea and kept it before the 
people with winning persistence. It is thus that 
Pan-Germanism has come to be one of the great 
facts in German public opinion. By preaching 



GERMAN IDEALS AND ORGANIZATION 149 

race unity with patriotic zeal the intellectual lead- 
ers have established a powerful propaganda of 
expansion. 

Of the men most prominently associated with 
this movement especial attention must be given 
to Heinrich von Treitschke, for years profes- 
sor of Modern and Contemporary History at the 
University of Berlin, whose remarkable influence 
reached all classes of people. He was a hand- 
some man with an open face that invited admira- 
tion without appearing to care whether it was 
given or not. When he spoke the auditor heard 
"a raucous, half -strangled, uneasy voice" and 
noticed that his movements were mechanical and 
his utterances were without regard to the pauses 
that usually stand for commas and periods, while 
his pleasant facial expression had no apparent 
relation to what he was saying. The explana- 
tion was that he was so deaf that he did not hear 
himself speak. That such a speaker could fire 
the heart of a nation is evidence that he was filled 
with unusual earnestness and sympathy. 

He had great love of country, and if he exalted 
royalty and strong government it was because he 
thought that Germany would reach her highest 



150 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

authority through them. It was no selfish or in- 
competent king that he worshiped, but one that 
lived righteously and sought diligently to pro- 
mote the interest of the people. He held that the 
nobility should serve as thoroughly as the com- 
mon men. Strong government in his idea did 
not mean privilege, as ordinarily understood, but 
vital energy in all the organs of administration, 
efficiently directed by a will that was not ham- 
pered by the contrarywise tugging of individual 
opinions. 

Treitschke's penetrating eloquence was heard 
throughout the land. Editors, preachers of re- 
ligion, schoolmasters, authors, members of the 
legislative assemblies, high officials, and even min- 
isters of state came to his class-room and went 
away to carry his ideas into other channels. He 
inspired the men who did the actual thinking for 
the nation. All his efforts were expended for 
what he considered the enhancement of Ger- 
many's position among nations. 

In giving him his due we must not overlook his 
faults. He was narrow in his ideas of interna- 
tional relations. His exaltation of Germany 
would have left other nations at her mercy. He 



GERMAN IDEALS AND ORGANIZATION 151 

seems to have had small respect for the principle 
of live-and-let-live among states. As much as 
any one in his country he was responsible for the 
idea that the British are a pack of hypocrites, of- 
fering inferior races the Bible with one hand and 
opium with the other. That they had not a good 
record with respect to the opium trade is true, 
but it was sheer narrowness to make it the chief 
characteristic of a people who have done a great 
work in behalf of the backward races. 

Although Treitschke wrote many pamphlets 
on topics of current interest, all bearing upon 
what he considered the destiny of Germany, he 
was preeminently a historian. It was by telling 
the story of Germany since the revival of na- 
tional feeling after the battle of Jena that he 
wished to serve best the generation in which he 
lived. For him it was the historian to whom was 
committed the task of making the citizen realize 
what place he had in the nation's complex of 
duties and hopes. 

He came upon the scene when history had be- 
come fixed upon the basis of accuracy and de- 
tached research. Men like Leopold von Ranke 
had insisted that history should deal with the 



152 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

cold exploitation of universal laws. For them 
Treitschke was a bad historian, and they used 
their influence to prevent his appointment at the 
University of Berlin. He was a Chauvinist, un- 
doubtedly, and his History of Germany in the 
Nineteenth Century is a highly colored pic- 
ture of what he conceived the reader should know 
about the history of his country. It is a work 
written to arouse the enthusiasm of the people for 
their country, rather than to instruct them in the 
universal laws of human development; and it 
would be a sad day for the world if all history 
were written as he wrote this. But it was a 
powerful appeal to national pride and energy. 
It played a great part in the formation of the 
Germany with which we are concerned in this 
chapter, the striving, self-confident, and aspiring 
empire that set for itself the task of dominating 
the European continent. 

This chapter is not written to reconcile Amer- 
ican readers to the German side of the contro- 
versy that now engages the attention of all men. 
I wish to enable the reader to have a clear view 
of the people with whom we fight. It is they 
with whom we must deal in building up the sys- 



GERMAN IDEALS AND ORGANIZATION 153 

tern out of which the future is to be constructed 
again; and we shall not know how to deal with 
them if we do not see their point of view and 
know what they are thinking about. 

If in some of their ideals they are superior to 
other peoples, and if their organization of indi- 
viduals into the state has some elements of 
strength not found in other systems, it is not for 
us to seek to destroy the advantage they have 
won. It would be better for us to adopt their 
good points, in order that we might the more 
surely defeat them on the field of battle. Hav- 
ing won the victory we desire, we should cer- 
tainly not seek to destroy that which we cannot 
replace. Live and let live, a principle which 
Germans have ignored in some important re^ 
spects, must be recognized after the military am- 
bition of Germany is broken, if we are to have 
an enduring peace. 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE FAILURE OF THE OLD EUROPEAN SYSTEM 

Much has been written to prove that one side 
or the other was responsible for the present war. 
Minute facts, as the words in a dispatch, or the 
time at which the troops were mobilized, or 
whether or not a preliminary summons of troops 
to the colors was in itself an act of mobilization, 
have become the subjects of bitter debate. Such 
questions will have to be settled by the historians 
of the future years: they cannot be discussed 
here with any profit, since this book is an appeal 
to the reason of men on each side of the con- 
troversy. 

Back of the events of July, 1914, is a more 
fundamental cause of the war. It is the break- 
down of the systems of concert and balance to 
which the powers had trusted themselves. Cas- 
tlereagh and Metternich allowed themselves to 
slip into these theories, when they set aside the 
suggestion of a federated Europe, which came 

154 



FAILURE OF THE OLD SYSTEM 155 

from Alexander I. Granted that the tsar's 
dream was too ethereal for a world steeped in sel- 
fishness, it does not follow that a policy entirely 
devoted to the balancing of selfishness with self- 
ishness would have preserved peace. 

On the other hand, we must admit that nations 
are not idealists. Selfishness is their doctrine. 
So long as the project of a federation is viewed 
idealistically it is practically impossible. But if 
it ever comes to be admitted by the people who 
count in political things that it is for the interests 
of the nations to adopt it, that is, if it is brought 
within what we may call the sphere of selfishness, 
it ceases to be idealistic and comes to be a subject 
worthy of the consideration of the practical 
statesman. 

Furthermore, the political philosopher has 
ever to answer the question, "What about the 
future?" What are we going to do after the 
present debauch of waste and murder is over? 
Are we to trust the world to the same old forces 
that brought us this ruin? One says that human 
nature is the same forever, that it learns only in 
the hard school of experience, and that it must 
fight its wars as the price it pays for being human 



156 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

nature. To such a man the Napoleonic wars 
did all that could be expected of them when they 
so impressed the world with the cost of war that 
a system was adopted which gave the world a 
measure of peace for a hundred years. "What 
more can you ask?" said such a philosopher to me. 
In humble responsibility to the throne of reason I 
reply that we can try as intelligent beings to re- 
move the war madness permanently, making it 
our duty to posterity to do the best we can. 
Some generation must make the start, or we shall 
wring our hands forever. 

In this chapter I wish to show in what way the 
old system crumbled before the desire of world 
power. It seems a vicious system by virtue of 
its innate qualities of selfishness, and it is all 
the more to be feared because its subtle spirit 
gets control of our own hearts as well as the 
hearts of other men. While our opponents — 
Germany and Austria — were following the sys- 
tem to its bitter conclusion, our friends — Great 
Britain, France, and Italy — were doing nearly 
the same things, but in a slightly different way. 
And there is no reason to expect that under the 
continuation of the balancing of great and am- 



FAILURE OF THE OLD SYSTEM 157 

bitious world powers we shall have more respect 
for the rights of one another than we had in the 
past. 

The system of Balance of Power flourished best 
in Bismarck's time. It was his strong personal- 
ity that held together the Three Emperors' 
League for a brief season and the Triple Alli- 
ance for a longer period. Each of these groups 
had certain interests in common which gave them 
coherence : Bismarck alone knew how to exploit 
these mutual advantages and lessen the jars of 
clashing feelings. His objects were made easier 
by the fact that most of the other nations of 
Europe at that time had developed quarrels of 
their own. Great Britain and Russia were at 
swords' points over the Far Eastern question, and 
France and Great Britain had not forgotten their 
century old antagonism, which only a minor dis- 
pute was sufficient to set aflame. 

Moreover, Great Britain was engaged in a vast 
task of empire building. Manufactures in- 
creased rapidly in the United Kingdom, an ever 
growing trade threw out ever expanding tentacles 
to the remotest parts of the world, and the 
growth of the colonies produced greater pros- 



158 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

perity at home and abroad than the most hope- 
ful Briton had previously thought within the 
bounds of probability. She was too busy with 
this splendid process of internal prosperity to 
take notice of what was happening on the Conti- 
nent, so long as her own interests were not threat- 
ened. From her standpoint Bismarck's policy of 
preserving peace through the means of a Ger- 
man predominating influence was a welcome re- 
lief from other burdens. 

This state of affairs was prolonged for at least 
fifteen years after the death of Bismarck. 
Kaiser Wilhelm II 's temperamental impetuous- 
ness did not break up the balance that had been 
established, although many prophets had foretold 
such a thing. As the corner-stone of the Triple 
Alliance Germany was looked upon as the pro- 
tector of European peace, and the kaiser, it is 
said, was pleased to regard himself as the man 
especially responsible for that policy. 

It is difficult to say when and how this happy 
situation began to be undermined and whose was 
the responsibility. One cause of the rupture was 
the rapid growth of German manufactures and 
trade, which brought about stern competition be- 



FAILURE OF THE OLD SYSTEM 159 

tween the business interests of Germany and 
Great Britain. The newspapers of the two na- 
tions, like all other newspapers of modern times, 
were closely connected with the capitalistic in- 
terests of the respective states, and voiced the 
alarm and antipathy of the industrial classes. 
Thus the people of Germany and the people of 
Britain were stimulated to a condition of mutual 
distrust. They believed that each practiced the 
most disreputable tricks of competition against 
the other, and each talked of destroying the in- 
dustry of the other. It is difficult to say who is 
responsible for the beginning of commercial 
rivalry. 

Late in the last century Germany began to en- 
large her navy with the evident purpose of mak- 
ing it rival the navy of Great Britain. Her 
justification was found* in the idea that a navy 
was necessary to protect the great commerce that 
she was building up. At the same time German 
writers began to make many criticisms on the 
British claim of being mistress of the seas. 
"Freedom of the seas" became a phrase of com- 
fort in their mouths. It is not clear that it meant 
what it seemed to say ; for the seas were as free to 



160 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

the Germans in times of peace as to any other 
people, and Germany's plan to build a great 
fleet that would defeat the British fleet would 
establish that same kind of rule at sea that Great 
Britain through her naval superiority then held. 

Now it is very certain that Germany had a per- 
fect right to enter each of these two fields of 
endeavor. The contests of industry are open 
to all, and the laws of peace protect them. She 
had the right, also, to build up her navy, al- 
though she should not have expected to overtop 
the British navy specifically without arousing the 
hostility of the British people. The insular posi- 
tion of the United Kingdom and its relations with 
its colonies are such that a navy is its surest pro- 
tection if assailed in war ; and to fall into a second 
position is to hold its life at the permission of 
another state. Germany must have seen this 
phase of the situation. Her statesmen were poor 
leaders of men if they did not realize that they 
were entering upon a rivalry in which was the pos- 
sibility of great resistance. 

Another phase of the opposition that was 
steadily rising against Germany was the general 
alarm at the growth of her military power. Her 



FAILURE OF THE OLD SYSTEM 161 

army and navy ever increased in size and readi- 
ness for that initial rush to victory which is half 
the struggle in modern war. At the same time 
German leaders did not disguise their desire for 
the enlargement of German territory on the Con- 
tinent. The Pan-German party made a great 
deal of noise, and other nations were not re- 
assured by being told that the party was not as 
strong as its agitation seemed to indicate. 

Now and again one read in some German paper 
an assertion to the effect that Germany was 
bound to become the dominant power in Europe 
and that she would next turn on the United 
States. How many Americans have not heard 
some over-confident German friend make a 
prophecy of like import? It was evident that 
many Germans regarded the great republic of the 
West as an over-fattened commercial nation with- 
out the power of resistance and destined at the 
proper time to furnish rich nourishment for their 
conquering arms. That we considered these 
thoughts but the idle boasts of a nation intoxi- 
cated by success did not lessen the conviction of 
ourselves and others that Germany was running 
into a state of mind that required cooperative 



162 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

measures of resistance on the part of people who 
might become victims of her infatuation. 

While these two processes of national feeling 
ran their courses, several political events, which 
have already been described added vigor to the 
antagonism that was rising against Germany. 
Her attitude toward the Boers when they were 
at war against Great Britain was one, Delcasse's 
wise adjustment of the Fashoda incident was 
another, his clever formation of the Entente Cor- 
diale between France and Britain was another, 
the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance 
was still another, the defeat of Russia by Japan 
and her elimination as a threat against British 
interests in India was another, and the formation 
of the Triple Entente by Great Britain, France, 
and Russia, announced in 1907, was the final act 
of the series. Great Britain was not only again 
seriously concerned in Continental affairs, but a 
combination had been formed of three great 
European nations, with the strongest power of 
the East as a flying buttress, to hold back the 
much dreaded aggressions of the Triple Alliance, 
consisting of Germany, Austria, and Italy. The 
Balance of Power had come to its most logical 



FAILURE OF THE OLD SYSTEM 163 

state of development; for instead of having one 
great state balancing between the other states 
around it, we now had the great states of the 
world ranged in two camps, each side checking 
the other in the belief that in so doing it was pre- 
serving the world from war. 

It is hard to establish a balance when two 
opposing sides are strong and mutually jealous 
of one another; for the opposition of forces is 
then formed to secure mutual advantages, and 
not to promote the common interest through the 
preservation of equilibrium. In such a case one 
side or the other, possibly each side, is apt to 
fancy itself the stronger, and if it acts on that 
assumption it arouses the apprehension of the 
other which finds itself tempted to make a coun- 
ter stroke. Once such a step is taken equilibrium 
is lost. This is what happened in 1914. The 
train of events that led up to the destruction of 
the international balance is now to be described. 

Here we must go back to the days when Del- 
casse was foreign secretary in Paris, 1898-1905. 
One of his achievements was to come to agree- 
ment with Spain and Italy in reference to the 
northern coast of Africa. He effected a treaty 



164* THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

with the former nation by which French and 
Spanish spheres of influence in Morocco were 
defined, and another with Italy by which the right 
of France in Tunis was accorded in exchange for 
recognition of the right of Italy to Tripoli and 
Cyrenaica. 

Making this treaty by Italy did not constitute 
treason to the Triple Alliance, since it was clearly 
advantageous for Italy without infringing the 
rights of either Germany or Austria; but it 
alarmed Germany, already drawing close to Tur- 
key, because the object of Italian policy was to 
get territory over which Turkey had a vital 
claim. Nor was it pleasant for the kaiser to see 
one of the members of the Triple Alliance acting 
in cooperation with the members of the Entente 
in so important a matter. 

Taking these achievements in connection with 
the formation of the Dual Alliance and the mu- 
tual approach of France and Great Britain, Ger- 
many had reason to feel that she was being iso- 
lated. Her whole population resented this turn 
of events, seeing in it a sort of challenge hurled 
forth by France, who at last found herself strong 
enough to assume a position of self-assertion. It 



FAILURE OF THE OLD SYSTEM 165 

is true that Delcasse only placed Germany in 
a position of isolation like that which Bismarck 
imposed on France for many years ; and it was, in 
strict logic, as fair for him to treat Germany 
thus as for Bismarck to isolate France. Let 
Germany submit to her fate, as France sub- 
mitted, when she had to submit. But we are not 
dealing with logical matters here. It is a plain 
fact that confronts us. Germany, who had 
been strong through three decades without seek- 
ing to expand her territory, suddenly realized that 
her opponents were forming a combination 
stronger than hers, their acquisition of territory 
that followed set her in a rage, and she made 
plans for getting her share in the world that was 
to be taken. Under the system of balance then 
recognized as the proper means of regulating 
international relations her course was a natural 
result of Delcasse's policy. 

The particular portion of the earth to which 
she turned her eyes was Turkey. While she sup- 
ported the plans of Austria-Hungary to acquire 
territory on the Adriatic, she herself looked 
further to the East. She encouraged the party 
at Constantinople known as the "Young Turks," 



166 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

she furnished improved arms to the Turkish 
army, she formed plans to establish her influence 
in Palestine, and she projected a great railroad to 
Bagdad in the center of the Euphrates-Tigris 
Valley. It was a sphere of influence that might 
be considered more than a fair offset for the lands 
her rivals were about to gain. 

At the same time Germany found a means of 
restoring her prestige, which was sorely wilted by 
the progress of her rivals. The occasion arose in 
connection with France's occupation of Morocco, 
which had begun without the aid or consent of the 
kaiser. 

Morocco had long been under a line of inde- 
pendent sultans. Most of her commerce was 
with Great Britain although German capitalists 
had received concessions within her border. As 
the country next to the French province of Al- 
geria, France looked upon it as her own particu- 
lar sphere of influence. We have already seen 
that Italy conceded this claim, 1901, while France 
conceded Italy's claim to Tripoli and Cyrenaica. 
In 1904 France conceded Great Britain's prac- 
tical supremacy in Egypt and in return was as- 
sured the protectorate over Morocco. She asked 



FAILURE OF THE OLD SYSTEM 167 

no concession from Germany but came to an 
agreement with Spain, who had a small strip of 
territory south of the Straits of Gibraltar. 

In 1905 Delcasse was quietly preparing to 
carry out his plan for the development of Mo- 
rocco, when the kaiser landed in Tangiers without 
the slightest warning, and announced in a public 
address that he had come to visit his friend, the 
independent sultan of Morocco, in whose country 
all foreign nations had equal rights. The speech 
was received by the world as a challenge to 
France and a means of announcing that Ger- 
many was no longer to be ignored. The moment 
of the landing at Tangiers was well chosen by the 
kaiser; for only three weeks earlier Russia, the 
ally of France, had been defeated by the Japan- 
ese at Mukden and could give her no assist- 
ance. 

In this unfortunate situation it was necessary 
for France to bend before the storm. She agreed 
to submit the whole Moroccan question to an in- 
ternational congress, thus appealing to the prin- 
ciple of the Concert of Europe, and when she 
learned that the kaiser demanded that she dis- 
miss the minister whose hands had been played 



168 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

so skillfully against Germany, she agreed to that 
also. 

The dismissal of Delcasse recalls an incident of 
1807. In that year Napoleon forced the king of 
Prussia to dismiss Stein, his great minister, who 
was bending all his efforts to reestablish Prussia 
on a war footing. It marked the triumph of 
Napoleon's power for the time being, but it 
was a futile action; for Stein out of office under 
such circumstances had more influence than ever, 
and the shameful way in which he was treated 
only emphasized Prussia's humiliation and made 
the Prussians more determined than ever to as- 
sert their national power. Similar results in 
France in 1905 followed the stab given to that 
nation's faithful and efficient minister. 

The international congress assembled at Al- 
geciras in 1906. It adopted a compromise de- 
cision, which gave something to each side and sat- 
isfied neither. Germany was supposed to have 
gained when the congress recognized the terri- 
torial integrity of Morocco under the sovereignty 
of the sultan and guaranteed equal rights of trade 
in the country to the citizens of all the signa- 
tory powers. On the other hand, France and 



FAILURE OF THE OLD SYSTEM 169 

Spain were jointly to have the right to instruct 
and furnish officers for the Moroccan police force. 
Winning in a quarrel rarely makes the victor 
think well of the vanquished. Certainly Ger- 
many, who had now blocked the plans of France, 
was not less bitter in her attitude toward that 
nation; while France, feeling that she had been 
caught at a disadvantage, smothered her indigna- 
tion and waited for the opportunity to make 
things even. 

In 1907 disturbances occurred in Moroccan 
ports and French marines were landed to pre- 
serve order. When they were not withdrawn in 
a year Germany protested and an irritating 
diplomatic discussion followed. At last Ger- 
many was persuaded to submit the point actually 
at issue to the Hague tribunal, whose decision 
was not conclusive and satisfied neither side. 
Then a Franco- German convention was held to 
pass on the rights of each nation in Morocco. 
Its decision, given in February, 1909, announced 
that the interest of Germany in the province was 
only economic; and as France agreed to give 
equal protection in such matters, the kaiser 
promised he would not interfere in the country. 



170 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

In each of these incidents war seemed about to 
begin, and Europe awaited the results in great 
anxiety. When the clouds lifted the nations 
breathed freely again. 

Still there was no way under the existing sys- 
tem to solve the difficulty that presented itself, 
had Germany only decided that she would not 
trust her cause to peaceful negotiation. The 
fact that she took such a step was to her own 
people but a mark of the kaiser's love of peace. 
This and similar incidents, in which the militarists 
carried their country to the verge of war only 
to be held back by the hand of the emperor served 
to lay the foundation for that popular belief 
in Germany that a peace policy had been steadily 
followed under provocations and that Europe 
was indebted to Wilhelm II for immunity from 
war. In reality the system of balance of power 
had needlessly brought the world to the verge of 
a bitter and unnecessary conflict. 

Almost immediately after the war clouds lifted 
Europe had evidence of the small amount of 
tolerance the leading classes of Germany had for 
the slightest manifestation of the spirit of com- 
promise in the matter under discussion. The 



FAILURE OF THE OLD SYSTEM 171 

chancellor under whom the recent settlement was 
made was von Billow, who thought it better to 
adjust so small a quarrel than to incur the re- 
sponsibility of war. His action received the 
stern denunciation of the military party. So 
strong was the criticism that he was forced to 
retire from office, his place going to Bethmann- 
Hollweg, who had the support of the militarists. 
The only explanation to be advanced for this 
turn of the affair is that the German national 
spirit was so much excited by the long agitation 
of men like Treitschke that a concession which 
others might consider only trifling seemed to 
them a sacrifice of national honor. 

In 1911 occurred a third Moroccan incident, in 
which Bethmann-Hollweg took occasion to re- 
cover some of the attitude of assertiveness that 
von Biilow had given up in 1909. In pursuance 
of their plan to extend their protectorate over 
Morocco the French occupied Fez with a military 
force. A short time later the German warship 
Panther entered the Moroccan port of Agadir, 
ostensibly to protect German property. It was 
soon known that the German government pro- 
posed to hold the Panther at Agadir until the 



172 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

French withdrew from Fez. The war spirit 
again flared up. Russia still suffered from the 
wounds received from the hands of the Japanese, 
which Germany well knew; but Great Britain 
was in fighting condition and announced her sup- 
port of France. After a short discussion Ger- 
many took a more complaisant attitude, and a 
settlement was made whereby the French were 
allowed a protectorate over Morocco on condi- 
tion that they guarantee an "open door" in Mo- 
roccan trade and transfer to Germany two valu- 
able strips of territory in the French Congo re- 
gion. 

Again Europe breathed easily, and again wise 
men reflected that no real settlement had been 
made. France had been bluffed out of a valu- 
able portion of her Congo colony and was not 
disposed to endure the affront longer than was 
necessary. Some day Russia would be fully re- 
stored to her strength and ready to help her ally 
in the face of German aggression. Until then 
France would have to yield. Meanwhile she 
was consoled by the reflection that Great Britain 
had pronounced for her openly. That was some- 
thing to take to heart. The great sea power, 



FAILURE OF THE OLD SYSTEM 173 

though slow to anger, was at last conscious of her 
danger if Germany overran France and seized a 
channel port. 

On the other hand, Germany was not fully 
pleased at the outcome of the affair. The ap- 
pearance of Great Britain in it was an indication 
that the Entente was a thing of vitality. Ger- 
many had been forced to moderate her demands, 
taking colonial territory while her whole thought 
for the future was not developing African colon- 
ies but curbing the power of France. Not only 
was France not checked, but she was much 
strengthened in a vital part of her power. She 
had acquired lands in just the region that she 
needed them to carry out her ambition to control 
the western end of the Mediterranean. If some 
day Spain were to become a republic, could she 
fail to establish cordial relations with the republic 
of France, and thus be swept into the anti-Ger- 
man group? It may well be that in these reflec- 
tions were born two German impulses: first to 
win Great Britain to some kind of a compromise 
with Germany, detaching her, at least for a time, 
from the Entente; and second, to strike a vital 
blow before Russia was entirely recovered. 



174 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

Within the next three years she acted on each 
of these impulses. 

At the same time it became evident that the 
Triple Alliance was crumbling, and this was an- 
other source of anxiety to Germany. It meant 
that she should hasten her steps if she was to carry 
forward her great purpose. It was in Septem- 
ber, 1911, while the Agadir incident was still 
unsettled, that Italy began the war with Turkey 
to establish control of Tripoli and Cyrenaica. In 
view of Germany's well-known friendliness with 
Turkey, this step was most unexpected. It 
could only mean that Italy was not disposed to 
subordinate her own interests to those of Ger- 
many at Constantinople. If she had not felt cer- 
tain of support by the Entente powers, in case 
Germany turned on her, she would hardly have 
ventured to begin the war. 

Another advance made by Entente powers 
within the period under consideration was in 
Persia. This ancient state was in sad disorder. 
Weak and unpatriotic shahs, bold bands of 
brigands, and foreign intrigues plunged it into 
such a condition that it invited the domination of 
foreign nations. Russia approached from the 



FAILURE OF THE OLD SYSTEM 175 

north, and Great Britain appeared in the south, 
where rich oil fields had caught her eye. 

After some initial gains the two powers 
came to an agreement in 1907 by which they 
established their respective spheres of influence, 
so that Persia was occupied at the two ends, 
north and south, by strong powers, and the mid- 
dle portion was in such a chaotic state that its 
future seemed very doubtful. By making loans 
to the shah and furnishing capital for public im- 
provements British and Russian capitalists en- 
abled their respective countries to tighten their 
grips on Persia. Soon that country was in the 
throes of revolution, a so-called Nationalist party 
came into power which was not able to rule with- 
out the aid of Russia and Great Britain. So far 
did the foreign influence go that Morgan W. 
Shuster, an American financial adviser of the 
shah who had tried hard to place the government 
on a satisfactory basis, was fain to withdraw from 
Persia in despair. To the rest of the world it 
seemed that the independence of the country was 
near its end. 

A mere glance will show us what these de- 
velopments meant for Germany and Austria- 



176 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

Hungary. Remembering that Italy was acting 
with the Entente in her African policy, we 
see that the entire southern shore of the Medi- 
terranean was passing into hands adverse to the 
central powers, and that the new combination 
stretched out a long arm to the Persian Gulf and 
the region south of the Caspian. In view of 
Germany's hope that she would some day gain 
through Syria a railway route to the Far East, 
the trend of things in Persia threatened to close 
the narrow gap that was left her for such a route 
by completing the absorption of the kingdom of 
the shah. Should she allow the gap to be 
stopped, or should she strike while there was still 
time? And if she did not strike, what was there 
in the system of the Balance of Power that could 
be counted on as a guarantee that she was not a 
passive victim to the play of politics in the system 
then in use ? 

Furthermore, it was evident that Germany's 
prestige was being undermined by the progres- 
sive steps of her rivals. Three times had she 
rattled the saber over the Moroccan incidents, 
and each time with decreasing terror in the minds 
of her opponents. Perhaps its rattling had been 



FAILURE OF THE OLD SYSTEM 177 

one of the main facts in promoting the union of 
those opponents, since it always brought before 
them the picture of Germany embattled against 
the rest of Europe. To strike a blow that would 
teach France and Russia a lesson would restore 
German prestige and bring the balance back to 
the German side of the rivalry, if it did not do 
more. 

There is good ground for the guess that it was 
expected in high quarters in Berlin that the blow 
would do far more than restore prestige. It is 
true that the plan to which I am about to refer 
has not been openly accepted by responsible 
agents of state, but it was widely advocated by 
a portion of the people, the Pan-Germans. It 
involved the union of Austria-Hungary and Ger- 
many in a great state, Mittel-Europa, with strong 
influence in the Near East. Treitschke and 
many others had written and spoken for such a 
thing, and to a large number of Germans it had 
become a sacred ideal. When some one spoke to 
the deaf Colussus about the acquisition of ter- 
ritory in Africa he exclaimed: " Cameroons? 
What are we to do with this sand-box? Let us 
take Holland; then we shall have colonies." It 



178 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

was a part of the dream of the Pan-Germans 
that the proposed Mittel-Europa should extend 
from the Baltic to the Black Sea. If such a thing 
could be carried through, how excellent a trump 
card to play against the Entente plotters ! 

Francis Joseph, of Austria-Hungary, was too 
stout a patriot to hand his country over to the 
schemes of the Pan-Germans, but he was ap- 
proaching an already long deferred demise. 
The heir-apparent, Ferdinand, was supposed to 
be a great admirer of the kaiser, and the advo- 
cates of union had high hopes that he would pro- 
mote their desires. Suddenly came the crime of 
Sarajevo. In a peculiar manner it dashed the 
hopes of the dreamers ; for not only was their chief 
reliance taken away, but the new heir-apparent 
was supposed to be a pacific man who would 
favor constitutional government. Such a ruler 
would hardly support the formation of a great 
empire built after the fashion of Prussian autoc- 
racy. It was the inspiration of the moment to 
have the war come, and demonstrate the glory of 
Germanjr and Austria-Hungary, while the old 
emperor still lived. And if it was precipitated 
in the interest of Austria-Hungary, that was all 



FAILURE OF THE OLD SYSTEM 179 

the greater reason that the people of the dual 
empire should feel under obligation to the mili- 
tary power that carried it through. Possibly 
they would be so much impressed that they would 
sweep a youthful emperor on with them in the 
realization of a great united empire. 

It is not certain how far the Pan-German party 
controlled the policy of government in July, 
1914; but it does not seem too much to attribute 
such plans to men who did not hesitate to dream 
of the annexation of Holland and who had defi- 
nitely planned for the acquisition of Constanti- 
nople. The imagination of a German patriot is 
no mean thing in ordinary situations ; but a great 
sweep would be vouchsafed to it when its pos- 
sessor realized that his country was being out- 
played by the diplomats and the grim Captain of 
Death. It was an extraordinary situation that 
the Germans confronted in July, 1914, and there 
was not much time for deliberation. 

This chapter is not written to show that Ger- 
many was, or was not, responsible for the war. 
If it explains how it was that the German people 
believed that the war was forced on them, it will 
accomplish more than it was designed to accom- 



180 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

plish. But it is intended to enable persons to 
keep calm heads in these times of perplexity in 
order to understand how each side approached 
the great conflict. It is evident that the Entente 
powers thought that Germany wished to change 
Europe into a great empire with herself at the 
head, while the central powers felt that the chains 
were being riveted around about them. 

In view of this long train of events the last 
week in that fateful July assumes small propor- 
tions. If Ferdinand had not been killed war 
would still have hung over the horizon. If Ser- 
bia had accepted the Austrian ultimatum war 
would still have threatened; for though it may 
have been averted for the moment, the Triple 
Entente would still have existed, nor would it 
have brooked the increase of German prestige 
that the backdown of Serbia would have implied. 
If Russia had not mobilized her army, Germany 
may not have mobilized, but the ancient fear of 
Russia as an overwhelming opponent when 
she was once organized in the modern way 
would have remained as a threat of dire conse- 
quences. 

The theory of the Balance of Power is built 



FAILURE OF THE OLD SYSTEM 181 

upon the idea that states act for their own in- 
terests in the restraint of one another from over- 
weening ambition. At bottom it is selfish. It 
assumes a state of rivalry; and it is necessary to 
the theory that as fast as one side gains in 
strength the other shall gain also. If the En- 
tente nations acquire Morocco, Tripoli, Cyre- 
naica, and parts of Persia, the central powers 
must gain also or they are over-balanced. And 
who is to determine how much they shall gain? 
Manifestly each will strive to get all it can. The 
very process of gaining stimulates antipathy and 
makes war a probability. 

Another observation that is worthy of consider- 
ation is that balance is logically possible only 
when more than two sides are opposed to one 
another. When Great Britain, France and 
Russia had varying purposes it was not difficult 
for Bismarck to play one against the other and 
so keep the equilibrium. But when it happened 
that the central powers became so strong that 
they constituted a threat against every other na- 
tion in the world, it was natural for the other 
nations to unite to check them. In such a con- 
dition no true balance of power could exist, and 



182 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

it was folly to expect that theory to serve as it 
served in former days. 

One of the things the world ought to learn 
from the war that now afflicts it is that no nation 
can conquer the world by stealth. It is one of 
the happy shortcomings of political selfishness 
that its agents usually fancy they can cover their 
tracks. How often do we see a bad politician 
doing something wrong in the false confidence 
that while he knows what he is doing the people 
cannot see it! So with Germany in the years 
before the war. Making her plans for large 
accretions of power, she thought she could steal 
a march on other nations and gain in a spurt a 
position from which at a later time she could ex- 
tend her power by other and still larger sweeps 
of conquest. She did not think that the other 
nations would take part until it was too late. 

But the rest of the world was as wide awake 
as she. No man in England accustomed to view 
political things in the large failed to see the in- 
stant the war began that the hour of crisis for 
his country was at hand. If Great Britain had 
not fought in August, 1914, she would have been 
the stupidest nation in the world. To have al- 



FAILURE OF THE OLD SYSTEM 183 

lowed her greatest rival to sit down in the French 
channel ports would have been suicidal for her. 
The only probable explanation of Germany's fail- 
ure to realize this is that she had become so con- 
fident of the superiority of her own mind that 
she thought all other minds were sodden. 

In a similar way, when she had carried on the 
war for two years and a half and resorted to 
the submarine in ruthless attacks on American 
ships of commerce, she should have known that 
she was giving the United States a reason for 
participating in the war at a time when it was 
clear to most Americans that their national safety 
demanded that they should take part. If by this 
kind of battle the Germans forced Europe to 
bend to her, what could we expect in the future? 
The very imminence of German success de- 
manded that the United States should throw her- 
self into the struggle. And after the war is 
over this truth will be written indelibly in the 
pages of history: No great nation can be al- 
lowed to conquer the world piecemeal. 



CHAPTER IX 

IF THE SUBMARINES FAIL 

The German people say the submarines will 
not fail. They seem to think that what they call 
the highest achievement of the scientific mind of 
Germany cannot fail. There is little doubt 
that they pin on this arm of the service their 
last hope of securing a decision in actual war- 
fare. If it fails them they can look forward 
only to a long course of sheer dogged resistance, 
hoping they can last longer than their adver- 
saries. Let us consider the probable results re- 
spectively of the success and the failure of the 
submarine campaign. 

If the under-sea boats do all the Germans 
expect of them the result is soon told. Great 
Britain will be forced to make lame and in- 
efficient war, France will be unable to do more 
than hold on to the line that she occupies, and 
the United States, unable to send her vast army 
across the seas in large numbers, will not be able 
to repair the loss of strength that her allies sus- 

184 



IF THE SUBMARINES FAIL 185 

tain. Under such circumstances Russia, even if 
she should recover from her present state of 
weakness, could hardly deliver the blows that 
would bring Germany to reason. 

Under such conditions the war would end with- 
out the defeat of the Teutons, and Mittel-Europa 
would still be impending. If the enthusiasm 
of victory would stimulate such a union, the re- 
alization that Germany and Austria-Hungary 
were pressed back to the wall and must fight for 
their future existence might equally bring them 
to unite their fortunes. In fact, if these two 
states wish to unite it is hard to see how they are 
to be prevented, unless at the end of the war they 
are so much weaker than their opponents that 
they can be forbidden to take such a step, with 
assurance that the prohibition will be respected. 

To form such a union would be, in fact, to 
snatch victory out of sore distress ; for the united 
empires, even though Serbia, Bulgaria, and Tur- 
key were left out of account, would have a popu- 
lation of 116,000,000, which is more than the 
population of the United States and smaller only 
than that of Russia and China. Ten years' 
breathing space in which to reorganize the indus- 



186 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

trial and social life of. so large a body of men 
would work wonders with them; and when re- 
organized and fired by a common ambition they 
would be able to dictate terms to any two of the 
nations of Western Europe. It is the probable 
union of these states rather than the power of 
either when acting alone, that makes it necessary 
for the rest of the world to procure their defeat. 
In two ways the union can be prevented. One 
is to inflict such a defeat on the central allies 
that they will not dare run the risk of another 
war through endeavoring to combine. Possibly 
such a defeat could be inflicted by fighting long 
and winning great victories. It would have to 
be a greater victory than was won by Prussia 
over France in 1871 ; for after that victory 
France, fired with hatred for all that was Ger- 
man, was so much feared by her conquerors that 
it became a chief object of their diplomacy to 
keep her isolated by drawing possible allies over 
to the German interest. The great military 
strength of Germany at present hardly warrants 
the hope that she can be brought to a lower 
state than France at the end of the siege of 
Paris. 



IF THE SUBMARINES FAIL 187 

The other method is to bring about such a 
situation that union shall not be desired in the 
Teutonic states. For it is not to be disputed 
that if ever a strong and competent group of 
states wish to become an empire, nothing short of 
a great war by other states can stop them. 
It behooves us, therefore, to make our appeal to 
the reasons of the Germans, Austrians and Hun- 
garians. It is not necessary to limit our argu- 
ments to words merely; it is, however, essential 
that the Teutonic mind shall understand what 
to threaten the equilibrium of nations means. 
To show that such a preponderance cannot be 
established practically would be an effective 
warning to those leaders who set up to preach 
Germanic militarism in the future. 

As this chapter is being printed, it seems that 
the submarines are not a success. They have 
taken a great toll but not all the grist. Enough 
ships are left on the sea to carry the minimum of 
food and war material that our allies must 
have to maintain their grip on Germany. The 
war of the central powers does not force their 
enemies to their knees, and it seems that the best 
the kaiser can hope for is to hold out for a time 



188 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

with the expectation that victory will be snatched 
by accident out of the gloom that hangs over his 
cause. 

When the war began it was essentially a con- 
test between two groups of powers, each of which 
had been pursuing policies of aggrandizement. 
One group had progressively acquired territory 
in Africa and Asia, and the other had a plan 
equally definite for acquiring territory in South- 
eastern Europe and the Near East. If the war 
had been fought out as begun it would probably 
have led to the realization of one or the other of 
these desires. Either the Entente powers would 
have fixed their hold on their respective spheres 
of influence and broken the schemes of Germany 
and Austria- Hungary, or Germany would have 
made a great sweep forward and established her- 
self in the keystone position of Europe, with im- 
mense consequences for the future. 

As the war progressed it became evident that 
it was becoming a supreme test of the ability of 
one combination of nations to create a new empire 
that would dominate Europe. It is no stretch 
of imagination to say that the Germans dreamed 
of reestablishing a modern Roman Empire of 



IF THE SUBMARINES FAIL 189 

the Germans. If the scheme had materialized — 
and the future historian will probably conclude 
that it was near success at one time — the fate 
of the rest of the world would have been far 
different from what we wish it to be. A gigantic 
struggle would have been thrust upon the United 
States to save the Western World from con- 
quest. It was the conviction that such a crisis 
actually menaced us that brought us to join in the 
attempt to block the German plans. 

Assuming, therefore, that the anti-German al- 
lies are victorious, it is unthinkable that the war 
shall be allowed to end as a mere check on the 
plans of the central powers. To do so would 
be to grant that the Entente powers should be 
left to carry on their plans for national aggran- 
dizement with carte blanche approval by the 
United States. It would mean that we are fight- 
ing at a great sacrifice in order to enable Great 
Britain to maintain her position as mistress of 
the sea and ruler of a far distant empire. Now 
we do not object to British rule in the distant 
parts of the earth: we have found it a tolerable 
thing that she should be entrusted with the task 
of developing the backward races over whom she 



190 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

has established her authority. But we have 
never meant to save her toppling empire for her 
own comfort, as an act of grace merely. 

If we are to contribute a material part to the 
suppression of aggression in the world, we have 
a right to say in what way and to what end our 
sacrifice will have been made. As the greatest 
of the anti-German allies we shall have the larg- 
est burden to bear in proportion to the time in 
which we are to fight. That we should guar- 
antee to Great Britain and our other allies the 
full existence of their rights is but fair. It is 
equally reasonable that we shall demand that 
the future does not inure to the special advan- 
tage of any one of the group; but in fixing 
upon the terms under which it shall be arranged 
the main end in view should be the good of all 
the nations in the world. 

This is a view which is likely to have the sup- 
port of all the anti-German allies, with the pos- 
sible exception of Britain. France and Russia, 
to say nothing of the smaller states, have the 
same interest as we in making the common wel- 
fare the chief aim in peace negotiations. If 
we were not in the group and if victory came to 



IF THE SUBMARINES FAIL 191 

it, these nations would perforce have to yield the 
lead to Great Britain, since she would outclass 
them in strength by reason of her sea power. 
She might well say that as the nation on which 
would fall the largest burden in keeping Ger- 
many in a state of restraint, she should have 
the largest influence in deciding what was to be 
done. She cannot make such a claim under ex- 
isting conditions. 

Of course, there is the difficulty that the United 
States may not be guided by statesmen who real- 
ize the importance of following a thoroughly 
American policy. It has long been a practice 
with a great many Americans to follow the lead 
of Great Britain. Unaccustomed to take a nor- 
mal share of responsibility in world problems, we 
may now be inclined to hold back, leaving the 
game to hands that have acquired greater skill 
in playing it. Such a course would be a misfor- 
tune. It would mean that statesmen would be 
given charge of the situation who derived all 
their ideas under the old system of Balance of 
Power, and it would be strange if they did not try 
to carry on the world in the future with a strong 
squint at the only principles of international 



192 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

policy they know anything about. To break into 
this well crystallized realm of so-called practical 
ideas, demands an unusually strong man, a man 
well founded in principles and able to convince 
others of the wisdom of his views. 

It is true that the President of the United 
States now in office has many of the traits that 
seem necessary to a correct conduct of the situa- 
tion. A man who had the training of a mere 
politician might well be less than able to deal 
with the situation that faces us. President Wil- 
son's knowledge of history enables him to think 
in terms of large national movements. That is 
the chief value of historical training to a states- 
man. If he knows the history of the attempts to 
settle the affairs of the nations after the great 
world struggles of the past, he is better able to 
understand how the various suggested plans will 
work in the crisis that is to be passed through. 

President Wilson has, also, the unusual faculty 
of doing what he wishes to do. When he has 
formed a purpose it is not generally a com- 
promise with a number of men whose chief con- 
cern is how the result of action will affect their 
party support. At least this is true in mat- 



IF THE SUBMARINES FAIL 193 

ters not clearly within the bounds of party activ- 
ity. Moreover, he has spoken and written words 
which seem to show that he understands the need 
of providing for such a course of conduct between 
the nations as will assure us of cooperation fof 
the elimination of future wars. In his long de- 
lay in urging war and in his early pronounce- 
ment for a league of peace, he gave us the assur- 
ance, if nothing else, that he understands the sit- 
uation and is capable of holding a firm course in 
accordance with his principles. 

If the submarines fail, therefore, and if we 
come to a settlement of the largely new world 
problems that will confront us, and if our policy 
is in the hands of wise men, what principles will 
guide our actions and the actions of the rest 
of the world? This is a question that all intelli- 
gent citizens should consider, since it cannot be 
answered well unless there is a restrained and 
broad-minded public opinion to support the lead- 
ers of the people. It is a matter for the consider- 
ation of Germans as well as their opponents ; for 
their attitude toward any policy adopted will 
have a strong effect upon the continuation of the 
policy. 



194 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

The first question we should ask ourselves is: 
What are we to do to the Germans? How shall 
we punish them for what they have done to make 
the world miserable? My answer to that is: 
Let God punish them. For us it is not a ques- 
tion of giving the Germans their deserts but a 
question of coming out of this cataclysm with 
a clear gain for the cause of human happiness. 
Let us look upon the Germans as suffering from 
a kind of disease of the mind which produces 
bad results on those with whom they are in con- 
tact. It is ours to prescribe a cure, both for 
their sake and for ours. I suggest that we first 
put them on a liquid diet to reduce their exuber- 
ant vitalitjr and then give them the rest cure. 
At any rate, that is better than cropping their 
ears or putting them into strait- jackets. To 
treat an impassioned man you do not kick and 
beat him but try to bring him to his senses. To 
bring the Germans into a realization that this 
world is run on the principle of live-and-let-live, 
we ourselves must show a willingness to let live. 

We had a large amount of the opposite spirit 
in the United States from 1865 to 1875. The 
South, passionately convinced that slavery was 



IF THE SUBMARINES FAIL 195 

no evil, had made as good a fight to preserve her 
cause as Germany has made or can make. She 
held out to the last with what her own people 
called a stout heart, but her foes said with a 
stiff neck. For a year and a half after the out- 
side world concluded that she could never win, 
she held on in the hope that her adversaries would 
tire of war and make peace without victory. 
Now all this was exasperating, and the mass of 
the Northern people felt in 1865 that some pun- 
ishment should be inflicted on the perverse people 
who had inflicted so much unnecessary misery on 
the country. But Lincoln did not feel that way. 
There is no reason to think that he gave a mo- 
ment's thought to making the South suffer for 
her course. For him all thought was how to 
smooth the wrinkles out of the present, and how 
to make the Southern people cast out their hatred 
of the union and come back to their former loy- 
alty. The Lincoln spirit should guide the world 
at the end of the present struggle. 

War lives on hatred. To make your people 
put all their energy into the fight make them 
hate the other people; and you may rest in the 
assurance that the leaders of the others are striv- 



196 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

ing to make their followers hate the men on your 
side. The mill of hate grinds steadily and at a 
high speed while war lasts. In Germany in these 
days is a vast amount of industrious abusing of 
England. That makes the German people sup- 
port the war. In Great Britain is a great ac- 
tivity in describing atrocities in Belgium and 
Armenia, and it exists in order to make the Brit- 
ish people mad for war. When you see a new 
crop of the testimony concerning the torturing 
horrors of the first month of war in Belgium, 
you may know that the war spirit is running low 
in Britain. Unhappily, such propaganda is a 
necessary feature of war. We are naturally 
good-hearted, and we do not go out to kill men 
until we are made to hate them. 

The moment war ends all this kind of thing 
should cease. The time will then have come for 
the propaganda of peace. Unfortunately there 
are few men whose mission it is to spread such 
ideas. Merchants and tourists may do what is 
their nature to do, but they are not sufficient ; and 
it generally takes years for the fires to cool off. 

The aftermath of our civil war was as un- 
happy a series of events as we have encountered 



IF THE SUBMARINES FAIL 197 

within our national history. Undertaken as a 
means of making sure of the gains of the civil 
war, it became a procession of passion in which 
stalked all the worst feelings that divided the 
people in actual warfare. There are still men in 
the North who have Andersonville in mind when 
they vote, and men in the South who can never 
respect the republican party because it was re- 
sponsible for the reconstruction acts of 1867. It 
will be extremely unfortunate if we take up the 
problems that are soon to be upon us in the spirit 
with which we assumed the duties of reconstruct- 
ing the South. 

During the civil war the South was possessed 
of a fixed idea: the same thing is true of Ger- 
many today. The South was committed to a 
position that the rest of the world had abandoned : 
Germany is committed to a type of bureaucratic 
government which is as much out of date in a 
modern world as slavery. No ordinary system 
of reasoning could show fair and honest Southern 
men in what respect they had the sentiment of 
civilization against them: the German is thor- 
oughly convinced that he is fighting for the pre- 
servation of the most efficient type of government 



198 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

the world has seen. The South went to her de- 
feat after a long and astonishingly effective re- 
sistance : Germany seems to be destined to a simi- 
larly long and steady process of reduction into 
complete prostration. The South was ruled by 
a small but able class of landed proprietors who 
refused to see the plain truth of the situation 
before them and prolonged the struggle until 
they were exhausted, although by making a fav- 
orable adjustment in accordance with the logic 
of the conditions before them they might have 
ended the war in 1864 and saved their people 
from the uttermost bitterness of defeat : the Ger- 
mans, ruled by their Junkers, are equally deaf 
to argument, equally determined to die at their 
posts, and equally opposed to a compromise by 
which they will have to give up their antiquated 
"institution," relinquish their special privileges, 
and make their country like the rest of the world. 
There are so many parallels between the two 
countries that we wonder if there will not also be 
a disposition of the victorious opposing allies to 
degrade Germany in her defeat. 

Probably her best adjusted punishment will be 
the reflection that her "peculiar institution" 



IF THE SUBMARINES FAIL 199 

proved a failure in time of need. For a century- 
she has been training an army, but it is not the 
army that has failed her. It has done all that 
could have been expected of it. Nor did the 
Southern army fail the South. It is not the 
sense of loyalty, nor the scientific efficiency, nor 
the unity of purpose within the empire, that have 
failed her. They are all splendid and have done 
what could be demanded of them. The thing 
that has failed is the peculiar way in which the 
German ruling classes have made use of these 
forces. They have used army, scientific effici- 
ency, loyalty, and unity of purpose to promote 
the ends of an aggressive ruling class. Now the 
best treatment is to defeat them in the war and 
allow them plenty of time, with no unnecessary 
antagonisms, to learn that their system does not 
pay, and that any attempt to revive it in the 
future will be followed by another punishment as 
severe as that which this war brought. The sup- 
port of a military caste and the training of all the 
men in a great army are heavy burdens on the 
economic life of the state. Will any nation con- 
tinue to bear them if they come to nothing in the 
day of trial? Armies for defense do not demand 



200 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

the great expenditures that Germany has made 
in the last decades. 

No penalty that the victors could lay on Ger- 
many would be permanently effective in reduc- 
ing her. So great are her economic energies that 
they would restore her to prosperity within a short 
time, and she would be ready to take advantage of 
any favorable combination to strike in revenge. 
Disarmament would not be a guaranty that she 
would cease to be troublesome to her neighbors; 
for she would still have her excellently trained 
soldiers who could be reassembled in a great army 
at short notice. She might well be required to 
dismantle her great armament factories ; and since 
they are essential to the re-arming of a great 
army some check on her restoration would come 
from such dismantling. But it would be a tem- 
porary check. It is only necessary to remember 
that the beginning of the present German army 
was the attempt of one conqueror, Napoleon, to 
limit the Prussian army to 42,000 men. 

Moreover, what nations could be expected to 
agree among themselves while standing guard 
over Germany? Under the Balance of Power 
we might expect a fair amount of mobility of 



IF THE SUBMARINES FAIL 201 

alliances. We have just seen that not even the 
Triple Alliance was proof against the skillful 
hands of Delcasse. If Italy could be withdrawn 
by France from that powerful combination, how 
can we doubt that a humiliated Germany would 
find means of weakening the combination against 
her? She would have the greatest inducement 
to do so ; and it is not probable that complete har- 
mony would prevail long between the victors, if 
they were held together only by the bonds of 
mutual friendship. The history of diplomacy is 
the record of broken friendships. 

To see what readjustment might occur with 
respect to a humiliated Germany, it is only neces- 
sary to recall the position of France after the 
Napoleonic wars. Beaten beyond resistance, 
suspected of carrying the germs of bad govern- 
ment from which all other nations felt that they 
must be protected as from deadly disease, and 
held down by great armies of occupation, her sit- 
uation would seem to have been most deplorable. 
But her isolation lasted for only a moment. She 
was admitted to the Congress of Vienna, — called 
to pass on the future arrangements of Europe, — 
because there was division among her conquer- 



202 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

ors. From that time she was suspected less and 
less, and at the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle, 
1818, she was admitted to the Concert of Europe, 
but not with full fellowship; for the other powers 
made a secret agreement to watch her for a while 
longer. She progressed so rapidly in eliminat- 
ing the republican virus in her system that in 
1823 she was entrusted with the task of suppress- 
ing the constitution of Spain. Thus in eight 
years after the battle of Waterloo France was 
again in full accord with the other powers. 
Probably few people would have said in 1815 that 
her restoration would come about so rapidly. It 
would be no more singular if within ten years 
after the end of the present struggle a conquered 
Germany were to forget her antipathies of 1918 
and be ready to give and be given in diplomatic 
alliances with as little regard for the past. 

If, for example, a restored and highly nation- 
alized Russia becomes a threat against Western 
Europe some years hence, the antagonisms of 
today would be forgotten and Germany, France, 
and Great Britain would probably be found 
fighting side by side to restrain the Muscovite 
giant. The old system is intensely selfish and it 



IF THE SUBMARINES FAIL 203 

lends itself to rapid changes in policies. But it 
is an expensive thing to keep up the system. 
Large armies are necessary, great debts are 
created, and a vast amount of nervous strength is 
diverted from the normal activities of humanity. 
It is small hope for him who longs to see war put 
down permanently that only by fighting a war 
like that now raging may we expect the nations 
to defeat any future aspirant for universal 
power. 

Finally, if the submarines fail and the anti- 
German allies break down the defenses of their 
enemies and thus are able to determine the kind 
of peace that is to be made, the treaty of peace 
should not have for its end the prolongation of 
the power of the Entente group. The history of 
the first half of the nineteenth century shows how 
easy it is for such a group to be re-arranged 
with the result that new wars threaten. We 
must trust the fair mindedness of human nature 
and the logic of the situation to do much for the 
Germans. It is on their acceptance of the issue 
that we must rest our hopes for a peaceful future. 

These truths are especially pertinent to the in- 
terests of the United States. We are not fight- 



£04 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

ing Europe's war, but the world's. We are the 
only nation in the struggle that has not a special 
interest at stake. We are the only member of 
our group of allies that has a right to take the 
side of the weakest member of that group against 
the desire of the strongest. If any one member 
should in a moment of more or less pardonable 
forgetfulness of the common good advance 
claims that would be based on a desire to recoup 
herself for her sufferings, we best of all could 
demand equal treatment and see that the seed of 
future discord are not sown. These are prin- 
ciples that every American citizen should under- 
stand. 



CHAPTER X 

OBSTACLES TO AN ENDURING PEACE 

By an enduring peace I mean a peace that 
shall last as long as we can see into the future. 
It is such a peace as has in it, so far as we can see, 
no fact that would seem to make for its ruin. If 
we adopt a peace that has the seed of destruction 
in its very nature, we cannot hope for relief from 
the evils of war. We must, under such a condi- 
tion, take account of war as one of the permanent 
burdens of civilization, with the full consciousness 
that it will become increasingly expensive in 
life and property, and with the result that at re- 
curring periods an intelligent world will drop its 
peaceful tasks to try to reduce its population to 
a nullity. From the possibility of such a strife 
we turn to ask the question: "Can nothing be 
done to save humanity from such madness?" 

The answer is very simple: All people are 
unreasonable to some extent. In connection 
with the question now under consideration, each 
of the great states of the world, our own in- 

205 



206 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

eluded, has its own special form of unreasonable- 
ness, which acts as an obstacle to the formation 
of a regime of peace. If the immense disaster 
by which we are depressed could serve as a means 
of bringing us to a state of entire reasonableness, 
the present war would be worth all it costs. 
Whether or not it can lead to such a result the 
reader must determine for himself. 

An important obstacle to such a result is the 
economic competition of nations. Economic 
competition by individuals has ugly sides, but it 
is not dangerous in the sense in which national 
competition is dangerous. When two merchants 
undersell until one breaks down the business of 
the other, the victim passes out of sight in the 
business world, and the current of trade soon goes 
on as before. When two corporations, however 
great, engage in a business "war" and one is 
crushed or absorbed by its competitor, the ripple 
that was made is soon obliterated, and the victor 
serves the human wants with which it has to do 
without serious damage to humanity. 

But when one nation finds itself in strong com- 
petition with another in the hope of controlling a 
sphere of trade, it is apt to seek territorial annex- 



OBSTACLES TO AN ENDURING PEACE 207 

ation to gain the desired field of exploitation. 
The competitor can only follow the same course. 
It is the only thing it can do, if it is not willing to 
give up the contest. If it is strong enough to dis- 
pute the will of the rival, its very sense of individ- 
uality demands that it shall not tamely yield be- 
fore the aggression of a rival. When France 
acquired Morocco, Italy acquired Tripoli, and 
Great Britain acquired the southern part of 
Persia, economic advantage was a strong motive, 
but not the only motive. When Germany laid 
out the field of her future expansion in Turkish 
lands and when she expected to establish a per- 
manent influence over the Balkans, the extension 
of her sphere of commerce was a chief motive. 

Probably the fundamental wrong here was 
the idea, widely held by the present generation, 
that a nation has a right to establish bars around 
her national territory to keep the trade of other 
nations out, so that her own citizens shall have 
preferential advantages in the exploitation of the 
territory. That idea is so firmly held today 
that one must be a rash man who attempts to get 
the nations to give it up. But it is a fundamental 
obstacle to permanent peace in the world. Prob- 



208 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

ably it is not too much to say that as long as the 
business men of the world insist on dividing 
themselves into national groups with these 
national preferences, so long may they expect 
business at recurring intervals to be burdened 
with the waste and ruin of war. 

Against the existing practice we may place the 
"open door" policy, which we have known chiefly 
in connection with the trade of the undeveloped 
nations. It means the free opening of the trade 
of a given state to all the nations that may care 
to have it. We heard much of the "open door" 
in China a few years ago, and most of the benev- 
olent governments approved of the suggestion. 
To have been perfectly logical they should have 
applied the same idea to their own commerce; 
and if the world ever comes to a perfect state of 
international comity, it is likely that national 
tariff barriers will be broken down. . 

It is true, however, that we can have enduring 
peace and have national protective tariffs, also. 
If nations agree that tariffs are one of the un- 
happy excrescences of an unreasonable world, 
they may find it in their hearts to tolerate such 
growths. To tolerate them would be, no doubt, 



OBSTACLES TO AN ENDURING PEACE 209 

better than going to war. But when a state sets 
its eyes on a certain part of the earth which it 
feels it must acquire in order to enlarge the terri- 
tory in which it can trade without fair competi- 
tion, the peace of the world is imperiled. 

It is probable that this kind of motive played 
a large part in Germany's decision to begin the 
present war. For a long time her industries 
had been developing at a rapid rate. Protected 
at home by tariffs they were able to sell goods 
to the German people at high prices, while they 
sold at cheap prices in foreign markets in order 
to drive their competitors away. The volume of 
German trade increased immensely, factories 
were multiplied, and large credits were extended 
by the banks in order to support this great 
structure. At last the situation became un- 
steady. The expansion of the foreign part of the 
national trade at small profits was a clog on the 
home trade, which could not be made to yield 
enough profit to keep the business of the country 
in a healthy condition. Then the manufacturers 
and capitalists came to the conclusion that it was 
to their interest for the country to go into a war 
of conquest in which new national territory should 



210 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

be laid at their feet for profitable exploitation. 
Thus, the large business interests, usually sup- 
porters of peace, swung to the support of the mil- 
itarists. It is significant that the liberals, that 
party in the Reichstag which speaks especially for 
the traders, capitalists, and manufacturers, have 
been among the most outspoken advocates of an- 
nexation. 

In a powerful, if indirect, way the laborers 
are reached by this argument. They see that if 
the manufacturers and transportation companies 
expand their business wages are better and em- 
ployment more abundant, and this leads them 
to favor a policy of expansion. To what extent 
the remote organs of the business world are thus 
reached it is difficult to say. But it is evident 
that in a phase of human activity which has been 
organized most intricately the influence of the in- 
itial idea that a war of annexation helps business 
is far reaching. 

We frequently encounter the assertion that 
economic laws are unchangeable; but the state- 
ment is not true, as it is made. Many economic 
processes that appeared fundamental in their 
time have changed as the minds of men have taken 



OBSTACLES TO AN ENDURING PEACE 211 

new grips on human life. The world has out- 
grown the mercantile school of economic ideas. 
The attitude toward private property and 
monopolies, and the view of the right of individ- 
ual bargaining have been greatly modified in the 
process of time. If a so-called economic law 
stands in the way of a reasonable adjustment of 
human relations, it can be altered, if enough time 
and effort be given to the attempt to change it. 
Although it may seem to be fundamentally fixed 
in the minds of business men and laborers that 
a war for annexation is in their interests, if rea- 
son shows that they are mistaken, there should 
be a way of bringing reason to their minds, even 
as it has come to ours. 

Another obstacle to enduring peace is a false 
sense of patriotism. If a man extols his own vir- 
tues we say he is a boaster : if he extols the good 
qualities of his town, state, or nation, we say he 
is a patriot. I am inclined to say that it is not 
permitted to a man to praise his country — I do 
not say love his country — in any sense but that in 
which he may praise himself, modestly and with 
reservations. At any rate, he should praise and 
magnify his country in the most restrained 



212 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

spirit possible. Patriotism does not demand 
national egotism in the good citizen. Those 
writers and teachers who try to create a national 
spirit should be careful lest they make men mere 
chauvinists. 

Especially perilous is the doctrine that "self- 
preservation is the first law of nature" as applied 
to nations. Times come when a man is not justi- 
fied in preserving his life. So to nations come 
crises in which they are not permitted by the rules 
of morality to save themselves by what appear to 
be the only means left. In the present war Ger- 
many asserted that she was justified by this prin- 
ciple in adopting the ruthless war of the sub- 
marine, since it was the only thing that would 
save her from destruction. It is better for a 
state to go to destruction, just as it is better for 
a man to go to his death, with clean hands than 
to live foully. 

It is but an extension of this doctrine for men 
of normal' morality to say they may do things 
for the benefit of the state which they 'may not 
do for their own benefit. A statesman has no 
more right to make his state steal another state's 
lands than he has to take his neighbor's watch. 



OBSTACLES TO AN ENDURING PEACE £13 

It is not a virtue if he lies for his state. The 
state cannot speak of itself : it speaks through its 
agents. It is sullied, even as a man is sullied in 
his character, when its only voice, the words and 
acts of its servants, is not true. Judged by the 
standards here set up, the world's diplomacy 
needs amendment, and if amended one of the 
obstacles to peace will be removed. 

A false sense of patriotism may lead to acts 
that imperil peace. When France acquired Mo- 
rocco her object was not wholly to extend her 
economic interests. To increase the national 
strength was also a motive. Likewise, Ger- 
many's desire to establish control over the terri- 
tory southeast of her was not entirely economic 
in its origin. She also wished to increase the 
glory and strength of the Fatherland. How 
much we are to condemn this desire of a citizen 
for the glory of his country it is hard to say ; but 
it seems to be clear that such a desire may mani- 
fest itself in such a way as to become a serious 
obstacle to peace. 

At the end of the present war the victorious 
nations will be in a position to abate national 
glory in the interest of enduring peace. Our 



214 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

own citizens are supposed to be particularly 
proud of the achievements of the United States. 
If our efforts should contribute as much as we 
wish to the triumph of our own side, we should 
be careful lest we forget that we entered the 
war with the modest purpose of making the world 
a fit place of habitation for all people. Likewise 
we should be justified in using our influence 
among our allies to see that the desire of no 
statesman to enhance the glory of his nation leads 
to action which may imperil peace in the future. 
When we shall have fought long and suffered 
greatly our hearts are likely to become harder 
than now, in the beginning of the war; and there 
is danger that we shall forget early resolutions 
if we are not firmly committed to them at the 
outset. 

Another obstacle to enduring peace is the sense 
of nationality. The older men of this generation 
who were students in Germany in their youth 
acquired much respect for the passionate desire 
of Germans to build up unity among all German 
speaking people. It was a sacred idea to young 
men and imaginative writers. Long had North 
Germany been disunited, stumbling forward un- 



OBSTACLES TO AN ENDURING PEACE 215 

der the lead of the Hapsburgs. To be able to 
form a dominating group among all the Germans 
in the world seemed no more than was their just 
due. We did not realize in those days to what 
an end these people who lost so many opportuni- 
ties through internal weakness would put their 
strength when they had at last developed it. 
And yet, it was the right of the Germans to unite 
themselves into as strong a nation as they might 
form. The wrong came in the improper exten- 
sion of the idea. When men like Treitschke talk 
about including Holland in the German Father- 
land we may well ask where nationality's pre- 
tensions are taking us? 

It was natural, also, that the sense of national- 
ity should be manifested in many other European 
countries. Each of the Balkan states had its 
own phase of it. Russia had a large hope of 
uniting in her control all the peoples of Slavic 
blood. Italy demanded Trieste as a part of the 
Italian-speaking world. Greece lived for the 
acquisition of Macedonia and the Greek Islands, 
and France never diminished her pathetic long- 
ing for Alsace-Lorraine, where lived French- 
speaking peoples. 



216 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

Often the desire for nationality runs directly 
counter to economic laws. For example, what 
are we to do when we have Austria holding on 
to her only great Adriatic seaport as the essential 
outlet of her trade to the sea, and nationality 
proclaiming that this port shall be handed 
over to Italy? Moreover, different peoples are 
so intermixed in some parts of Europe that it is 
impossible for any but a scientific specialist to 
say which states, or sections of states, are oc- 
cupied by a majority of one race and which by 
a majority of another. If we are to set out to 
divide Europe according to nationality we shall 
have a large task on our hands. In the United 
States the principle of nationality is not to be 
pleaded, since we are so intimately intermixed 
that it would be hopeless to try to range us into 
racial groups. Moreover, we get along very well 
as it is, having once agreed that we shall have to 
get along together. Perhaps if the nationaliz- 
ing propaganda ceased in Europe race antagon- 
ism would subside. 

Autocratic classes in society constitute still an- 
other obstacle to peace. We have heard much on 
this subject of late, and some of the things that 



OBSTACLES TO AN ENDURING PEACE 217 

have been said have been so ill-established in truth 
that they must make the real autocrats smile. It 
will probably help us to understand the situation 
if we undertake to enumerate the good things an 
autocracy can do. For truth never profits by 
falsehood, and the most autocratic people in the 
world have sense enough to know when they are 
misrepresented. 

Let us remember that under favorable condi- 
tions an autocracy is composed of the more ca- 
pable people in the community in which it exists. 
They are more capable because they have been 
brought up most carefully, that is, because they 
have the best trained minds. There is no law of 
nature by which more fools are born in an aris- 
tocracy than in a proletariat. In fact, the tend- 
ency is the other way; for since the aristocrats 
are in a position to cultivate themselves in a given 
generation, it is natural that a comparatively 
large portion of their children shall be well en- 
dowed mentally. To this gift of nature add the 
influence of better educational training, and you 
see how natural it is to expect an autocracy to be 
stronger mentally than those who would have to 
replace it if it were overthrown. 



218 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

Again, an autocracy is not necessarily un- 
patriotic. Of course, it has its own idea of what 
patriotism is, but so have the classes below the 
autocracy. Its patriotism usually embraces an 
honestly held opinion that the autocratic state is 
the best form of society. On this basis it is will- 
ing to sacrifice much for the state. We see it 
putting "lives, fortunes, and sacred honor" lit- 
erally at the entire command of the state. No 
man can do more than give his all for that which 
he holds right. 

An autocracy may be composed of men of the 
best private manners and principles. They fre- 
quently include the best poets, historians, novel- 
ists, philosophers, and teachers of the nation. It 
is they who encourage art, and set standards of 
taste in architecture, landscape gardening, and 
general culture. Compared with the leisure class 
of a prosperous industrial country they may be 
more courteous, more unassuming, and less given 
to offensive use of their wealth. They are the 
kind of men whom any of us could love if we 
knew them personally. These words do not, of 
course, apply to all members of the class, but to 
the group as a whole in ordinary conditions. 



OBSTACLES TO AN ENDURING PEACE 219 

Of the German autocracy most of these things 
can be said, and more. It is a hard working 
group and generally speaking it is honest. In 
the service of the state it has a record of efficient 
government that few democratic countries can 
show. The officials of German towns and cities, 
provinces and states, taken from the hereditary 
upper classes, are well trained, faithful, and free 
from the suggestion of corruption. It will take 
New York or Chicago many years to develop 
the state of good government that exists in Ber- 
lin. Moreover, the German autocracy has the 
respect of the German people. 

Up to last winter the Russian autocracy was 
an obstacle to peace. Many who looked forward 
to a reign of reason wondered how they were go- 
ing to make the theory work while the largest 
Entente nation was in the hands of an autocracy 
that was less tolerable than the German autoc- 
racy. Fortunately, fate has settled the question, 
for the time at least. So uncertain is the condi- 
tion of affairs in Russia, that no one can say what 
will be the outcome. It is by no means certain 
that the peasants, workers, and soldiers, will not 
make actual war against the former autocrats, 



220 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

leading to a state of chaos like the worst phases 
of the French Revolution. If such a thing hap- 
pens, a reaction in favor of the former ruling 
class may well follow. If the war ends before 
the newly established government is firmly 
seated in power some such upheaval may be 
expected. Certainly the time of danger is not 
yet passed. 

The German autocracy is better than that 
which ruled Russia. In fact, it would be less 
dangerous if it were less serviceable. Its sins are 
not the patent sins of pecculation, cruelty, lazi- 
ness, or despotism. It offends in that it takes 
away the confidence of nation in nation. It of- 
fends because it is filled with unfortunate pur- 
poses. It is possible to think of an autocracy 
that would be no menace for the peace of the 
world, an autocracy filled with no ambition for 
world conquest. It is true that most autocratic 
governments have not been of this kind, and they 
seem militarists by nature, whence arise the ideals 
with which they trouble the world. 

When Hegel preached the philosophy of war 
that underlies the German's devotion to 
war, he was largely right from the Prussian 



OBSTACLES TO AN ENDURING PEACE 221 

standpoint. He held that the mind becomes 
sluggish through inactivity and that war burns 
up its waste matter and leads to energy of char- 
acter. This doctrine would not be essentially 
true in any normally organized society ; for there 
are as many opportunities for self-expression in 
commerce, finance, manufactures, art, and other 
peaceful occupations as in war. But a century 
ago Prussia was filled, even more than today, with 
a mass of small nobles, unaccustomed to any or- 
dinary form of labor, and with slender incomes. 
They were just the class that would fall into the 
effete vices of an aristocracy. To them the mili- 
tary life was an avenue of steady and moral em- 
ployment. They took places in the great ma- 
chine, and by 1870 they had been bred into its 
very spirit. The process saved the German 
nobles from vapidity. At the same time, as 
a class, they preserved their political privileges, 
and it has happened that they, with their official 
heads, the kaiser, kings, and princes, have been 
able to unite political power and military pur- 
poses until they have made of their country the 
most military state of modern times. If Ger- 
many has fought the present war with great abil- 



THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

ity, it is the organized autocracy that deserves the 
credit. 

It is, therefore, the union of the political and 
military power in the hands of a privileged class 
in Germany that now constitutes the greatest 
obstacle to peace. It enables a small and efficient 
portion of the German population to wield the 
rest of the people for the ends they have decided 
are best. If this union of functions could be 
broken up, and if political power could be dis- 
tributed as in the countries governed by the peo- 
ple, the obstacle would be reduced in size. It is 
not necessary to suppose that it would be re- 
moved altogether ; for even if equal suffrage were 
established in Germany, and if autocracy were 
shorn of its preponderating electoral power, 
the nobles would still be the most capable class in 
the empire. Their personality would go a long 
way in perpetuating their influence. If they 
played the game of trying to lead the people 
they might remain rulers of Germany for a long 
time after losing their present electoral ad- 
vantages. 

It is fair to assume that a democracy will be 
less likely to go to war than an autocracy. It is 



OBSTACLES TO AN ENDURING PEACE 223 

the middle and lower classes that bear the chief 
burdens of war. They fight for no promotions. 
Generally the happiest thing that can come to one 
of them is a disabling wound to send him home 
with his head safely on his shoulders. Kings and 
their sons are rarely killed in battle. When this 
war began the kaiser was one of the proud Ger- 
mans who had five tall sons of military age. 
After nearly four years of fighting none of them 
have been seriously injured. It would be inter- 
esting to know if there is another German father 
of five sons who has been so gently treated by for- 
tune. Report says that fifty thousand school- 
masters were killed in Germany during the first 
two years of the war. It would be interesting to 
learn whether or not the titled class has given up 
so large a proportion of its members for the cause 
of the Fatherland. 

And yet, it must not be thought that wars can- 
not exist in democratic countries. When Rome 
was a republic war was a constant thing. Athens 
in her republican days had many wars. In the 
region that is now the United States of America 
have been several wars. The war for independ- 
ence was essentially popular. It was organized 



224 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

by that part of the population which resented 
British aristocratic institutions, the class we 
should today call "the plain people." In the civil 
war the demand that slavery be destroyed did not 
come from the wealthy men of the North, the 
class that stood for the American aristocracy, but 
from the middle classes, men who filled the 
churches and who followed the common impulses 
of the heart. It was resisted by the South, as 
democratically organized as Germany would be 
with the Junkers turned out of power, and the 
struggle was as bitter as any the world had 
seen up to the fatal year 1914. Democratic 
states can fight, and they do fight, but they are 
less likely to go to war than autocratic states. 

If it seems to any of us a necessary thing that 
autocracy must be removed from the earth, it is 
well to remember that autocracy can be removed 
only through the operation of a long and slow 
process. It can be reduced by some great catas- 
trophe, but it cannot be smitten out in a day. 
Take away its political power, and perhaps its 
financial power will be left. Undermine that by 
raising up a rich bourgeoisie, and its social influ- 
ence will perhaps still exist. You do not abolish 



OBSTACLES TO AN ENDURING PEACE 225 

it by decree; you banish it only when you have 
substituted a better thing. 

What force exists in Germany with which the 
autocracy can be supplanted? Next to the rad- 
icals, a small faction at best, we have the social- 
ists, numerous enough to have great influence, 
but committed to a theory of society which can- 
not be established until humanity has gone 
through centuries of development in the princi- 
ples of equality. Then we find the national lib- 
erals, whose name is likely to mislead liberals in 
other parts of the world. They would be called 
the stand-pat, capitalistic portion of society in 
the United States, men who believe first of all in 
the protection of their large interests. In the 
present struggle they are committed to the Pan- 
Germany policy since it means the expansion of 
markets for German wares. Next come the cen- 
trists, Catholics in their primary interests, and 
fundamentally opposed to the doctrines for which 
the socialists stand. Finally we come to the con- 
servatives, who believe in the autocracy. What 
magician can fuse these parties into a solid move- 
ment for the establishment of really parliamen- 
tary government? 



226 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

Last obstacle of all that I shall mention here 
is the accumulated machinery of war that has 
been built up in modern states. I do not refer 
to ideas but to materials and men. Much has 
been written to show that munition makers have 
deliberately fostered a belief in war, so as to make 
a market for their products. Probably some ex- 
aggeration exists in most of these arguments 
and statements. The Krupps and their brethren 
have plausible grounds for saying that war is 
inevitable, and that they serve it but do not pro- 
mote it. But giving them as much benefit of the 
doubt as they can expect, it must be true that 
their very existence, and their fine application of 
science to their business, have led states to count 
on war as a matter of course. These great ag- 
gregations of capital have vast influence in politi- 
cal circles. They have so many stockholders that 
they affect a large number of influential men. 
So much are they committed to the cause in which 
their fortunes and hearts are enlisted that they 
ought not to have the opportunity to wield their 
peculiar influence. When this war is over, it 
would be a real service if every munitions factory 
as such were taken into government hands and its 



OBSTACLES TO AN ENDURING PEACE 227 

capital stock closed out as a business enterprise. 
It is only the state, and the state in the hands of 
the people, that can safely be trusted with this 
powerful weapon for the creation of war senti- 
ment. 

The professional soldiers are also a part of the 
war machinery which stands in the way of an 
enduring peace. They can hardly be expected to 
become pacifists. They are trained to regard 
war as a necessity. All their ideas of virtue are 
wrapped up in the fine qualities of a brave soldier. 
Any other standard is strange to them. They 
may be expected to throw all their weight of in- 
fluence in favor of recurring wars. Not that 
they wish wars to recur, but that they consider 
it improper to contemplate anything else in the 
natural order of events. This is a hard problem 
to deal with. A few professional soldiers may be 
brought to set their faces against war; but as to 
the great majority, I fear that those who try to 
abolish war will have to count on the opposition 
of the professional warriors until the end of the 
chapter. 

This array of obstacles to enduring peace, is it 
not formidable? Economic competition, the ac- 



228 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

tual if false sense of patriotism, the desire for 
nationality — which is liable to run into extreme 
assertions and sometimes to run counter to the 
strongest economic interests — the existence of 
autocratic government, and the powerful influ- 
ence of munition makers and professional war- 
riors — these are some of the obstacles against 
which those must contend who try to convince 
the world that peace is the better way. They 
may well appal the stoutest hearted friend of en- 
during peace. 



CHAPTER XI 

ARGUMENTS FOR A FEDERATION OF STATES 

The arguments against attempting to estab- 
lish an enduring peace are undoubtedly formid- 
able, but they do not leave the idealist entirely 
vanquished. On his side fight humanity and 
reason, and it is his function to stand by humanity 
and reason. He has long ago formed the habit 
of attacking obstacles. In this case the objec- 
tions he meets are all rooted in the opinions of 
men, and he loves to change opinions, or, if he 
does not change them, to hammer away at them 
as long as life lasts. For his fine optimism we 
can but have great respect, and in this chapter I 
intend to summarize his arguments and give them 
to the public in as strong a light of plausibility 
as possible. If the stolid opposition of the 
"practical" world is not to be broken down, let it 
be shaken as much as may be. The time of its 
defeat is written in the book of fate. It may be 
that the time is near at hand. 

229 



230 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

In the first place, let me recall a statement 
made in the preceding chapter. To get any- 
desired reform adopted and carried out, it is 
first necessary to get the people to imagine the 
reform in operation. I mean that they must 
have a clear mental picture of themselves living 
contentedly under the proposed plan. Let the 
proposition be made in such a way that the effec- 
tive people who direct the government can not, or 
will not, in the mind's eye see it in operation, and 
it will surely fail. Let them imagine its success- 
ful use and they will most likely find it unobjec- 
tionable. Likewise, if the people of the world 
could imagine a great cooperative union to pro- 
mote peace, with enough force behind it to enforce 
the will of the union, if in their minds they could 
see themselves adjusted into such a system, with 
all its economy in taxes, human suffering, and 
ordinary governmental effort, it would not be 
very difficult to make such a scheme work in 
actual experience. 

The "practical" man has but little imagina- 
tion. He has to be deceived into the acceptance 
of reforms. Make him believe that a given plan 
has been made to work and his objections are 



ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERATION 231 

diminished, if not overcome altogether. This is 
not said for scolding but as a sober fact confront- 
ing the man who reasons his way through matters 
that perplex him. The "practical" man is not 
responsible for his weakness, and he is in the ma- 
jority among men. On the other hand, the man 
with imagination is not to be faint-hearted. If 
he can see and talk, he may, by reiteration finally 
make his brothers see also. 

Fundamentally his position rests upon the rea- 
sonableness of his proposition: war is madness, 
brutality, useless waste of wealth and life, and the 
negation of civilization. It proceeds from the 
unnecessarily irritated state of the public mind. 
Reason demands that she be allowed to have an 
opportunity to exert her influence in a reasonable 
world over reasonable beings. Since law is the 
expression of the will of reasonable beings, let law 
be given the supervision of all the disputes which 
may possibly lead to war. How true all this 
sounds! And the preacher of peace says boldly 
that it is more worth while to plan, spend money, 
and take a chance in a great world effort to bring 
such a reasonable situation to pass than to go on 
planning, spending, and risking things in the 



232 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

efforts to make a system work that has ever led 
us around in a circle to the same old end, war and 
misery. 

The advocate of peace points to the duel. 
There was a time when every man felt it his right 
and duty to settle his own quarrels. He was his 
own judge and his own sheriff. The result was 
so bad that law was created to enforce peace be- 
tween individuals. The old condition survived 
in the duel, but in most countries this at last was 
brought under the authority of law. Private 
combat in its nature does not differ from public 
combat, and if one was eliminated by the creation 
of a law that was strong enough to forbid it, the 
other can be abolished by creating a still stronger 
law, powerful enough to restrain states as crim- 
inal law restrains individuals. 

Kant's argument for perpetual peace ran like 
this, but he, in sympathy with Rousseau's social 
contract theory, argued that the law that re- 
strained individuals was the result of agreement 
between individuals; and he went further and 
argued that all that was necessary to secure per- 
petual peace would be for the states to agree to 
establish a league, or a federation, to enforce it. 



ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERATION 233 

Now there was a fallacy in Kant's argument that 
has a bearing on the subject immediately before 
us today. There is no reason to suppose that any 
state ever arose from an agreement of individ- 
uals. The ordinary process was growth out of 
several conditions. An enlarged family might 
become a state, or one tribe might conquer an- 
other and enlarge itself into a state. Kinship 
and force were probably the chief causes in pro- 
ducing the state ; and reason seems to have played 
a small part. Similarly, law grew up, not as the 
result of reason, but as a body of tribal customs, 
reasonably interpreted by the wise men of the 
early state. 

There is, therefore, no analogy between the 
proposed method of forming a great super-state 
with its own body of law, the object of which is to 
restrain the states from going to war, and the 
method by which the early state was created. In 
fact, if one great nation were to conquer the rest 
of the world and impose its peace on all the world, 
as it would do, we should have a process more 
analogous to the origin of the early state. And 
that is one way of having peace. Within the 
last years it has seemed a horribly possible 



234 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

method; for if Mittel-Europa becomes a fact, it 
will have such predominating power that it is 
difficult to see what will stop its march to general 
authority. 

Pointing out Kant's fallacy weakens his argu- 
ment as such, but it leaves us in such a dilemma 
that we are prone to pronounce his suggestion 
worth trying as an escape from conquest by one 
great power. For if the world is tending toward 
unity through conquest, who can doubt that it 
would be better to anticipate the process, save a 
great sum of human suffering, and by agreement 
found the world federation which is the same 
result to which ages of war will lead us. That 
we could have such a super-state by contract is 
not to be doubted. It would be as possible as the 
creation of the United States of America by 
agreement. 

Another argument of the peace advocate is that 
the old system by which the world was kept in 
equilibrium, the balance of power, has broken 
down, and cannot be trusted to preserve the peace 
of the future. Its chief characteristic was that 
several states mutually checked one another. If 
one manifested an intention that was alarming 



ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERATION 235 

to the rest they combined to restrict the action of 
the aggressor. The several states were with re- 
gard to one another in a condition mobile enough 
to permit any state to shift from one side to an- 
other as the situation demanded. Now this con- 
dition no longer exists. There has developed a 
mid-continental alliance, apparently expecting 
to continue to act as one state for practical 
purposes, which in itself threatens to dominate 
Europe. To hold it in check calls forth all the 
united force of the other states and then success is 
obtained only through the greatest amount of 
preparedness. Such a condition is anything but 
the old system which was to work through bal- 
ance and concert of action. 

The central position of the Germans and Aus- 
trians gives them an immense advantage, if the 
world is to go on in its national rivalries. On the 
west lie the two nations who are today doing most 
to hold them in restraint, France and Great Brit- 
ain. The former could never stand against Ger- 
many alone, and the latter is remote enough from 
the German frontier to make it improbable that 
her forces could reach that spot in time to prevent 
the Germans from gaining the initial advantage 



236 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

which, in a state of efficient preparation is the 
only military success that either side can hope 
to win. In the face of a strong and threatening 
Germany it would be very likely that these two 
nations would have to make a more than formal 
alliance. Even if that happened, it is possible 
that Germany would construe it as a threat and 
begin war. 

The only other strong check on the central 
powers is Russia, now in a sad state of change. 
What her future is going to be is still problem- 
atic. It is a stupendous task for so large a na- 
tion, composed of landlords and peasants for the 
most part, to pass from an autocracy to a self- 
governing nation. It took France, a smaller 
country, from 1789 to 1879 to pass through the 
various changes and counter-changes by which 
she reformed her government into a republic. It 
is safe to say that in the Russian development 
the changes will come more rapidly, but it is not 
impossible that in this country a period of pro- 
longed unrest is ahead. Under such circum- 
stances Russia could hardly be counted on to give 
much aid to the Western nations who wished to 
restrain Germany. In fact, so fluid would be the 



ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERATION <W 

state of her society that she might well become 
the victim of German ambition and contribute 
valuable parts of her empire to swell the resources 
of her aggressive western neighbors. 

One insecure spot must be pointed out in this 
argument. It is the continuous close alliance of 
Germany and Austria-Hungary. If that breaks 
down the whole argument fails. At the present 
time it is impossible to say what may happen in 
this respect. Much will depend on the new em- 
peror of the Dual Empire. That he has a very 
difficult problem before him is without ques- 
tion. On one hand is the intense Hungarian 
aversion to absorption by Germany, on the other 
the passionate desire for union by the German 
people in the Dual Empire. It is supposed that 
the emperor does not favor absorption; but it 
seems certain that he is not able at this time to 
take an open stand against it. 

The strong part Germany has taken in saving 
Austria from Russia gives Germany a firm hold 
over the imagination of the Austrian people. It 
is possible that financial aid has also been ex- 
tended to such an amount that Austria would be 
embarrassed if called on to pay back. Nor is the 



238 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

kaiser in Berlin in a mood to brook defiance from 
Vienna. If, therefore Kaiser Karl wishes to be 
free of his too intimate dependence on Kaiser 
Wilhelm, he will find it to his advantage to con- 
ceal his desire for the time being. It is probable 
that we shall not know the present true state of 
feelings in Austria for several years after the 
war. But unless she is very well Germanized, it 
would seem that she must soon realize that she is 
playing a losing game in the combined movement. 
The real advantages of this war, if any are ob- 
tained, are German advantages. It is German 
trade, German kultur, and German prestige that 
are being enhanced by the war. Austria as Aus- 
tria is not reaping advantages commensurate 
with the gains of her greater partner. 

The financial argument seems to be much on 
the side of the peace advocate. Let us consider 
the situation in which the European states will 
find themselves after the return of peace. Bank- 
ruptcy is a relative term, if we so interpret it. 
That is to say, if the people are willing to bear 
patiently their great burdens they will bear them, 
and the debts that have been acquired will be 
shouldered. If one nation repudiates this debt, 



ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERATION 239 

or scales it down, it is probable that the others 
will do the same, since to continue to carry the 
debt would leave the faithful nation at a disad- 
vantage with the other nations in reference to 
future struggles with one another. 

No one knows as yet just who owns the bonds 
in the several nations. From Germany we hear 
that they are widely held. It is the policy of the 
government of any nation to distribute a heavy 
debt as widely as possible ; and we have in recent 
history instances of great patriotism in assuming 
debts of this kind. Now it is fair to say that 
the more widely the debt is distributed, the 
greater its likelihood of permanency. The 
larger the number of poor people who own it, the 
harder it will be to lessen the burden of the na- 
tion. It follows that in this case the immense 
interest charge is likely to persist as a permanent 
encumbrance on the economic life of the country. 

On the other hand, let us say that it turns out 
that the debt is not very widely distributed after 
all, or that after the war it follows the course of 
most national debts and passes into the hands of 
the rich. Then we have the situation likely to 
promote class friction. The taxes necessary to 



240 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

pay the interest will fall on the mass of people, 
who will probably come to believe that they are 
taxed for the benefit of the wealthy. Class jeal- 
ousy will lead to suggestions of repudiation. 
Such a course is more than ordinarily easy in 
Germany, France, and Russia, where there are 
well organized socialist parties, already keenly 
suspicious of the capitalists. 

Thus, whether the debt is widely distributed or 
not, it contains a menace to society. In one case 
it constitutes such a burden that it absorbs the 
financial strength of the government. In the 
other it invites the most formidable struggle of 
the poor against the rich that the world has seen 
in a century. 

Such a situation is bad enough in itself, but it 
does not directly affect the question of peace, our 
main consideration at this time ; for the debt will 
exist as a result of the war, and nothing in the 
view of the friends of peace can prevent it. But 
through whichever of the two contingent courses 
it goes, the state will have difficulty in continuing 
the old system. 

Let us say that we have a permanent great 
debt with a huge interest fund, and the state 



ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERATION 241 

wishes to add to the taxes in order to keep up its 
measures of preparedness. The result must be 
to produce uneasiness in the minds of the tax- 
payers. In Germany, for example, the interest 
charge and the provision for pensions on account 
of the present war will probably be considerably 
more than a billion dollars a year. Added to the 
ordinary expenses of government it will make a 
burden more than double that of 1913. Can the 
government go on providing armaments, that 
may lead to another war, without jeopardizing 
the loans that are already issued ? In the face of 
such heavy taxation it would not be surprising 
if the people sold their holdings of bonds to the 
capitalists and later turned toward repudiation. 
On the other hand, it would be to the interest of 
the capitalists to favor moderate expenditures 
for armaments and armies, lest the patience of the 
people under their burdens might be exhausted. 

But suppose the debt was not distributed 
widely in the first place, and suppose it was re- 
pudiated after a class struggle, or for any other 
reason scaled down. The result would be a se- 
vere blow to credit, and in the future it might 
be so difficult to raise funds that war could not 



242 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

be carried on. No nation can afford to contem- 
plate war if it has not borrowing capacity. If 
the debts of one war are repudiated those of an- 
other may also be repudiated. It behooves the 
capitalists, therefore, to support a policy which 
will make armed conflict impossible. While 
bonds benefit the banker when issued up to a cer- 
tain point, they can in some conditions become 
his most serious difficulty. So many perils await 
the capitalist from a renewal of struggles like the 
present, that it is not too much to count upon 
him as a supporter of peace until the financial 
situation in Europe shall become better than it 
will be for many a day. It is his true interest to 
support a federated peace, which will tend to 
make his bonds secure. 

As to the influence of autocracy, the advocate 
of peace must admit that it is by nature hostile 
to his system of cooperative peace. Such co- 
operation must depend on mutual confidence and 
trust between nations; and it is natural for dis- 
trust to exist between republican and autocratic 
states. The whole trend of autocracy is to self- 
assertion. As it exists in Germany today it 
could hardly be relied on to take its place in any 



ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERATION 243 

union of states which would involve the subordi- 
nation of individual national interests to the com- 
mon good. 

Granting this, the advocate of peace can assert 
that Germany must eventually give up autoc- 
racy. As the only great nations that hold to this 
relic of a departed age Germany and Austria- 
Hungary are becoming anachronisms. They are 
set against the spirit of the twentieth century. 
If they tide over the crisis that now confronts 
them they will encounter more furious storms at 
a later time, and eventually autocracy must be 
broken down. The argument rests on faith in 
progress. It is the result of confidence in the in- 
nate qualities of human nature. So many times 
in the past ages have the people risen against 
bad government, that it is safe to say they will 
repeat the process until all inequality shall have 
been reduced. 

German autocracy, a survival of a past cen- 
tury, exists only because it takes for its object 
the good government of a parliamentary system. 
In intelligence and honesty it is not like the an- 
cient system. The resemblance is only in forms. 
The republican says: "I will give the people 



244 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

just, intelligent, and honest government." The 
German autocrat says: "I will do all these 
things"; and he redeems his promise. His 
brother of the eighteenth century had no such 
purpose, being so certain of his position that he 
did not have to promise the people anything. 
The German autocrat lives in fear of an over- 
throw. Perhaps some day he will make a slip — 
it may be from the action of an unwise emperor 
or a selfish party clique — and away will go the 
whole system. 

Last summer a crisis arose in Berlin. The 
very life of the autocracy seemed about to be 
taken. It was saved finally by a narrow margin, 
and with the making of promises which seem 
a long step forward. The people were assured 
that such was their meaning. If the promises are 
broken, there will be a reckoning. It may be 
said that there will never again be so good an 
opportunity to force the granting of parliamen- 
tary reforms. That statement is contestable. 
The autocracy needs the support of the people at 
present, in order to bring Germany through the 
crisis that has arisen from the action of the 
autocracy, and it may seem from that standpoint 



ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERATION 245 

that the people never had and will never have an 
equally good opportunity to strike a blow. But 
the call of patriotism is strong in Germany, and 
if the liberally minded persons were to stand de- 
liberately for the defeat of the war credits unless 
they were given the reforms they demanded, it is 
doubtful if the people would support them. It is 
hard to carry a country through a great political 
revolution while the very life of the country is 
threatened. 

After war comes a time of questioning. The 
German people will have reason to ask them- 
selves what has been done to them. The burdens 
of taxes, the loss of commerce, the wrecks of 
human life through maiming, and the great gaps 
in population through death, all these things can 
but come to the minds of the people. At that 
time the press must lose something of its rigorous 
control, for it is impossible that when the Ger- 
mans get over the feeling that their country is in 
danger they will continue to tolerate a press 
whose every word is dictated by the one thought 
of keeping the people solidly united in war senti- 
ment. If it should happen that the empire has 
an emperor who is not trusted by the people it 



246 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

may be that the questioning will sweep away- 
many old doubts and forms. 

These things should not be taken as prophecy, 
but as possibilities for tempering the opinion that 
Germany is destined to be permanently auto- 
cratic. The advocate of an enduring peace has 
a right to think a self-governing Germany well 
within the bounds of possibility before another 
decade has elapsed. If such a thing happens, 
certainly one of the most serious obstacles to 
peace will have been removed. 

I shall venture to put one more argument into 
the mouth of the advocate of peace. Probably 
he has not used it as I am going to use it, but it 
works his way; for it shows that a tremendous 
fate threatens, unless some cooperative move- 
ment is established to avert it. Stated briefly it 
is this : Through the ages runs a law of unifica- 
tion in society, and it seems probable that the 
world has today come to the point at which the 
unifying force is likely to take a long stride for- 
ward, a force which may operate in one of two 
directions. I mean that with the next century 
unification seems imminent by conquest, if not by 
common consent. 



ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERATION 247 

It is not easy to say that the process of concen- 
tration in human society is a law in the sense in 
which there is law in natural science. But there 
is a general social tendency, seemingly irrepres- 
sible, operating steadily from the beginning of 
history, for the political units to be larger and 
ever larger. If this tendency is not a law it is an 
extremely strong force ; and we may well ask if it 
is not about to take one of its great steps forward. 

A glance at the past will show how the process 
has gone on. In ancient times diminutive states 
were absorbed by larger but still very small 
states, which in turn were welded into so-called 
confederacies, or leagues, which at last became 
integrated states. The concentration went for- 
ward in cycles, one empire rising in power until it 
ruled most of its known world, and then it broke 
into pieces through its lack of cohesive power. 
Thus it was with Babylon, Assyria, Persia, 
Greece, and Rome. Whenever the bubble burst 
the process of unification began again immedi- 
ately, and on a larger scale. After the fall of 
Rome it was again set in motion in an area that 
included most of Europe, the unifying hand be- 
longing to Charlemagne, king of the Franks. 



248' THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

His personal valor won the triumph of his will, 
but his empire fell away soon after he relaxed his, 
hold upon it. 

Then began a rebuilding process. Feudal 
states evolved out of clashing duchies, counties, 
and bishoprics. Immediately feudal states be- 
gan to devour one another. With each century 
the unit of government became larger. At last 
rose the great power of Spain, so great that it 
became a threat to other powers, and then fol- 
lowed a series of wars to decide whether or not 
Spain should be the supreme state in Europe, 
and Spain lost. A century later France seemed 
to be seeking to establish herself in the same kind 
of supremacy, and again the combined force of 
Europe was necessary to break her purposes. 
Still later came the Napoleonic wars, in which 
Europe seemed for a moment to be subjected by 
one central will, but again it was saved through 
great suffering. To some people it seemed that 
the Napoleonic attempt would be the last. 

Of these modern struggles in Europe it is seen 
that each has been harder than the struggle that 
preceded it. That is because in each the imple- 



ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERATION 849 

ments and organization of warfare were im- 
proved as compared with the former struggle, and 
because states were stronger and more capable of 
endurance. It is also evident that each of these 
great wars was the result of the ambition of one 
sovereign, supported by a strong and well united 
nobility, while in each case the most effective re- 
sistance was offered by the states in which some 
degree of self-government had been adopted. 

The struggle that now exists is the highest 
manifestation of this tendency to unification that 
the world has seen since the fall of Rome. Al- 
though Napoleon seemed at certain moments in 
his career to stand nearer absolute success than 
Germany now stands, he never really gained as 
much as the kaiser now holds ; for he won his suc- 
cesses against the poorly trained and dispirited 
troops of Prussia, Austria, and Spain, while the 
Germans have won what they have won against 
some of the best troops of history. Moreover, 
Napoleon's power was founded on his suc- 
cess solely, while the German victories rest on 
the long established and certain foundation of the 
German empire. It seems reasonable to say that 



250 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

Europe stands today nearer to unification than 
it has stood since the fall of Charlemagne's 
power. 

Two great combinations are fighting for mas- 
tery. One has the avowed purpose of extending 
its power until it is in a fair way to absorb the 
rest of the states one after the other. The other 
group fights to beat off the fate that threatens, 
and it acknowledges that it cannot succeed unless 
it crushes its opponents into such a state as will 
take from them the desire and the power to at- 
tempt another war for supremacy. Whichever 
side wins, the other will feel an impulse to con- 
tinue to act in alliance. And we may have a 
Europe of two great federal states, with the 
little states at their mercy. 

For example, how can Great Britain and 
France ever be opponents again, as in the old 
days? The sense of common sacrifices would of 
itself make them more than friends, but the con- 
sciousness that each depends on the other in deal- 
ing with the great danger will never fail them, 
and it will force them into some kind of political 
union. In the same way, we should expect to 
see a greatly altered relation between Great 



ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERATION 251 

Britain and her colonies. Three-quarters of a 
million of colonial defenders constitute a contri- 
bution that demands reward. As the colonies 
depend on the mother country for some important 
elements of defense, and Great Britain cannot 
comfort herself with the assurance of safety un- 
less she has a broad imperial power for its basis, 
it would seem natural to expect some kind of im- 
perial union. As to Belgium, when she escapes 
from the grasp of Germany, what mind has the 
ingenuity to foresee her fate? If she relies on 
the promise of neutralization, she is again tempt- 
ing fate. If she is annexed to France, with some 
kind of autonomy, German enmity will be 
aroused. 

Probably her fate is to be bound up with the 
fate of the other small states of Europe, states 
which in the present war are hardly entirely 
sovereign. Holland, Denmark, Norway, Swe- 
den, Switzerland, Greece, and Portugal have lost 
something of the power to direct their internal 
affairs. In war they have had a lesson of the 
necessity of bending to the will of an external 
government, which they will probably remember 
many times in the days of peace. When once a 



252 THE LOST FRUITS OP WATERLOO 

state has yielded at the dictation of a neighbor, 
and made money out of it, the next time it is 
pressed yielding becomes an easier thing. The 
fate of these small states in a possible era of fierce 
competition between two great groups would be 
very perplexing. In an era of peace through 
federation, says the advocate of peace, it would 
be much happier. 

In short, it is a practical question that our 
idealist puts to us. Here is a world that has gone 
mad, shall it not turn to reason again? The old 
system has broken down, shall we try to make it 
work again? To do so will lead us to just the 
disaster that now overwhelms us. Shall we 
not try a plan which will not cost us in money 
half what the old system of preparation cost, and 
which if it fails cannot be more of a failure than 
the old system has proved ? If autocracy stands 
in the way, let us hope that autocracy will give 
way before the march of the spirit of the times. 
And finally, the law of unification is working so 
strongly in these days of international relations, 
that we are at last at the point at which we 
cannot longer elect to remain distinct in our na- 
tional activities. We must choose between a 



ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERATION 253 

world state through conquest, and a world state 
through mutual agreement. Which shall we 
take? To try to go on with the states entirely 
distinct, is to invite their conquest by a great 
state. 



CHAPTER XII 

A FEDERATION OF NATIONS 

Taking into consideration the obstacles and 
the advantages summarized in the two preceding 
chapters what are we going to do when the war 
comes to an end? The easiest and most likely 
thing is to adjust ourselves as quickly and quietly 
as possible to the peace that is given to us, take 
up the old problems of living as nearly as we can 
where we left them in 1914 — or in 1917, when 
the war began for the United States — and trust 
to our good stars to guide us to a happy haven. 
But if there is one thing this war has shown, it 
is that trusting to stars is not a safe protection 
against war. The only thing sensible people 
ought to count on in these days is the judgment 
of their capable and efficient minds. And it 
seems that the suggestion of the men who wish to 
obtain peace by cooperation is worthy of the most 
careful debate by men who have the best interest 
of humanity at heart. 

When the war ends it may be that the world 

254 



A FEDERATION OF NATIONS 255 

will not have arrived at the time when such a 
scheme can be adopted, but we should not be 
hasty in saying so. It is not a scheme to be dis- 
posed of by newspaper editors, who rarely have 
time to weigh the conditions of such a serious mat- 
ter, or of senators and representatives, whose 
views arise out of party interests, or of high 
officials as a class, who are usually overburdened 
with administrative matters. It is a thing for 
all the people to consider, and in order that it 
may have the fairest and most conspicuous hear- 
ing, there should be a great world congress, not 
composed of theorists merely, but of the most 
practical statesmen, who will take up the matter 
in a spirit of friendliness, with the intention of 
adopting the scheme if it can be received in a 
manner that warrants the hope of success. 
- Every nation in the world has reason to desire 
the establishment of an enduring peace; but the 
United States has a larger interest in such an 
issue of the war than any other nation. Since we 
became a nation we have gone on developing 
along peaceful lines. Having had no reason to 
fear our neighbors and being so remote from 
Europe that we were not likely to be molested 



256 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

from that part of the world, we formed our insti- 
tutions on the basis of peace. Our public ideals, 
our sense of citizenship, the aims of our lawmak- 
ing have all been such as are natural for a nation 
that has nothing to fear from external enemies. 

One result of the present war is to relegate 
these ideals into the junk-heap of institutions, un- 
less we can be assured that peace is a certainty. 
Under a system of competition between states we 
cannot afford to be less ready for war than any 
other great nation. We must have a large navy 
and a great army ready to meet the blows of any 
power that feels that it has reason to interfere 
with our peaceful development. We must be- 
come a militaristic republic, a thing which seems 
against nature. When such an attempt has been 
made in the past, the result has been an oligarchy. 
In the United States it would probably lead to a 
sad clash of social classes mingled with vicious 
party politics and timidity in the national legisla- 
ture. And yet, under a continuation of the old 
system it would be folly to endeavor to get along 
without an army and navy large enough to pro- 
tect us from the initial swoop of some powerful 
adversary. 



A FEDERATION OF NATIONS 257 

If from this fate the advocate of coopera- 
tion can offer an escape, it behooves us to listen to 
his scheme. We should weigh it carefully and 
be willing to take some kind of a chance to secure 
its adoption, if in it there is the possibility of suc- 
cessful operation. 

To be perfectly fair to those who suggest 
leagues or federations we should remember that 
we are not dealing with the ideas of pacifists, as 
such. The schemes that are set forth by the 
friends of lasting peace come from men who are 
giving all their energies to the prosecution of the 
war. They believe, as much as any of us, that 
the war should be pressed with every ounce of the 
nation's strength. They are fighting as hard as 
any one in the country, and they desire the defeat 
of Germany as much as any soldier or statesman 
in the world. They are fighting to establish a 
basis on which the peace of the world can be built. 
They are not cranks, and even if they are mis- 
taken, they are honestly trying to call mankind 
to the better way. 

One of their suggestions is a league of peace, 
to be composed of the civilized nations. As we 
have seen, it is loosely organized and does not 



258 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

allow the central authority of the league enough 
power to punish a state that tries to withdraw 
from the league. Nor does it grant the central 
authority the right to punish a state which, after 
submitting its case to the proposed tribunal of 
arbitration and losing the decision, decides to go 
to war in defiance of the tribunal's judgment. 
What would Germany do, for example, if she 
had lost such a judgment and did not wish to 
accept her defeat? Strong and well prepared 
for war, she might disregard all respect for the 
opinion of the world, if she felt that her future 
was at stake, and we can hardly doubt that her 
own people would support her. 

Connected with the idea of a league is the plan, 
advocated by those who place respect for law 
above all other considerations, for creating a high 
court of judicature, with judges selected from all 
nations, which shall have authority to try and 
give judgment on all disputes of nations. As a 
part of a strongly organized federation such a 
court would have great influence, but if it existed 
under a league it could hardly have enough 
authority to secure the obedience of the great 
states. As for the small states, they never give 



A FEDERATION OF NATIONS 259 

trouble any how, except as they act in association 
with some great state, or as they are threatened 
by some great power. No union for peace can 
accomplish its object that does not deal with the 
great states, and any scheme suggested may leave 
the small states out of consideration. On the 
other hand, the small states are deeply interested 
in forming such a union, since it would give them 
a safety they could hardly get otherwise. 

The proposed plans for a league of peace and 
for an international court of arbitration were an- 
nounced before the war or in its early stages. 
They were made with an eye to the most that 
the nations could be induced to give up of their 
control over their own actions. It is possible that 
their authors would not follow the same plans if 
they were forced to make them today. The war 
has shown us several things. It has revealed 
Germany's reason for opposing steadily all the 
real peace plans at the Hague conferences. It 
has shown us what fate awaits the world after 
the war, unless there is a return to reason and 
cooperation. It is possible that in writing out 
a plan for peace today the gentlemen who met in 
Carpenters' Hall, Philadelphia, in June, 1915, 



260 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

would feel justified in supporting a stronger 
proposition. 

Mr. H. N. Brailsford, in a book called A 
League of Nations, London, 1917, announces the 
outline of a working scheme, which he hopes the 
friends of peace will consider. Its chief features 
are: 1. An international court of justice to con- 
sider and pass on justiciable cases, with a council 
of conciliation to pass on non- justiciable cases, 
and a pledge by the states that they will not make 
war nor mobilize their troops until the court or 
council has within a stipulated time passed on the 
several matters in dispute. 2. An executive of 
the league to take steps, military or economic, 
to enforce the obligations of the members of the 
league. 3. The guarantee of the right of seces- 
sion together with the possibility of expelling a 
state. 4. A consideration of disarmament on 
land and sea. 5. An international commission 
to see that all the signatory powers have access to 
raw material in manufactures, with a pledge to 
permit trading among themselves without dis- 
crimination and to follow the "open door" policy 
in trade with the undeveloped regions of the 
world. 



A FEDERATION OF NATIONS 261 

In this scheme we see the influence of the war. 
The author is brought to see that some form of 
central authority to coerce a state is necessary. 
On the other hand, he does not allow his league 
to become a law-making body, an omission that 
goes far to weaken the united efforts of the 
league. Guaranteeing the right of secession, also 
shows that the author of the plan is unwilling to 
merge the nations into a great state, in which they 
will each give up a portion of their sovereignty. 
His plan is a little stronger than the American 
plan but it nevertheless falls short of being a fed- 
eration. 

If we are to make a serious attempt to obtain 
enduring peace by cooperation it behooves us to 
start on the basis of sufficient force to insure 
that the attempt will be worth while. If that 
cannot be done, it is unwise to make the attempt, 
since to trust ourselves at this juncture to that 
which we have good reason to believe insufficient 
only lulls us to a false sense of security and dis- 
sipates resolution that might with better effect 
be used in an opposite direction. If we do not 
have peace through cooperation we must main- 
tain a sharp state of preparation for war. 



262 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

Furthermore, no people can be rallied to a scheme 
which seems insufficient to them. Give them that 
which they can trust and they can perhaps be 
made to support it, in spite of the inconveniences 
they find in it. 

Probably it is not too much to say that the only 
form of united action that can be relied on is a 
federation with enough cohesive force to guard 
against secession, repress any constituent state 
that defies the united will, make laws that concern 
the purposes for which the federation is formed, 
exercise the right of interpreting those laws by a 
system of federal courts, and maintain an execu- 
tive that can make itself obeyed. It need not 
have these extensive functions for all the areas of 
government, but it should have them for those 
things that concern the declaration of war and the 
preservation of peace. It means that to escape 
an era of conflict ending, perhaps, in a world 
united through conquest as the Roman Empire 
was united, we establish by agreement a world 
united through federation, as the United States 
of America were united. A league of nations, 
under the plans suggested above, would be only 
a half-way house that would lead to rupture and 



A FEDERATION OF NATIONS 263 

failure or to some future struggle out of which 
a world taught by experience might possibly form 
"a more perfect union." 

Some of the fundamental ideas of a federation 
were embodied, as we have seen, in the plans of 
the Abbe St. Pierre and the philosopher, Kant. 
Living at a time when the state was conceived as 
the seat of power, they trusted to force to execute 
the will of the suggested government that was to 
provide peace. Bentham, however, was deeply 
impressed with morality as a force for good gov- 
ernment, and he was willing to trust his proposed 
system to the reasonable impulses of men. To 
him it is possible to reply that if men were so 
reasonable that they would respect an agreement 
to settle disputes by arbitration, they would be 
reasonable enough to avoid the differences which 
run into such disputes. In our modern world 
reason thrives best when it is reenforced by au- 
thority. 

The attempt of Alexander I, of Russia, to ob- 
tain some practical realization of the principle of 
a federated Europe in behalf of peace followed 
these lines as closely as could be expected, but, it 
must be confessed, in a very lame way. The 



264 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

failure of his efforts has been taken as proof that 
the idea is impracticable. But it does not fol- 
low that it is impracticable to the same extent and 
in the same way today as in 1815. No Metter- 
nich now controls the policy of the majority of 
the European courts. Republican institutions 
exist to an appreciable extent in most of them. 
The mind of Europe is more nearly a unit today 
than a century ago, and commerce, travel, and 
international sympathy bind nations together as 
never before. Moreover all these unifying forces 
are growing rapidly. When the feeling engen- 
dered by the war subsides, and it always does 
subside after a war, the nations will be more con- 
scious of one another and less willing to chal- 
lenge one another than before they engaged in 
the present appalling struggle. In these things 
there is a hope that the federation of Europe for 
the preservation of peace would be more possible 
than in the times of Metternich. I do not mean 
that all obstacles are removed, but they are fewer 
than formerly. 

Considering these things I find myself driven, 
in closing my essay, to a serious examina- 
tion of the possibility of creating a world federa- 



A FEDERATION OF NATIONS 265 

tion out of the chaos that now floats over the 
globe — not an integrated world empire, with 
power over all phases of political action, but a 
federation that will have authority to regulate the 
forces that make for war. If such a thing could 
be created and accepted by the states of the world, 
it would make the present struggle, with all its 
horrors, the best and most fortunate event that 
has come to humanity since the beginning of the 
Christian era. If the war should result in the 
thorough defeat of the present regime in Ger- 
many, followed by the creation of a world fed- 
eration into which Germany should be forced to 
come, with her pride so reduced that she could 
be kept obedient to the federation until the virus 
of world power should get out of her system, the 
world would have passed a milestone in civiliza- 
tion, and for our part in it future generations 
would thank us to the end of time. 

The organization of the American Union in 
1787-1789 was a similar process on a smaller 
scale. So many of its features are analogous to 
conditions that suggest themselves in connection 
with the proposition of a world federation that it 
is worth while to recall them. If we are not led 



266 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

to conclude that a similar step should be taken 
at this time in the larger sphere, we shall at least 
have a clearer idea of what such a federation 
would mean, and it may happen that we shall 
conclude that it is not so difficult a thing to estab- 
lish as appears on first sight. 

Before the war for independence the American 
colonies it is true, were not as separate as the 
present European states, but they were so dis- 
tinct in their ideals and purposes that no one 
thought their union possible. When Franklin 
proposed a very mild sort of concentration in 
1754 his suggestion was rejected in the colonies 
because it involved the surrender of some of the 
colonial separateness. Had no pressure come 
from the outside it is difficult to see what would 
have forced the thirteen colonies to come together. 

The external pressure was the conviction that 
Great Britain was about to adopt a policy by 
which the interests of the colonies would be sub- 
servient to the interests of British traders, thus 
destroying their partially avowed hope of a dis- 
tinctly American policy. Then came seven years 
of war and four years of fear lest Great Britain 
should recover through American dissension 



A FEDERATION OF NATIONS 267 

what she had lost in the trial of arms. Under 
such conditions the newly liberated states were 
willing to form the American union. 

A similar pressure on the nations will exist in 
the burden of preparedness and the danger of a 
renewal of the present struggle. The last three 
years of conflict are more burdensome to the 
world than the seven years of the American revo- 
lution to the states engaged against Great Brit- 
ain. Moreover, the danger of chaotic conditions 
in the future is as great as the danger that con- 
fronted the Americans in 1787. Every period is 
a critical period in history, but that which follows 
the present struggle is especially important. 

When our revolution ended a majority of our 
people thought the old system good enough. 
The men — and there were many of them — who 
pointed out the advantages to the western world 
of a great federated state were pronounced ideal- 
ists. "Practical" men meant to go on living in 
a "practical'' way. But the idealists were led by 
Washington, Madison, and Hamilton, and the 
logic of events came to their aid. Dissensions 
appeared, taxes were not paid, and the national 
debt seemed on the verge of repudiation. Then 



268 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

the country was willing to listen to the idealists ; 
and the American federated state was estab- 
lished. 

It was received with derision by the publicists 
of Europe. They could not believe that republi- 
can government would succeed in an area as large 
as that of the thirteen states. Their fears were 
not realized and today most of their descendants 
live under republican government of some form 
or other. We should not blame them too much. 
They had never seen republican government op- 
erated on a large scale, and they were not able 
to imagine that it could operate on a large 
scale. If they could have seen it working with 
their mind's eye, they would have had confidence 
in its operation. The Americans were accus- 
tomed to using their imagination, and seeing the 
"experiment" working in their imagination, they 
could adopt it and make it work. 

The greatest obstacle to "federation" in the 
American constitutional convention was the jeal- 
ousy of small states toward the large states. 
Since it would have been unwise to leave any 
state out of the proposed system, the small states 
were in a position to make demands. When they 



A FEDERATION OF NATIONS 269 

were allowed equality in the senate they became 
quite reasonable. This obstacle could hardly 
exist in the formation of a great federation for 
the elimination of war ; for the small states would 
probably be the first to accept such a plan, as our 
small states were most willing to adopt our con- 
stitution, once it was prepared. It would give 
them as perfect security as they could desire, 
and without such a guaranty their continued ex- 
istence is always precarious. 

Next to the fears of the small states was the 
unwillingness of many people in the states to give 
up the idea that only a state should control the 
happiness of its citizens, and that the union, if 
formed, would destroy or lessen individual lib- 
erty. This idea inhered in whatever idea of state 
sovereignty the people of the day held. To form 
a federation to enforce peace would undoubtedly 
limit to some extent the sovereignty of the pres- 
ent states of Europe. But sovereignty in itself is 
worth nothing. It exists to give in general some 
forms of life and dignity to states. If a sur- 
render of part of a state's sovereignty will give 
that state immunity from wars perpetually, is it 
not sovereignty well exchanged? No American 



270 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

state suffered because it gave up control over its 
right to make war, but, on the contrary, it gained 
immensely. Such a right is a costly necessity, a 
thing to be held tenaciously as long as we are in 
a condition which makes wars necessary, but to 
be given up as quickly as we can do without it. 

To enter a federation would mean that individ- 
ual nations would give up the right to expand 
their territories. Germany could not acquire 
more territory under such a system, unless she 
got it by agreement of the parties concerned. 
The British empire could become no larger by 
any forceful process. But this would not be a 
hardship. The only real justification of expan- 
sion is to enlarge trade areas. A federation to 
eliminate war would necessarily adopt a policy 
which allowed all states an "open door" in trade. 
This was one of the essential things in the forma- 
tion of our union ; for we read that no state shall 
interfere within its borders with the rights of the 
citizens of other states to trade there. Under 
such circumstances territorial expansion becomes 
useless. 

When the American states were trying to form 
that simple kind of union that was expressed in 



A FEDERATION OF NATIONS 271 

the articles of confederation, Maryland long re- 
fused to join. She was jealous of the great size 
of her neighbors and especially of Virginia, 
whose claim to the Northwest was in general not 
disputed. Experience showed that her fears 
were groundless. Virginia not only never be- 
came a menace to Maryland, but she soon realized 
that her wide boundaries were worthless to her 
under a system which guaranteed her against 
quarrels with her neighbors, and as a result she 
surrendered her Northwestern lands. Under a 
federation an undeveloped part of Asia or Africa 
would be open as freely to Germans as to others 
for trade, settlement, and the happiness of life, 
just as our Northwest was open to Virginians, 
Pennsylvanians, and New Englanders alike. 
The only thing that Virginia gave up in relin- 
quishing her lands was the right to call herself a 
big state, that is, self-glorification, a thing the 
nations would have to give up in a federation. 
But might it not be well exchanged for the right 
to call themselves safe from warfare? 

When the American constitution was being de- 
bated the small states declared they would not 
"federate" unless they were given privileges 



<m% THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

which guaranteed them against absorption by the 
large states, while the large states declared they 
would not "federate" unless it was arranged that 
the small states should not have the power to de- 
feat measures that were for the common good. 
Each side was very honest in suspecting the other, 
and great patience and persistence were necessary 
to bring them together in a compromise which 
gave neither what it at first demanded. For 
us it is interesting to observe that in actual prac- 
tice there has never been a time when the large 
states seemed to threaten to devour the small 
states, nor a time when the small states placed 
their welfare against any measure that concerned 
the general good of the country. The union 
formed, the people began to debate questions that 
had nothing to do with this or that state, general 
policies that cut across great sections of the fed- 
eration, without regard to the states as such. 

It seems that if a federation of Europe were 
once formed a development might be expected of 
a somewhat similar nature. At least, it is not 
unlikely that the clashes predicted by the doubt- 
ers would not be as violent as they fear. It 
seems certain that at once a new class of issues 



A FEDERATION OF NATIONS 273 

would engage the minds of the politicians, issues 
that would spring from the general interests that 
were conceived essential to life in the new group- 
ing. It is not possible to say what clashes might 
grow out of these general issues, but it is probable 
that the genius of man would be as competent to 
take care of them as to direct the issues that 
will arise if the world goes on under a system 
like that now in use ; for clashes we must have in 
any event. After all, humanity has to manage 
its own problems, and there will never be a gov- 
ernment under which it will not have all it can 
do to make the doubts of today resolve themselves 
into the confidence of tomorrow. 

In our American constitution-making one 
often heard the question, "What will become of 
the liberties of the citizen of the state under the 
federation?" The answer was well made at the 
time: "Will not the citizen of the state still be the 
citizen of the state, and will not the state continue 
to guarantee him all that it can now guarantee 
him? Does he not also pass under the protection 
of the federation as truly as the citizens of any of 
the states? All that the federation proposes to 
do is to take charge of the functions that concern 



274 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

the things for which the federation is founded, 
and these are things to which the states are not 
so well adjusted as a united government." And 
so it proved in practice. No American has ever 
had reason to think his liberty lessened because 
the union was formed ; and he has been immensely 
stronger in all his rights on the high seas, in trav- 
eling abroad, in being safe from the burdens of 
foreign wars, and in his rights of trade in the ut- 
termost parts of the earth; for he has been the 
citizen of a great federation of small states. 

Applying the analogy to the suggested federa- 
tion of the world it appears that under such a 
system the citizen of France, Great Britain, Rus- 
sia, or the United States would in nowise lose his 
rights under his own government, and he would 
gain vastly in relief from burdens. He would 
no longer have to think of wars, his trade rela- 
tions would be adjusted in such a way that no 
other man could have what he did not have. In 
short, for all the purposes for which the federa- 
tion was founded he would stand on equal footing 
with any other man, and for the purposes for 
which his own state existed he would have all the 
rights he had before. His only losses would be 



A FEDERATION OF NATIONS 275 

in casting off the burdens that grow out of inter- 
national rivalry under the present system. 

One of the things for which the American 
union was created was the payment of the revolu- 
tionary debts. Compared with the debts the 
colony had incurred individually before the revo- 
lution, and compared with their ability to pay 
them at the time, these debts were large, although 
they proved, under the union, a very small bur- 
den. It was the sense of security under a gov- 
ernment which had eliminated the possibility of 
interstate wars that made the burden light. 

The amount of indebtedness that the several 
nations in the present war have contracted seems 
appalling. It would become a comparatively 
light burden, if we could feel that for the future 
the world had nothing to do but to pay it. The 
waste of interstate rivalry, the burden of prepara- 
tions for future wars, the loss to industry through 
uncertainties on account of wars, all these things 
would disappear from the consideration of the 
financiers, the credit of a federated world would 
become excellent, and bonds that are likely to be 
quoted very low when the artificial stimulus they 
get from patriotism is taken away would be con- 



276 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

sidered better investments than any bonds ever 
offered under the existing system of states. The 
capitalists of the world, like the American cap- 
italists of 1787-1789, should be the most earnest 
supporters of federation. 

In the United States a great deal has been said 
about "entangling alliances." As the term was 
used a century ago it meant an alliance that was 
likely to make us parties to the quarrels of Euro- 
pean states, one against the other. Into such a 
maze of selfish maneuvers it would never be well 
for us to enter. But to take our place in a fed- 
eration to preserve peace would be quite another 
thing. That it would pledge us to the discharge 
of a duty is not to be doubted; but we should be 
entering no intrigue. We should be doing the 
most patriotic thing possible; for the very es- 
sence of the act would be to protect ourselves 
from the possibility of being drawn into "en- 
tangling alliances" with Europe. Let us sup- 
pose that the old system is continued, and that 
Germany has a mind to pay off what she may 
consider an old score. Suppose she tries to set 
Mexico up against us, or to induce Japan to 
attack the Philippines, or to interfere with any 



A FEDERATION OF NATIONS 277 

weaker American government in such a way as 
to threaten the integrity of the Monroe doctrine, 
have we not an "entangling alliance" on hand? 
If Germany emerges from the present war strong 
enough to threaten the world as before the war, 
when other nations found it necessary to form 
ententes against her, we shall not dare remain 
outside of some kind of alliance that will be 
formed to check her pretensions. World federa- 
tion is the guaranty against the formation of 
"entangling alliances" on the part of the United 
States. 

In drawing the parallels between the forma- 
tion of our union and the possible creation of a 
federation of nations, it is hard to avoid the infer- 
ence that the two systems lead to the same end, 
federated general government. And yet they 
are not the same. Our union was created to take 
over a large area of government which the indi- 
vidual states could not conduct successfully. It 
has a direct bearing on the citizens of the states, 
it even has its own citizenship, although it was a 
long time after 1787 before it was defined. It 
has popular elections, a postal system, and hun- 
dreds of other things which no one would allot to 



278 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

the kind of federation discussed here. It has 
been cited only for the argument that can legiti- 
mately be derived from analogous conditions re- 
lating to the difficulties of forming the union. 

A world federation, on the other hand, could 
have only one main purpose, the preservation of 
peace. No other bonds should knit it together 
except those which exist for that purpose. They 
would be strong enough for the strain that would 
be put upon them, and no stronger. They would 
be made for a specific object by persons who 
would be careful that they were properly made. 
A federation of this kind could not be adopted 
until it was approved by the authorities in the 
constituent nations, which would guarantee that 
it did not sacrifice the individuality of those 
nations. In fact, so great would be the obstacles 
at this point that it is safe to say that there would 
be more danger that the federation would be too 
weak rather than that it would be too strong. 

Here ends this statement of the arguments for 
the only possible plan of cooperation that will, if 
adopted, give the world enduring peace. It 
would be easier to form a league to enforce peace 



A FEDERATION OF NATIONS 279 

by arbitration and moral suasion than to form a 
federation with power sufficient to enforce its 
decrees. But a league would in all probability 
be flouted by the states as often as their interests 
seemed to them to make it advisable. Reverting 
to the analogy of our own formative period in 
national government, a league would be like our 
articles of confederation, weak and insufficient 
because they did not authorize the central govern- 
ment to coerce a recalcitrant state. As a step 
toward a more desirable end the articles of fed- 
eration were worth while: as a similar step a 
league of nations might be better than nothing, 
but it would not lead to the end to which the 
world is looking. 

The idea of a federation of nations has been 
behind many a philosopher's dream. Jesus 
looked forward to it when he offered the world 
"my peace," and many another has held that 
somewhere in the shadowy future a millennial era 
of super-government and peace will fall upon 
the earth. It would be a great thing if at this 
day we could take a step toward the realization 
of an ideal whose universality attests its desir- 
ability. The "fruits of Waterloo" were lost a 



280 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 

century ago by a wide margin, due to the less per- 
fect comprehension the world then had of the 
advantages of federated peace. If they are lost 
at the end of this war it will be by a smaller 
discrepancy. Some time they will be secured, 
not because men have dreamed of them ; but be- 
cause, in such a case at least, dreams are but "sup- 
pressed desires." 

The writer of a book can do no more than raise 
his voice to the people who do things. To that 
large class who make things happen he can only 
give impulse and hope. His cry goes to those 
who govern, to those who direct the press, and to 
all citizens who feel responsibility for the forma- 
tion of good public opinion. If he speaks to 
them faithfully and without prejudice or mere 
enthusiasm, he has done all he can do. The re- 
sults are on the knees of the gods. 



INDEX 



Adams John Quincy and the 
Monroe Doctrine, 79. 

Agadir, 171. 

Aix-la-Chapelle, Conference of, 
66. 

Albania, in the Balkan war of 
1912-1913, 89, 125, 126; or- 
igin of, 106, 108, 121. 

Alexander I, of Russia, 155; 
his peace plans, 36, 45-63; 
his personal qualities, 46; his 
education, 46-48; and the 
Treaty of Tilsit, 49; eyes 
opened to Napoleon, 50; his 
friendship for France, 51 ; 
"grouped" by Castlereagh, 
52; signs treaty of Chau- 
mont, 52; enters Paris in 
1814, 54; at Congress of 
Vienna, 55; and Poland, 56; 
and the Holy Alliance, 59- 
64; and Baroness Kriidener, 
60; and the Conference of 
Aix-la-Chapelle, 66; at Con- 
ference at Troppau, 68-70; 
his change of policy, 70; and 
the Greek war of indepen- 
dence, 77; and a federation 
of nations, 263. 

Algeciras, Conference at, 168 

Alliance, the Treaty of, 65; the 
Quadruple, 65, 66, 67; the 
Quintuple, 66, 67, 68, 69, 79; 



disruption of, 69. See Holy 
Alliance. 

Alsace and Lorraine, 92. 

American Peace Society, 37. 

Armageddon, 1-5, 15. 

Austria and the Greek war of 
independence, 77; and the 
revolution of 1848, 86; and 
Congress of Berlin, 89, 113, 
114; and Balkan War of 
1912-1913, 89; and the Triple 
Alliance, 93; acquires rights 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
115; and the revolt in Crete, 
119; takes over Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 120; interest in 
the Balkan War of 1912- 
1913, 124-126, 128. See Met- 
ternich. 

Austria-Hungary, see Austria. 

Autocracy, an obstacle to per- 
manent peace, 216-224; qual- 
ities of, 217; in Germany, 219, 
220-222; in Russia, 219; fu- 
ture bearing of German fi- 
nances on, 242-246. 

Balance of Power, 90; under 
Bismarck's policy, 93; after 
Bismarck, 96; affected by the 
Entente Cordiale, 99; by the 
Triple Entente, 100, 101. 

Balance of Power, failure of the 



281 



282 



INDEX 



theory, 157, 162; breaks down 
in practice, 234-236. 

Balkan States, history of, 103- 
131; Turkish rule over, 104; 
spirit of nationality in, 108; 
growing power of, 119; a 
"tinder-box," 120; the war 
against Turkey, 122-127; The 
Balkan League, 122. 

Balkan War of 1912-1913, 89. 

Belgium, and the revolution of 
1830, 79. 

Bentham, Jeremy, on perpetual 
peace, 32-34; and a federa- 
tion of nations, 263. 

Berlin, Congress of, 89. 

Bethman-Hollweg, and the 
Moroccan question, 171. 

Bismarck, builder of the Ger- 
man Empire, 91 ; policy to- 
wards France, 92, 93; and 
the Three Emperors' League, 
93; and the Triple Alliance, 
93-94 ; his retirement, 95, 143 ; 
his German policy, 140-143; 
not for Pan-Germanism, 148; 
his foreign policy, 157. 

Boer war, Germany's attitude 
in, 97, 99. 

Bosnia, 108; Austria acquires 
rights in, 115; taken over by 
Austria, 120, 121. 

Brailsford, H. N., his idea of a 
league of nations, 260. 

Bryce, Lord, attitude toward 
federated peace, 15. 

Bulgaria, origin of, 105, 106; its 
position under Turkey, 108; 
national feeling in, 109; at 
the Conference of Paris, 110; 
in the war of 1877, 113; "Big 



Bulgaria," 114; acquires East 
Rumelia, 117; growing power 
of, 119; declares complete in- 
dependence, 120; in the Bal- 
kan War of 1912-1913, 122- 
127. 
Biilow, Chancellor von, 171. 

Canning, George, and the Span- 
ish Colonies, 78 ; and the Mon- 
roe Doctrine, 79; welcomes 
end of the Alliance, 83. 

Carnegie Endowment for Inter- 
national Peace, 38. 

Cartels, compared with trusts, 
xiii-xvi. 

Castlereagh, Lord, 154; his rela- 
tions with Alexander I, 51; 
and treaty of Chaumont, 52; 
goes to Paris, 55; his idea of 
the Concert of Europe, 65; 
and the Treaty of Alliance, 
65-67 ; at Troppau, 68, 69 ; his 
relation to the Concert of Eu- 
rope, 74; his object, 81. 

Chaumont, Treaty of, 52-53; 
Castlereagh on the application 
of, 69. 

"Christian Republic" of Henry 
IV, 24, 25. 

Concentration, laws of, in so- 
ciety, xii-xvi; progress of, 
247-251. 

Concert of Europe, theory of, 
49, 53, 65; its character, 81; 
its condition after the end of 
the Alliance, 84; and the 
struggle of Mehemet Ali, 85; 
and the Crimean War, 86; 
and other mid-century wars, 
88; and Congress of Berlin, 



INDEX 



283 



89; and the Balkan War of 
1912-1913, 89, 124-127; its 
new meaning, 90; and the 
revolution of the Greeks, 107; 
and the Crimean War, 110; 
defied by Moldavia and Wal- 
lachia, 111; and the Congress 
of Berlin, 114, 116; and 
Crete, 118; defied by Balkan 
League, 123; incompetent to 
deal with the situation of 
1913-1914, 130; and the Mo- 
roccan incidents, 167-173; 
failure of, in 1914, 180-182, 
201, 234-236. 

Conference of Paris, see Paris. 

Congo, French, given up, 172. 

Congress of Berlin, 89, 113. 

Congress of Vienna, disappoint- 
ments of the, 55; cause of its 
failure, 58. 

Congress of London on Balkan 
situation, 1913, 124. 

Contract theory of the origin of 
the state, 232-234. 

Crete, revolt in, 118. 

Crimean War, 86, 109. 

Cuza, John, 111. 

Cyprus, handed over to Great 
Britain, 116. 

Debt, public, makes for feder- 
ation, 238-242. 

Delcasse, Theophile, his foreign 
policy, 98, 100, 101, 163-168; 
and the Fashoda incident, 
162; building up French colo- 
nial power, 163-168; dismissed 
at the demand of Germany, 
167. 

Democracy, not an absolute 



safeguard against recurring 

wars, 223. 
Dual Alliance, 95, 96. 
Dueling, how abolished, 232. 
Dum-dum bullets, 3, 5. 

Economic competition as an ob- 
stacle to peace, 206-211. 

Economic laws not unchange- 
able, 210; sometimes opposed 
to nationality, 216. 

England, see Great Britain. 

"Entangling alliances" and a 
federation, 276. 

Entente Cordiale, The, formed, 
99, 162. 



Fashoda Incident, the, 98, 162. 

Federation, definition of, 23. 

Federation of Nations, why it 
would now have better chance 
of success than in 1815-1818, 
72-76; discussion, 261-264; 
why a federation is better 
than a league, 261-273; anal- 
ogy with the American con- 
stitution, 267-276; differences 
pointed out, 277 ; the idea held 
up, 278-280; arguments for, 
229-253. 

Ferdinand, Crown Prince of 
Austria, 178, 180. 

Fez, the French in, 171. 

Finances, national debts make 
for federation, 238-242, 275. 

France, attitude toward feder- 
ated peace, 15; Alexander I's 
friendship for, 51-53; and the 
Spanish colonies, 78 ; the revo- 
lution of 1830, 79; and the 



INDEX 



wars of Mehemet Ali, 85 ; and 
the revolution of 1848, 86; 
and the Crimean War, 86; 
War against Prussia, 188; in 
Franco-Prussian War, 91 ; 
later relations with Germany, 
91; new attitude towards 
Great Britain, 97; influence 
of Delcasse, 98; and Entente 
Cordiale, 99; and Triple En- 
tente, 100; and the revolu- 
tion of the Greeks, 107; ex- 
tends rule over Tunis, 116; in 
Franco-Prussian War, 141 ; 
military training in, 147; for- 
eign policy under Delcasse, 
163-168; in Morocco, 164, 166- 
173; gives up the Congo for 
Morocco, 172; her position 
after war with Prussia, 201; 
future relations with Great 
Britain, 250. 

Francis Joseph, of Austria, 178. 

Franco-Prussian War, 88; and 
the Balance of Power, 90. 

Franklin, Benjamin, his propo- 
sal for union, 266. 

Frederick William III and the 
Holy Alliance, 62. 

Freedom of the seas, 159. 

Gentz, Frederick von, on the 
Congress of Vienna, 55-57, 58. 

George, Lloyd, attitude toward 
federated peace 15. 

Gerard, James W., xiii. 

Germany, attitude of, toward 
federated peace, 13; opposed 
plans of Hague Conference, 
38; and the revolutions of 
1848, 86; under Bismarck's 



policy, 93-95; under his suc- 
cessors, 95; policy during the 
Boer War, 97; growing an- 
tagonism toward Great Brit- 
ain, 97; later relations with 
Austria, 91; and Three Em- 
perors' League, 93; his influ- 
ence for peace, 94, 95; under 
his successors, 94; attitude 
during the Boer War, 99; 
gets nothing at the Congress 
of Berlin, 117; and the Balkan 
War of 1912-1913, 125, 128; 
ideals and organization of, 
132-153; her broken faith, 
132-134; and Mittel-Europa, 
134; a better Germany, 134, 
136, 146-148; development of 
pernicious ideals in, 136-138; 
under the heel of Napoleon, 
138; re-making the army of 
Prussia, 139; under Bis- 
marck's lead, 140-143; Kultur 
of, 144; and Militarism, 146- 
148; the work of intellectual 
leaders, 148-152; national ego- 
tism, 153; peaceful attitude 
under Bismarck, 157; under 
Wilhelm II, 158; growth of 
manufactures, 158; building 
a navy, 159; growing military 
power of, 160; Pan-German 
hopes, 161; isolated by Del- 
casse during the Boer War, 
162; eyes turned to Turkey, 
165; in the Moroccan inci- 
dents, 166-173; attempt to 
win over Great Britain, 174; 
alarmed by growing power of 
rivals, 176; her plans in be- 
ginning the Great War, 177; 



INDEX 



285 



short-sighted policy in war, 
182, 183; a mild treatment 
after her defeat, 194, 196-202; 
economic reasons for engag- 
ing in war, 209; autocracy in, 
219, 220-222, 224; parties in, 
225; influence of munition 
makers, 226; influence of the 
military men, 227; future in- 
fluences on surrounding na- 
tions, 235-240; future rela- 
tions with Austria, 237-239; 
influences of finances, 238- 
242 ; autocracy threatened, 
242-246; in a possible league 
of peace, 258 ; reasons for op- 
posing, 259. See also Bis- 
marck; see Prussia. 

Grand Design, of Henry IV, 24, 
25. 

Great Britain, attitude toward 
federated peace, 15; attitude 
towards peace in the Napol- 
eonic wars, 45; approached by 
Alexander I to establish a 
peace agreement, 48; and the 
Spanish American colonies, 
78; and Turkey, 85; and the 
Crimean War, 86; and the 
Conference of Paris of 1856, 
87; policy during Bismarck's 
era, 96; new attitude towards 
Germany, 96; new attitude to- 
wards France, 97; forms the 
Entente Cordiale, 99; and the 
revolution of the Greeks, 107; 
in the Crimean War, 109; at 
the conference of Paris, 110; 
influence over Turkey, 112, 
115-117; at Congress of Ber- 
lin, 113, 115-117; and Cyprus, 



116; and Suez Canal, 116; in 
Persia, 128, 174; imperiled by 
German success, 133, 134; 
former isolation in Europe, 
157; and the German naval 
program, 159; reenters Conti- 
nental politics, 162; position 
in Egypt recognized, 166; 
supports France in third 
Moroccan incident, 172; nec- 
essary for her to enter the 
war, 182; probable course if 
Russia becomes aggressive, 
202; future relations with 
France, 250. 

Greece and Balkan War of 
1912-1913, 89. 

Greece, beginnings of modern, 
107; the revolt against Tur- 
key, 107; acquires Thessaly, 
117; and Cretan revolution, 
118; growing power of, 120; 
in the Balkan War of 1912- 
1913, 122-127. 

Greek war of independence, 77. 



Hague Conferences to promote 

peace, the, 37. 
Hague tribunal and the Mo- 
roccan question, 169. 
Hatred as an implement in war, 

195-197. 
Hegel, his relation to the peace 

plans, 35; philosophy of war, 

35, 220. 
Henry IV, his Grand Design, 

24. 
Hertling, Chancellor von, on 

federated peace, 13. 
Herzegovina, 108; Austria ac- 



286 



INDEX 



quires rights in, 115; taken 
over by Austria, 120, 121. 
Holy Alliance, 36; history of, 
59-64 ; terms of, 61 ; discussed, 
62-64; compared with the 
Treaty of Alliance, 66; taken 
up by Metternich, 72. 

Internationalism, 10-12. 

Italy, attitude toward federated 
peace, 15; wars for libera- 
tion, 88; and the Triple Alli- 
ance, 93; and her right to 
Tripoli, 164; weakened rela- 
tion with the Triple Alliance, 
164, 174; war in Tripoli, 174. 

Japan — effect of her war with 
Russia, 99; alliance with 
Great Britain, 100. 

Junkers, character of, 141, 145. 
See Autocracy. 

Kant, Immanuel, his plan for 
peace, 34; error in his theory, 
232-234; and a federation of 
nations, 263. 

Krudener, Baroness, 60. 

Kultur, discussion of, 144-146. 

La Harpe, Frederic C6sar de, 
46, 47, 48, 50. 

League, definition of, 23. 

League of peace, probable 
working of, 257-261. See 
Federation of Nations. 

"League to Enforce Peace," 
formed in 1915, 39. 

Lincoln, President, his way of 
dealing with conquered peo- 
ple, 195. 



Mars, his Day, 6, 20. 

Maryland, hesitating to accept 
union, 271. 

Mehemet Ali, 84-86. 

Metternich, Prince, 154, and 
the Holy Alliance, 62; and 
the Treaty of Alliance, 65 ; on 
the situation in Naples, 67; 
at Troppau, 68; gets support 
of Alexander I, 70-72; and 
the Greek war of independ- 
ence, 77; end of his power, 
83; his influence not existent 
to-day, 264-276. 

Military Class in Germany, in- 
fluence of, 227. 

Mittel-Europa, 134, 141, 177, 
185; its strength, if estab- 
lished, 185; how to prevent 
its formation, 186; future of, 
237. 

Moldavia, 105, 110; united with 
Wallachia, 111. 

Monroe Doctrine, 79. 

Montenegro, origin of, 106, 
108; opens the Balkan War, 
123; takes Scutari, 124, 126. 

Morocco, French rights in, 164; 
position of, 166; German in- 
terference in, 167-173. 

Munition makers, influence of, 
226. 

Naples, revolution in, 67, 73, 76. 

Napoleon I, repressing his 
spirit, 18; hatred felt for, 43; 
and Russia in 1807, 49; his 
severe treatment of Prussia, 
138-140. 

Napoleonic wars, and perma- 
nent peace, 17-21. 



INDEX 



287 



Nationality, an obstacle to per- 
manent peace, 214. 
Nicholas II, of Russia, 37. 
Novi-Bazar, sanjak of, 122. 

Obstacles to permanent peace, 
205-228. 



Pan-Germanism, 148, 161; be- 
hind the Great War, 177-179. 

Panther, the, at Agadir, 171. 

Paris, conference of, 86-110; 
Declaration of, 87. 

Patriotism, false, an obstacle 
to peace, 211. 

Peace Societies, development 
of, 37. 

Penn, William, his plan for 
peace, 26, 32. 

Persia, occupied by Great Brit- 
ain and Russia, 128, 174. 

Phillips, W. A., on the Quad- 
ruple Alliance, 67. 

Pitt, William, reception of 
Alexander I's suggestions, 
47, 48, 65. 

Poland, Alexander I's support 
of, 56; revolution in, 80. 

Prussia, supported peace pol- 
icy of tsar in 1815, 17; war 
against Austria, 88, 91; 
against France, 91; creates 
the German Empire, 91. See 
Germany, Holy Alliance, and 
Frederick William III. 

Quadruple Alliance. See Alli- 
ance. 

Quintuple Alliance. See Alli- 
ance. 



Revolutionary movement of 
1830, 79-80. 

Rousseau, his plan for peace, 
31, 35. 

Rumania, origin of 105, 106; 
under Russian protection, 
108; national feeling in, 109; 
Russian protectorate abol- 
ished, 110; union of Moldavia 
and Wallachia, 111; in the 
war of 1877, 113; growing 
power of, 120; enters the 
Balkan War of 1912-1913, 
127. 

Russia, recent progress of 
events in, 8-11; friendly to 
peace under Alexander I, 17- 
19, 45; and the Greek war of 
independence, 77; and Tur- 
key, 84; in the Crimean War, 
86, 109; and war of 1877, 88; 
and Bismarck, 93; and Dual 
Alliance with France, 95; 
effect of Russo-Japanese war, 
99; enters Triple Entente, 
100; and the revolution of 
the Greeks, 107; nourishes 
Balkan hopes, 109; at the 
Conference of Paris, 110; war 
against Turkey in 1877, 112; 
her hopes for a "Big Bul- 
garia," 114; unable to aid 
Serbia in 1908, 121; and the 
Balkan War of 1912-1913, 
126-128; in Persia, 128, 174; 
possible future aggression of, 
202; autocracy in, 219; un- 
certain part in the future, 
236. See Alexander I. 

San Stefano, treaty of, 88, 113. 



288 



INDEX 



Scharnhorst, military reforms 
in Prussia, 140. 

Serbia, in Balkan War of 
1912-1913, 89; origin of, 105, 
106; desire for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 108, 115; na- 
tional feeling in, 109; be- 
comes autonomous, 108; in 
the war of 1877, 113; growing 
power of, 120; and Austria's 
assumption of power in Bos- 
nia and Herzegovina, 120- 
122; in the Balkan War of 
1912-1913, 122-127. 

"Self-preservation, the law of," 
212. 

Shuster, Morgan W., 175. 

South, reconstruction of not a 
model for Germany, 194, 196- 
199. 

Spain, revolution in, 67, 73, 76; 
Alexander I and, 77; revolu- 
tion of its colonies, 77, 78. 

St. Pierre, Abbe" Castel de, 27- 
29, 263. 

Stein, Baron vom, 168. 

Submarines, and the United 
States, 183; if they succeed, 
184; if they fail, 185-204. 

Suez Canal, 116. 

Sully, Duke of, 24. 



Tariffs and obstacles to per- 
petual peace, 207-209. 

Three Emperors' League, the, 
93, 142, 157. 

Tilsit, Treaty of, 49. 

Treaty of Alliance, the, 65. 

Treitschke, Heinrich von, his 
ability, 149; his ideals, 150, 



177; his influence, 151; his 
histories, 151. 

Triple Alliance formed, 93, 
142, 157; its influence, 95, 
157; balanced by the Triple 
Entente, 101, 102; weakened 
by Italy, 164, 174, 201. 

Triple Entente formed, 100; its 
influence, 162, 173, 174. 

Tripoli, 164. 

Troppau, conference at, 67, 68, 
69, 71, 72, 74. 

Trusts compared with cartels 
xiii-xvi. 

Turkey and the Greek war of 
independence, 77; and Me- 
hemet Ali, 84-86; and the 
Crimean War, 86; and war 
of 1877, 88; rule over Balkan 
States, 104; revolt of Greece 
against, 107; and Crimean 
war, 109-111; under British 
influence, 112; war of 1877, 
112; and Crete, 118; and the 
Balkan War of 1912-1913, 
122-127; position of in 1913, 
128; approaching friendship 
with Germany, 165; and the 
war in Tripoli, 174. 

Turks, conquer Constantinople, 
104; hold on the Balkans, 
104. See Turkey. 

"Turks, the Young," 123. 

Tunis, under French rule, 116, 
164. 

Union, the American, as a 
model for a federation of na- 
tions, 265. 

United States, the, their part 
in the Great War, 189-193; 



INDEX 



289 



constitution of, the adoption 
of, 267-276; an "experi- 
ment," 267. See Union, the 
American. 

Venezelos, Eleutherios, 118. 
Vienna, threatened by Turks, 
104. 

Wallachia, 105, 110; united 

with Moldavia, 111. 
War, the Great, the real cause 

of, 154-156; and Pan-Ger- 



manism, 177, 178, 179; the 
beginning of, 177-179; the 
changing character of, 188. 

Wilhelm I, 142; II, ideals of, 
142; his part in the war, 143; 
his character, 158; changed 
German policy under, 158- 
160; lands in Tangiers, 167; 
his sons uninjured in the 
war, 223. 

Wilson, Woodrow, his attitude 
toward a federated peace, v, 
12; address of January 22, 
1917, 12; peace views of, 192. 



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